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FOREWORD 
We are a diverse nation  and have always been so. In recent decades our national, 
ethnic, and religious diversity have increased with the growing numbers of people 
who have come from abroad to make Ireland their home – either temporary or 
permanent. People migrate to Ireland for many different reasons – to study in our 
world-renowned higher education sector; to work in the many sectors of our 
growing economy; to join family members who already live here; or to seek refuge 
from war or persecution. Whatever their reasons for coming, their presence brings 
a welcome diversity to our shores, enriching our culture, society and economy and 
creating new bonds of friendship and kinship. 
 
For newcomers, integrating into Irish society means nothing more, and nothing 
less, than being able to participate in life here in Ireland in the ways that they need 
to and want to. For many people, this process of integration may occur without 
undue stress or difficulty. Others, especially perhaps those with poor English 
language skills, may find it harder to navigate life in Ireland and may need 
additional supports. 
 
Measuring integration outcomes on a regular basis is essential for us to know how 
different groups are faring, and where extra supports may be needed to help 
people to integrate successfully. Our overall approach to integration policy – as set 
out in our national Migrant Integration Strategy 2017-2020 – is built on 
mainstreaming. That is, migrants access public services on the same basis as 
citizens, with additional supports being provided for specific groups based on 
identified need. This approach is aligned with key principles of equality and non-
discrimination. However, it does rely on regular monitoring to identify any 
differential outcomes among migrants as compared to the native population. This 
can allow us to see where services may need to adapt, or additional supports be 
provided to enable migrants to participate fully in our economy and society.  
 
This Monitoring report finds that, overall, migrants to Ireland are integrating well 
across the range of indicators examined, which covers education, employment, 
social inclusion and active citizenship. This is encouraging and we must ensure to 
maintain our success here and expand our good practice. However, the report also 
identifies specific challenges faced by some groups, some of which have persisted 
over many Monitoring reports. We clearly need to consider new approaches to 
tackle these persistent challenges.  
 
In line with our Programme for Government commitment, I will initiate a process 
to develop a successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy in the months ahead. 
Implementation of the current Strategy will continue pending the adoption by 
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Government of its successor. This Integration Monitor provides a key part of the 
evidence base we require to ensure the successor strategy is well targeted and 
effective. 
 
We may also have new challenges to address. The data analysed for this report 
precedes the COVID-19 pandemic, which is known to have exacerbated existing 
inequalities here as in other countries. I welcome the simultaneous publication of 
a short report analysing the impact of the pandemic on migrants to accompany this 
Monitor. 
 
As Minister with responsibility for integration, I am currently leading two major 
policy initiatives that are interlinked with migrant integration. Firstly, I am 
preparing a new policy on accommodation and support services for international 
protection applicants. The new policy will mark an end to Direct Provision and 
replace it with a new human rights centred, not-for-profit approach. Secondly, the 
independent Anti-Racism Committee that was established in June 2020 under the 
previous Government will now report to me. This Committee is tasked with 
developing a new National Action Plan Against Racism for recommendation to 
Government in 2021.  
 
I welcome this Monitoring Report on Integration, which has been produced under 
the ESRI’s Equality and Integration Research Programme, which is funded by my 
Department. I am pleased to support this research, which provides essential 
evidence for integration policy.  
 
Roderic O’Gorman 
Minister for Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth 
December 2020 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
INTRODUCTION 
Integration not only allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, 
cultural and political life of their host country, but is also important for social 
cohesion and inclusive growth. This report considers how non-Irish nationals are 
integrating into Irish society. Specifically, it considers how non-Irish nationals 
compare to the Irish population in terms of employment rates, educational 
qualifications, income and poverty rates, health outcomes, housing and 
participation in Irish political life. 
 
The 2020 Monitoring Report on Integration is the seventh in a series of Integration 
Monitors published since 2011, the most recent of which was published in 2018.2 
The Monitor aims to measure the integration of immigrants into Irish society in 
four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and 
active citizenship. It is based on indicators proposed at the European Ministerial 
Conference on Integration held in Zaragoza in 2010. These indicators are 
comparable across European Union (EU) Member States and focused on 
integration outcomes. The indicators were selected partly due to the availability of 
data on these indicators across European Union (EU) Member States which allows 
for comparison both across states and over time. Monitoring provides both 
policymakers and the general public with facts to assess integration outcomes and 
respond to policy challenges.  
 
The context in Ireland is rather different from that in which the 2018 Monitor was 
published, set against a backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, Black Lives Matter 
protests in the United States and elsewhere, and Brexit. The COVID-19 pandemic 
and associated restrictions in Ireland will cause serious challenges for migrants, as 
for many other groups. The analysis in this publication predates COVID-19 but will 
reflect on some of those likely challenges where relevant. This report documents 
the situation pre-pandemic: an accompanying report provides an initial analysis of 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on non-Irish nationals in Ireland (Enright et 
al., 2020). Of course, any understanding of the impact of the pandemic and 
associated labour market shock will be informed by the situation of non-Irish 
nationals prior to the pandemic. 
 
Migrants to Ireland are diverse in terms of country of origin, and outcomes vary 
across groups. This summary focuses on overall differences between Irish and 
 
                                                            
 
2  https://www.esri.ie/publications/monitoring-report-on-integration-2018. 
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non-Irish nationals: individual chapters give more information on differences 
between national groups – UK, EU-West, EU-East and non-EU nationals.3 Key 
indicators at a glance are presented in Table A. 
INTEGRATION MONITOR: KEY FINDINGS 
In 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Irish labour market was showing 
signs of continued recovery from the economic shock of the Great Recession (2008-
2012) (Bergin et al., 2020). Overall, employment rates have increased, and 
unemployment decreased significantly in the period 2013-2019. Chapter 2 shows 
that both employment and labour market activity rates were slightly higher among 
non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals (see Table A). The unemployment rate had 
continued to fall for both Irish and non-Irish nationals since 2017; and in the first 
quarter of 2019, at just over 5 per cent, the unemployment rate was very similar 
for both groups. In other European countries, unemployment is typically higher 
among immigrants than natives, but this was not the case in Ireland in 2019.  
 
There are important differences in the labour market outcomes for different 
groups of non-Irish nationals. The African unemployment rate is 12 per cent 
compared to an average of around 5-6 per cent for Irish nationals and other non-
Irish groups. This pattern has persisted throughout the recession and recovery. 
 
Chapter 3 compares educational qualifications among Irish and non-Irish adults in 
2018-2019 and presents academic achievement scores at age 15 (see Table A). A 
higher proportion of non-Irish than Irish nationals aged 25 to 34 had third-level 
educational qualifications (60 per cent non-Irish versus 53 per cent Irish). The 
proportion of young adults (aged 20-24) who had left school before finishing upper 
secondary education was similar between the two groups. At around 4 per cent of 
the age cohort, the share of early leavers is very low (see Table A). When we 
compare educational qualifications for non-Irish adults who received their 
qualifications in Ireland (22 per cent) with those educated abroad (78 per cent), for 
the most part the pattern of qualifications is similar, regardless of where education 
was completed. The exception is the diverse ‘Rest of the World’ group (non-EU 
countries excluding Asia), where those educated in Ireland have lower rates of 
third-level education than nationals from this group educated abroad. 
 
Around 18 per cent of students taking the Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) test in 2018 in Ireland were from an immigrant background, 
10 per cent first-generation immigrants (born abroad) and 8 per cent classified as 
 
                                                            
 
3  EU-West refers to the ‘old’ Member States, prior to enlargement in 2004, excluding the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Ireland. EU-East refers to the ‘new’ Member States that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013. Where numbers permit, 
non-EU nationals are further divided based on broad region of origin. 
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second-generation immigrants (born in Ireland of immigrant parents). As in 
previous Monitors, home language is salient for achievement scores, for both first- 
and second-generation immigrants. Comparing English reading, we find immigrant 
students from English-speaking backgrounds do not differ from their Irish peers, 
but immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds have lower mean scores 
at age 15 (see Table A). Mathematics and Science scores between the groups are 
much smaller and not statistically significant (see Chapter 3).  
 
Income, poverty, health and homeownership are used as core indicators of social 
inclusion in Chapter 4. The median annual net income for non-Irish nationals in 
2017/2018 was lower than that of Irish nationals, and the ‘at risk of poverty’ rate, 
at 18 per cent, was higher for non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals (just under 
15 per cent) (see Table A).  
 
The consistent poverty rate, which takes into account the experience of 
deprivation as well as income poverty, was similar for Irish nationals and all non-
Irish nationals in this period (just over 6 per cent for both groups), and had fallen 
since 2016.4 The consistent poverty rate for non-EU nationals, was higher than for 
Irish nationals, at 12 per cent, but much lower than in 2016 (see Chapter 4). 
 
As before, non-Irish nationals tend to report better health than Irish nationals, 
though Chapter 4 discusses how this difference is primarily linked to age and 
education. Rates of homeownership were much, much lower among non-Irish than 
Irish nationals in 2017/2018 (Table A). Chapter 4 shows how over half of non-Irish 
nationals in 2017/2018 lived in private rented accommodation, compared to 11 
per cent of Irish people.  
 
Very significant changes have been seen in the active citizenship domain in the last 
decade. Three indicators are used to assess active citizenship: the share of 
immigrants who have acquired citizenship; the share of immigrants holding 
permanent or long-term residence permits; and the share of immigrants among 
elected representatives (see Table A).  
 
Between 2005 and end-2019, just under 110,000 non-EEA nationals aged 16 and 
over naturalised. With a new adjustment using the 2016 Census microdata and 
based on a 10 per cent outflow of naturalised migrants, we estimate that the 
number naturalised who stayed in Ireland represents up to 37 per cent of the 
 
                                                            
 
4  The at risk of poverty rate, which refers to the percentage of a group falling below 60 per cent of the median equivalised 
disposable income, is the official poverty threshold used by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and agreed at EU level. 
‘Consistent poverty’ combines at risk of poverty with enforced deprivation of two or more of a range of items.  
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population of non-EEA origin resident at end 2019. While the numbers of non-EEA 
nationals acquiring citizenship has fallen sharply since the 2012 peak, 
naturalisation is rising rapidly among EEA nationals. In 2019, around half of 
naturalisations were to residents of EEA origin, and the top nationalities acquiring 
Irish citizenship were Polish, followed by UK nationals (see Chapter 5). While rising 
rapidly, those naturalising represent a very small proportion of the total EEA 
population living in Ireland.  
 
TABLE A  KEY INTEGRATION INDICATORS AT A GLANCE 
 Irish Non-Irish 
Employment (working age) 2019   
Employment Rate 69% 73% 
Unemployment Rate 5% 6% 
Activity Rate 72% 77% 
Education    
Share of 25-34 age group with third-level education  
(2018-2019 pooled) 53.0% 60.0% 
Share of early leavers from education (20-24 age group)  
(2018-2019 pooled) 4.3% 3.7% 
Mean English reading scores at age 15 (2018) 522 
1st gen, English Speakers: 526;  
1st gen non-English Speakers: 500 
2nd gen, English Speakers: 514;  
2nd gen non-English Speakers: 494 
Mean Mathematics score at age 15 (2018) 502 
1st gen, English Speakers: 498;  
1st gen non-English Speakers: 501 
2nd gen, English Speakers: 492;  
2nd gen non-English Speakers: 491 
Social Inclusion (2017 and 2018 pooled)   
Median annual net income (needs adjusted) €22,125 €19,869 
At risk of poverty rate 14.5% 18.3% 
Consistent poverty rate 6.2% 6.5% 
Share of population (aged 16+) perceiving their health as 
good or very good 83.1% 87.7% 
Proportion of households that are property owners 78.4% 28.3% 
Active Citizenship (end-2019)   
Annual citizenship acquisition rate (non-EEA adults who 
acquired citizenship in 2019 as share of non-EEA nationals 
holding ‘live’ immigration permissions) 
 1.5% 
Ratio of non-EEA nationals who acquired citizenship since 
2005 to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA 
origin at end-2019 (adjusted*) 
 37.0% 
Share of non-EEA adults with live residence permissions 
holding long-term residence  0.7% 
Share of immigrants among elected local representatives 
(2019)  0.7% 
 
Sources:  LFS Q1 2019 for employment indicators; LFS Q1 2018 and Q1 2019 (pooled) for education indicators (except achievement scores, 
which are based on PISA 2018 data); EU-SILC 2017-2018 (pooled) for social inclusion indicators. Citizenship and long-term 
residence indicators: Irish Naturalisation and Citizenship Service, Eurostat. The ratio of non-EEA nationals who acquired 
citizenship since 2005 to the estimated immigrant population of non-EEA origin at end-2019 is adjusted for naturalised persons 
leaving the State (see Chapter 5 for details).  
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Ireland lacks a statutory long-term residence status with clear rights and 
entitlements. The share of non-EEA nationals holding long-term residence permits 
under the current administrative scheme was estimated to be 0.7 per cent at 
year-end 2019. The share of immigrants among elected (local) representatives was 
0.7 per cent. Chapter 5 notes that the lack of political engagement among migrants 
remains a concern, in spite of campaigns to increase political engagement among 
the group.  
FUTURE DATA COLLECTION 
The value of monitoring the integration of migrants will only be as good as the 
evidence on which it is based. One issue in Ireland is how well represented non-
Irish nationals are in social surveys, and who is excluded. Another issue is small 
sample sizes. Immigrant or ethnic minority boost samples would be useful to 
address this problem, particularly for measuring poverty and deprivation. Ireland 
needs a household survey that allows us to track income poverty and material 
deprivation between different non-EU migrant groups. Exploiting administrative 
data sources in areas such as education, health and social welfare would enhance 
our understanding of migrant integration from survey data. Recent initiatives to 
map existing data are promising in this regard (e.g. Fahey et al., 2019a) including 
the equality data audit recently conducted by the Central Statistics Office (Equality 
Data Audit 2020 – CSO, 2020a).  
 
The sizeable group of immigrants who now possess Irish citizenship may be positive 
for their integration into Irish society but means that measuring integration on the 
basis of nationality may exclude an increasing number of naturalised citizens. The 
planned introduction of parents’ country of birth and motives for migration into 
the LFS and the SILC data in Ireland represents an important change that will allow 
us to monitor the outcomes of second-generation adults. Ethnicity remains rarely 
measured in Ireland, in either surveys or administrative data. Yet with evidence of 
discrimination against some minority ethnic groups, particularly the Black ethnic 
group, in various areas of life, and renewed focus in public and policy debate on 
racism and discrimination, collecting data on ethnicity becomes more urgent than 
ever.  
POLICY ISSUES  
The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, represents a significant 
statement of policy intent and brought new energy and focus into efforts to 
integrate migrants in Ireland. The 2019 review of this strategy highlighted 
particular areas where efforts need to be intensified, and additional policy issues 
emerge from findings in this report. As noted by the interim review, given the 
mainstreamed approach to integration in Ireland, implementing the strategy is not 
just the task of the Department responsible for Integration and Equality but of all 
x i i  |  Monitoring report on integration 
relevant government departments and agencies who interact with migrants, 
including Local Authorities. 
 
While there is no difference between the unemployment rate of Irish and non-Irish 
nationals in 2019, the persisting high unemployment and low employment rate 
among African nationals is of concern. Chapter 2, supplemented with other 
research, argues that poorer labour market outcomes among this group are likely 
to be a combination of time spent in the asylum system and not in the labour 
market for those who were seeking protection, and potentially also the experience 
of racism and discrimination in the Irish labour market. In terms of ethnic 
discrimination, the recent establishment of a new anti-racism committee with the 
task of developing an anti-racism strategy is a positive development, though 
specific measures to combat racism and discrimination may be required. The 
recently published report from the Expert Group Report Of The Advisory Group On 
The Provision Of Support Including Accommodation To Persons In The International 
Protection Process recommends promoting the integration of those seeking 
international protection from the earliest stage of the process (Government of 
Ireland, 2020b). It follows that consideration should be given to including this 
group within the remit of the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017-
2020, as those seeking international protection awaiting a decision are not 
included in the current strategy. Initiatives to track integration outcomes of 
refugees and others who came through the protection process would enhance 
integration monitoring for this potentially vulnerable group of migrants. This is not 
currently possible in Ireland. 
 
Chapter 3 notes that a gap remains in English reading outcomes between Irish 
15-year-olds and those from a non-English speaking migrant background, 
consistent with previous Integration Monitors. This underlines the importance of 
monitoring needs, spending and effectiveness of English language tuition in Irish 
schools.  
 
Housing and homelessness are not identified as issues in the Migrant Integration 
Strategy. Yet findings from this Integration Monitor (Chapter 4) suggest that 
migrants are much more likely to be in private rented accommodation than Irish 
nationals, which is a potential problem in the current housing market, where 
private renting is often linked to high and fluctuating rents and insecurity of 
housing tenure. Combined with other research findings on homelessness among 
some non-Irish groups and discrimination against African applicants in the private 
rented market, these findings suggest any future Migrant Integration Strategy 
could and should usefully include a number of actions specifically on housing.  
 
Executive summary | xiii 
Political participation of migrants in Ireland is in principle favourable given 
relatively generous voting rights compared to other EU countries (Huddleston et 
al., 2015). In practice, however, Chapter 5 documents a serious under-
representation of migrant candidates in politics and on the voting register. 
Continued efforts to encourage migrant voter registration and voting, as well as 
participation in clubs and initiatives would potentially both increase migrant 
participation in Irish political life and promote local integration. At both national 
and local level, it is important to keep in mind that integrating migrants is not 
simply a task for government, either at national or local level, but of employers, 
schools, communities, sports and social clubs. As OECD (2020) argues, integration 
requires a ‘whole of society approach’.  
 
The policy gaps and areas of concern highlighted here underscore the importance 
of renewing the Migrant Integration Strategy to keep up the momentum built by 
the current one. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated job losses may prove even 
more challenging for migrants than others, and it is particularly important then 
that their needs are kept in focus by the new government which took office on 
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction, policy and context 
By Frances McGinnity and Shannen Enright 
 
Integration not only allows immigrants to contribute to the economic, social, 
cultural and political life of their host country, but is important for social cohesion 
and inclusive growth. Integration also plays a role in encouraging acceptance of 
immigrants by the host country population. While facilitating migrant integration 
may be challenging for host countries, international evidence shows that the 
consequences of failed integration may be even more challenging, from persistent 
disadvantage through recurring social tension, ghettos and race riots.  
 
The 2020 Monitoring Report on Integration is the seventh in a series of Integration 
Monitors published since 2011, the most recent of which was published in 2018. 
This monitoring exercise is currently funded by the Department of Children, 
Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth in line with the Migrant Integration 
Strategy 2017-2020. The Monitor is part of a broader integration research 
programme funded by the Department of Justice and Equality, which has now 
transferred, with the Integration function, to the Department of Children, Equality, 
Disability, Integration and Youth. The current research programme has funded a 
number of publications to date including an earlier Integration Monitor (McGinnity 
et al., 2018); a report on data for monitoring integration (Fahey et al., 2019a); a 
study of residential distribution of immigrants in Ireland (Fahey et al., 2019b); an 
examination of outcomes by detailed country of birth using Census microdata 
(McGinnity et al., 2020) and mostly recently a review of international practices on 
civics and language courses and tests with policy implications for Ireland (Groarke 
et al., 2020). 
 
The Monitor aims to measure the integration of immigrants into Irish society in 
four key domains or policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and 
active citizenship. Monitoring provides both policymakers and the general public 
with facts to assess integration outcomes and respond to policy challenges. 
Integration indicators are not necessarily assessments of integration policy but do 
point to successes and failures which may inform policy (OECD, 2018a). The aim is 
to provide a broad overview, to complement, and in some cases update, more 
detailed studies in particular areas of integration (such as McGinnity et al., 2020; 
Fahey et al., 2019b; Lima, 2020).  
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The context in Ireland is rather different from that in which the 2018 Monitor was 
published, set against a backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, Black Lives Matter 
protests in the United States and elsewhere, and Brexit. The COVID-19 pandemic 
and associated restrictions in Ireland will cause serious challenges for migrants, as 
for many other groups. This report documents the situation pre-pandemic: an 
accompanying report provides an initial analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on non-Irish nationals in Ireland. Of course, any understanding of the 
impact of the pandemic and associated labour market shock will be informed by 
the situation of non-Irish nationals prior to the pandemic. Brexit will also 
undoubtedly prove challenging for Ireland, but analysis of the impact on migrants 
and migration in Ireland will need to await future Monitors, though already we see 
increasing naturalisation of UK migrants. The change of government in June 2020 
and associated restructuring of government departments may also impact the 
nature of integration policy and the priority given to it. Due to this restructuring of 
departments the overall integration policy brief is being transferred to the 
Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth. 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to and context for the indicators. Section 1.1 
considers the challenges of measuring integration and monitoring outcomes, the 
indicators used and the strengths and limitations of the process. Section 1.2 
presents an overview of the main trends in migration in Ireland. Migration is a 
dynamic phenomenon, so these trends will help inform our understanding of both 
the composition of the migrant population and how it is changing over time. The 
Appendix provides some information about the composition of migrants in terms 
of region of origin, duration of residence, age and gender, to set subsequent 
chapters in context.  
 
The structure of this Monitor is designed to replicate that of previous Monitors, in 
order to assess change over time. Unlike previous Monitors, there is no ‘special 
theme’5 chapter, though an accompanying report considers non-Irish nationals and 
the COVID-19 pandemic in Ireland. There are some innovations to individual 
chapters this year. Highlights include: occupation and sector measures in 
Chapter 2, to profile where in the Irish labour market non-Irish nationals are 
working, and give insight into the potential impact of COVID-19; a breakdown of 
whether educational qualifications were acquired in Ireland or acquired abroad, to 
give a better indication of whether and how well the Irish education system is 
integrating non-Irish nationals, and finally in Chapter 5, more discussion of the 
political participation of migrants in Ireland to supplement the core indicators of 
active citizenship.  
 
                                                            
 
5  Special theme chapters use available data to explore a particular issue in depth. 
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1.1 THE BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF MONITORING INTEGRATION 
1.1.1  Defining and measuring integration 
What does it mean to be ‘integrated’ into a society? Being integrated into a country 
can mean different things to different people, and what it means can depend on 
their perspective, what they value and where they are living. Migrants need to ‘find 
a place for themselves’ – find a home, a job, income, schools, access to healthcare 
in their host country – and also where they fit into the social and cultural fabric of 
their destination. Penninx and Garcés-Mascareñas (2016, p.14) suggest integration 
may be defined simply as ‘the process of becoming an accepted part of society’, 
both as an individual and as a group. ‘Becoming’ is important here; Integration may 
actually be best understood as a process that develops over time.  
 
According to the European Union’s 2004 Common Basic Principles of Integration,6 
integration is ‘a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all 
immigrants and residents of Member States’ (see Appendix 1). In Ireland, 
integration is defined as the ‘ability to participate to the extent that a person needs 
and wishes in all major components of society without having to relinquish his or 
her own cultural identity’ (Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 1999 
in Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). 
 
Some domains and outcomes of integration are easier to measure using statistical 
indicators than others: sense of belonging, feelings, identity and involvement in 
communities can be more difficult to capture. Someone may have a high income 
and a great job but still do not feel they ‘belong’ in Ireland. Of course, migrants 
may also differ in the degree to which they feel they should or expect to experience 
a sense of belonging, identity or involvement in the country they migrated to, for 
some this may be more important than others. Migrants can also be performing 
well in one outcome and struggle in another. For this reason, the indicators are not 
combined into one composite ‘integration indicator’ but rather considered 
separately to provide information on different aspects of life. This Monitor 
generates a profile of certain migrant groups as being more or less integrated on a 
number of dimensions, rather than ‘integrated’ or ‘not integrated’. 
 
The outcomes of non-Irish nationals are compared to Irish nationals in this report. 
The social and economic outcomes of Irish nationals are thus used as a benchmark 
for assessing how non-Irish nationals are performing. This is to see in which 
dimensions they differ from Irish nationals, rather than because of a normative 
belief that the outcomes ‘should’ appear the same. An unemployment rate among 
 
                                                            
 
6  Council of the EU (2004), adopted following agreement among EU Member States about the need for more dynamic 
policies to promote the integration of third-country nationals in Member States. 
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non-Irish nationals of 15 per cent means something rather different in one scenario 
– the midst of a recession – if the unemployment rate of Irish nationals is also 
15 per cent, compared to a different scenario, where the unemployment rate of 
Irish nationals is 5 per cent.  
 
One of the EU Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy is the 
understanding that developing clear indicators is necessary to adjust policy and 
evaluate progress on integration (Council of the European Union, 2004). These 
indicators should be based on existing and comparable data for most Member 
States, limited in number, simple to understand and focused on outcomes. This is 
the approach adopted in 2010 by EU Ministers in the Zaragoza Declaration (see 
Section 1.1.2). 
 
Monitoring can be particularly important when approaches to integration are 
mainstreamed within government departments, as opposed to a ‘standalone’ 
dedicated department. Mainstreaming, the policy approach pursued in Ireland 
(Department of Justice and Equality, 2017), can be a very effective policy approach 
to the integration of migrants, particularly in the longer term, but monitoring is 
important in a range of policy domains to ensure the needs of migrants are being 
met. Indeed, the importance of a monitoring exercise like this one is also 
acknowledged in the Migrant Integration Strategy itself (Department of Justice and 
Equality, 2017; 2019a). Without monitoring, the needs of immigrants and whether 
these are being addressed may be ignored (Collett and Petrovic, 2014). 
1.1.2  Integration indicators 
The main aim of this Integration Monitor is to provide a balanced and rigorous 
assessment of the situation of immigrants in Ireland using the most up-to-date and 
reliable data available. The framework for that assessment is based on the set of 
integration indicators known as the ‘Zaragoza indicators’.7 A number of key 
principles guided the choice of these indicators. This section considers some of 
their strengths and limitations.  
 
First, the indicators are largely focused on integration outcomes. For each 
indicator, outcomes for non-Irish nationals are compared with those for the native 
population, in this case the Irish population, as discussed above. The two 
exceptions to this principle of comparing outcomes are the indicators concerning 
 
                                                            
 
7  Adopted in April 2010 by EU Ministers with responsibility for integration at the European Ministerial Conference on 
Integration, Zaragoza, Spain (April 2010) and approved in the Swedish presidency conference conclusions on indicators 
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citizenship and long-term residence (see Table 1.1), which describe the context and 
opportunities for integration rather than measure empirical outcomes. This 
Integration Monitor differs then from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 
(Huddleston et al., 2015) as the MIPEX indicators are designed to assess, compare 
and improve integration policy indicators across EU countries and selected other 
Western countries.8  
 
Second, there are a limited number of core indicators which are largely drawn from 
nationally representative data from ongoing survey exercises already collected. 
This strategy makes them cost-effective, reasonably up-to-date and, in principle, 
highly comparable, but it does have some disadvantages: 
(i)  The indicators principally measure the ‘structural’ dimensions of integration – 
aspects such as labour market outcomes, educational attainment, income and 
poverty. Subjective indicators, such as sense of belonging in Ireland, identity 
or the experience of racism and discrimination are not regularly measured, so 
these are not included as core indicators.  
(ii)  While representative of the population in Ireland as a whole, the existing data 
sources may not be designed to represent and measure outcomes for 
immigrants. This is discussed further in Section 1.1.3. 
(iii)  All of these indicators study integration at the individual level, neglecting the 
role that local communities play in the integration of migrants. Living in a 
disadvantaged, poorly resourced community may be an additional challenge 
to integration. In some countries, migrant communities can be spatially 
segregated in or concentrated in disadvantaged areas. Recent research (Fahey 
et al., 2019b) finds that there is no evidence that migrants in general are 
concentrated in disadvantaged areas in Ireland. However, migrants with poor 
English language skills do tend to live in areas of higher unemployment, 
particularly in the urban areas of Dublin, Cork and Limerick. This report 
measures integration at a national level, though we acknowledge that 
integration often takes place at a local level and can vary across 
neighbourhoods and across regions of the country (see Gilmartin and Dagg, 
2018; 2020). Reference is made to regional variation, where this information 
is available. 
(iv) The focus on nationally representative survey and administrative data means 
the Integration Monitor lacks a sense of the lived experience of integration, 
which is better captured by qualitative work using interviews and case studies 
(for example Lima, 2020; UNHCR, 2014).  
 
 
                                                            
 
8 For more information, see http://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex. 
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A third principle is that indicators should be simple to understand, accessible and 
transparent. Basing indicators on concepts familiar to people as unemployment 
and poverty means they should be meaningful for both policymakers and the 
general public. This transparency requirement also means they need to be defined 
clearly (see Appendix 2).  
 
Of course, the non-Irish population were typically raised and educated in a 
different environment, speaking a different language. They tend to be younger 
than the Irish population. Typically, but not always, integration outcomes improve 
the longer migrants have lived in a country. For this reason, Chapter 1 Appendix 
presents a profile of the different regional groups, to help understand group 
differences. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, some statistical modelling is used to check the 
role of background characteristics in understanding outcomes. Modelling is not a 
key part of this monitoring exercise though, as the focus is on a broad range of 
‘headline’ indicators that are easy to understand.  
 
Finally, the indicators are designed to be comparable over time, to allow for 
monitoring change. This emphasis on change is important for two reasons. Firstly, 
from a policy perspective, the direction of change is important: for example, are 
employment rates rising or falling? Secondly, an indicator might underestimate the 
proportion of an immigrant group who are renting their accommodation, but if it 
does so consistently over time and across groups, it will still detect changes in that 
proportion. 
 
Table 1.1 presents the indicators used in this Integration Monitor, which draw on 
those proposed at Zaragoza (see also Appendix 2). 
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TABLE 1.1  OUTLINE OF CORE INDICATORS, BROADLY EQUIVALENT TO ZARAGOZA INDICATORS  
1. Employment Employment rate 
Unemployment rate 
Activity rate 
2. Education Highest educational attainment 
Share of 25- to 34-year-olds with third-level educational attainment 
Share of early leavers from education and training 
Mean English reading and Mathematics scores for 15-year-olds (PISA)  
3. Social inclusion Median net income (household income and equivalised income) 
At risk of poverty rate 
Share of population perceiving their health status as good or very good 
Share of property owners among immigrants and in the total population 
4. Active citizenship Ratio of immigrants who have acquired citizenship to non-EEA immigrant population 
(best estimate) 
Share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits (best 
estimate) 
Share of immigrants among elected local representatives. 
 
Note:  In some instances, the indicators are slightly different because of data constraints (see Appendix 2). 
 
In addition, the indicators arose from the EU’s Common Basic Principles and are 
consistent with them (i.e. Principles 3, 5, 6 and 9 respectively. See Appendix 1). 
Current Irish integration policy (the Migrant Integration Strategy 2017-2020) also 
takes into account the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy – A Blueprint for the Future was published in 
February 2017. Ireland pursues a policy of mainstream service provision in the area 
of integration, so responsibility for the delivery of integration services rests with 
individual government departments and agencies, including Local Authorities 
(Department of Justice and Equality, 2017). The primary focus of the strategy is on 
ensuring the equitable provision of public services within a mainstreamed system 
(Arnold et al., 2019a), therefore government departments and agencies are key to 
service delivery, but not the only actors; an important method of delivering the 
Migrant Integration Strategy is also working with non-governmental delivery 
partners.9 
 
The Strategy is monitored by the Migrant Integration Strategy Monitoring and 
Coordination Committee led by the Department of Justice and Equality. This 
Committee is responsible for agreeing indicators for measuring progress. The 
interim Migrant Integration Strategy: 2017-2020 Progress Report to Government 
was published in June 2019. The key finding of the Progress Report is the 
importance of the whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to 
successful integration, and the benefits it brings to all aspects of Irish life 
 
                                                            
 
9  Where possible, references to measures and projects run by NGOs in this Monitor will indicate whether they are 
government funded. 
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(Department of Justice and Equality, 2019a). While the Progress Report highlights 
a number of successes – including up to €15 million granted in Integration Funding 
Programmes and the Education (Admissions to Schools) Act 2018 amongst others 
– the report also helps identify areas where actions need to be developed in the 
remaining period of the strategy (to end 2020). In noting the report, the 
Government agreed to develop new actions particularly to address areas where 
outcomes for migrants need to be improved. These areas are; combatting racism, 
employment, English language acquisition, and the promotion of integration at the 
local level.  
 
A new Anti-Racism Committee was established in December 2019 and held its 
inaugural meeting in June 2020. It includes 16 members, a diverse group of 
representatives of the public, private and voluntary sector and expert views.10 The 
key task of the committee is to develop a new action plan against racism within 
one year, focusing on concrete actions that can be taken. As Fanning and Michael 
(2017) note, the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism 
was dismantled during the Great Recession and there has not been an anti-racism 
action plan in place since, so this is a significant development.  
1.1.3  Challenges of monitoring outcomes among immigrants 
Even when indicators are agreed and defined, monitoring immigrant outcomes is 
challenging. This is related to how immigrants are defined, how they are 
represented in survey data, and how the nature and composition of the group 
changes over time.  
 
The general definition of immigrants in this Integration Monitor is based on 
nationality and is consistent with the previous publications in the series. However, 
the nationality definition does not count second-generation immigrants (those 
born in Ireland to immigrant parents) who are not typically identified using general 
social surveys, nor does it separately identify naturalised Irish citizens of immigrant 
origin. Most immigration into Ireland happened in the last decade and a half, but 
because a significant proportion of immigrants are now naturalised Irish citizens 
(see Chapter 5) this has implications for how best to define the immigrant 
population. This is a point we return to in Chapter 6, where we discuss that 
indicators of integration are only as good as the data on which they are based, and 
that decisions about defining the migrant population can inform what we can say 
about their integration.  
 
 
                                                            
 
10  Details of membership: https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/6bedb-action-plan-against-racism-for-ireland-to-be-
drawn-up-by-new-independent-anti-racism-committee. 
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A second challenge for monitoring is how effectively survey data collect 
information on immigrants. These large, nationally representative datasets are not 
designed to represent and record details of immigrants, but rather the whole 
population. A key concern is the tendency for certain groups to be under-
represented in survey data: telephone surveys for example can be challenging for 
migrants with poor language skills. While some nationalities dominate the non-
Irish population – UK and Polish nationals for example – there is also a very diverse 
range of nationalities and countries of origin among immigrants to Ireland 
(McGinnity et al., 2020). Small numbers in particular groups often mean they need 
to be combined into larger groups based on regional groupings, and, as McGinnity 
et al. (2020) show, these regional groupings can hide considerable variation 
between those from different countries. Household surveys such as the Labour 
Force Survey and the Survey of Income and Living Conditions are of private 
households, so exclude some potentially very vulnerable groups – the homeless 
and those living in residential homes or direct provision accommodation centres.  
 
From a European Commission perspective, integration relates to third-country 
nationals (those from outside the European Union) and does not include EU 
nationals moving to other EU countries. However, this Integration Monitor, like 
previous Monitors, measures outcomes for non-EU and EU immigrants. This is 
particularly important in Ireland as a large number of non-Irish nationals come 
from within the EU. EU nationals are distinguished from non-EU nationals as they 
have very different rights to live and work in Ireland. As previous research (Barrett 
et al., 2006) has indicated, the experience in Ireland of people from the United 
Kingdom differs from other EU nationals and they have typically lived in Ireland 
much longer than others (see Table A1.4), so UK nationals are separately 
distinguished. EU-West nationals and EU-East nationals are also distinguished 
separately.11 In this Integration Monitor, where data permit, we distinguish non-
EU nationals into the following groups: ‘Africa’; ‘North America, Australia and 
Oceania’; ‘Asia’, which comprises South, South-East and East Asia; and ‘Rest of the 
World’ which comprises Central America and Caribbean, South America, Near and 
Middle East, and other countries.12 However, where data from the Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions are used (Chapter 4), these latter groups are 
aggregated into a ‘non-EU’ category. 
 
 
                                                            
 
11  EU-West comprises the older EU15 Member States excluding the UK and Ireland, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. EU-East comprises 
the EU Member States that acceded in 2004 and 2007, i.e. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
12  In particular the ‘Rest of the World’ category is extremely diverse. It is not possible to distinguish groups further given 
the number of cases. The Asian category is also diverse, combining as it does Middle Eastern countries such as Syria 
with South Asian (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) with Far Eastern Countries (e.g. China, Japan). 
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A third challenge with monitoring integration is the change in size and composition 
of the immigrant population over time. Recent migration flows to and from Ireland 
illustrate how migration patterns closely reflect economic conditions: economic 
growth brings strong labour demand and stimulates immigration, whereas 
recession and falling labour demand typically stimulates emigration.13 This is why 
migration flows are so important for understanding changes in the characteristics 
of immigrants living in Ireland; this is discussed in the next section.  
1.2  OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN TRENDS IN MIGRATION IN IRELAND 
In this section we discuss the main trends in immigration in recent years with a 
particular focus on developments since the 2018 Integration Monitor, which reflect 
trends and developments in law and policy up to December 2017.  
 
In 2019, Ireland had one of the highest percentages of foreign-born residents 
among EU Member States at 17 per cent (Figure 1.1).14 Most migration to Ireland 
is from within the EU.15 Excluding Luxembourg (not shown), Cyprus and Ireland 
have the highest proportion of residents born in other EU Member States at 13 per 
cent in 2019. Ireland also had the seventh lowest proportion of foreign-born 
residents born in non-EU Member States (see Figure 1.1). Census 2016 shows there 




                                                            
 
13  It is not clear if the COVID-induced recession will lead to as much of an increase in emigration as previous recessions 
in Ireland, given the global nature of this recession and potential longer term or reimposed travel restrictions. 
14  Source: Eurostat. Note that ‘foreign-born’ are typically first-generation immigrants and may consist of both foreign 
nationals and foreign-born nationals of the host country. In Ireland, estimates from Census 2016 microdata indicate 
that just over 62,000 recorded their place or birth as Northern Ireland. This is about 1.3 per cent of the population 
resident in Ireland in April 2016. 
15  Foreign-born also includes those born in Northern Ireland. These are counted among those born in other EU Member 
States (see previous footnote).  
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FIGURE 1.1  FOREIGN-BORN RESIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 2019  
 
 
Source:  Eurostat (at 1 January 2019).  
Notes:  Light blue is the proportion born in other EU countries: dark blue is the proportion born outside the EU. The following data for 
Luxembourg are excluded: 35 per cent born in other EU Member States, 12 per cent born in non-EU Member States. Stateless 
residents not included.  
 
Ireland has experienced extensive migratory change over the past two decades, 
linked to changing economic conditions and the expansion of the EU (see 
Figure 1.2). Prior to the mid-1990s Ireland was a country with a long history of net 
emigration, but a period of economic growth from the early 1990s attracted 
returning Irish emigrants and other immigrants. In 2004 the enlargement of the EU 
led to particularly high net inward migration. Ireland, the UK and Sweden were the 
only three EU Member States to open their labour markets, without restrictions, 
to workers from new Member States. Inflows of migrants peaked during the 
economic boom in 2006/2007. However, due in part to a collapse in the property 
market, together with deteriorating international economic conditions, Ireland 
entered into recession in 2008. As a result, immigration plummeted. 
In 2010, Ireland re-entered a phase of significant net emigration, across all 
groups.16 Revised estimates provided by the CSO presented in Figure 1.2 show that 
the year to April 2019 was the seventh consecutive year of decreased emigration. 
The 2019 net migration figure stood at an estimated 33,700, meaning that 33,700 
more people came to Ireland to live than emigrated.  
 
 
                                                            
 
16  All groups (Irish, UK, EU-West, EU-East and ‘Rest of the World’) saw an increase in emigration between 2010 and 2011 
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FIGURE 1.2  IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION AND NET MIGRATION 1987-2019 
 
 
Source:  CSO ‘Population and Migration Estimates’,17 various releases.  
 
 
Using estimates from the CSO Population and Migration Estimates, Figure 1.2 
demonstrates that immigration inflows have risen slightly, roughly five per cent 
from 2017 to 2019 (from around 84,600 to 88,600). Emigration flows have also 
decreased by 18 per cent from 2017 to 2019 (from around 64,800 to 54,900) but 
are still 53 per cent higher than the flow recorded in 2006 (36,000).  
 
Figure 1.3 shows that immigration increased for all national groups from 2017 to 
2019. Immigration by (returning) Irish nationals increased by 2 per cent from 2017 
(27,400) to 2019 (26,900). Among non-Irish groups, the largest change was among 
migrants from EU15 whose immigration rate grew by roughly 17 per cent in 2019 
compared with 2017 (1,800). 
 
 
                                                            
 
17  The CSO creates these Population and Migration Estimates using the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the Census, when 
available. Estimates are also compiled against the backdrop of movements in other migration indicators such as the 
number of Personal Public Service Numbers allocated to non-Irish nationals, the number of work permits issued/ 
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FIGURE 1.3  NATIONALITY OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS, 2010-2019 
 
Source:  CSO ‘Population and Migration Estimates’, various releases.  
Notes:  Year to April of reference year. 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the nationality breakdown of emigration flows from 2010 to 2019. 
Overall, emigration flows (of Irish plus non-Irish nationals) have decreased for the 
seventh consecutive year from a peak of 83,000 in 2012 to 54,900 in 2019. 
Emigration of Irish nationals accounted for a larger proportion of emigrant flow in 
2019 compared to 2017. In 2019, Irish nationals accounted for 53 per cent of the 
emigrant flow compared to 48 per cent (30,800) in 2017. From 2017 to 2019, the 
outward flow of the non-EU groups decreased by 18 per cent (from an estimated 
13,700 to 11,200); EU-East decreased by 37 per cent (from 7,100 to 9,600); and 
EU-West increased by 33 per cent (6,700 to 4,500). The outward flow of UK 
nationals decreased between 2017 and 2019 by 20 per cent (from around 4,000 to 
3,200).  
 
FIGURE 1.4  NATIONALITY OF EMIGRATION FLOWS, 2010-2019 
 
 
Source:  CSO ‘Population and Migration Estimates’, various releases.  
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Figure 1.5 shows the breakdown of all registrations, or residence permissions, of 
non-EEA nationals18 aged 16 and over from 2010 to 2019. This can give some 
indication about reasons for migration of non-EEA nationals living in Ireland, 
though this is not the primary purpose of these data.19 EEA nationals and non-EEA 
nationals aged under 16 are not required to register and therefore are not 
included. In 2014, the Employment Permits (Amendment) Act 2014 removed the 
exemption for those under 16 to register, but this provision has not yet been 
implemented, meaning that we still have no reliable data on this group. The total 
number of residence permissions increased in 2019 for the third consecutive year. 
 
The most recent data available to year-end are for 2019; however, it is important 
to highlight that the figures presented for this year are provisional. In 2019 there 
were 168,297 non-EEA persons aged 16 and over registered in Ireland, 
representing an increase of 26 per cent since 2010 (133,232). The largest 
proportion of residence permissions issued were for education reasons (30 per 
cent) followed by renumeration reasons20 (24 per cent), other reasons21 (23 per 
cent), family reasons (20 per cent) and protection reasons (2 per cent). 
 
Figure 1.5 shows that the number of residence permissions issued for the purpose 
of work has increased since 2017 by 51 per cent (from around 26,133 to 39,404). 
The share of residence permissions issued for work has increased gradually from 
19 per cent in 2016 to 23 per cent in 2019, perhaps due in part to economic 
recovery and reforms of employment permit legislation in Ireland (see Barrett et 
al., 2017 for details of these reforms).  
 
 
                                                            
 
18  The European Economic Area (EEA) comprises the countries of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.  
19  Stamp 4 is a very diverse category, for example, and some non-EEA nationals may have naturalised since coming to 
Ireland and thus not require a residence permission (see Chapter 5). Initial migration motives may also be mixed, and 
may change over time (Platt, 2019).  
20  Refers to residence permissions issued for employment related reasons. 
21  Includes residence permissions that do not include the right to work e.g. pensioners. 
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FIGURE 1.5  RESIDENCE PERMISSIONS (NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER), 2010-2019 
 
Source:  Eurostat (table: migr_resvalid).  
Notes:  All valid permits by reason, length of validity and citizenship on 31 December of each year. Data for 2019 were provisionally 
provided by Eurostat. 
 
The absolute number of residence permissions issued for family reasons has 
increased steadily since 2017, increasing by 14 per cent between 2017 and 2019 
(from around 30,184 to 34,317). Yet the share of residence permissions issued to 
family members in total issued residence permits decreased between 2017 and 
2019, from 24 per cent to 20 per cent, and in comparative perspective migration 
for family reasons in Ireland is low – one of the lowest in OECD countries (OECD, 
2018a).  
 
The absolute number of residence permissions issued for education reasons has 
increased since 2017 by 28 per cent (39,779 to 50,946). The share of residence 
permissions issued for education reasons in total residence permits slightly 
decreased from 31 per cent in 2017 to 30 per cent in 2019.  
 
The absolute number of residence permissions issued for protection reasons has 
increased since 2017 by 62 per cent (from around 1,983 to 3,211), in part reflecting 
Ireland’s participation in EU relocation and resettlement schemes (Barrett et al., 
2017; Arnold et al., 2018). The share of residence permissions issued for protection 
reasons in total residence permits increased slightly from 1.5 per cent in 2017 to 
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Data released by the Department of Justice and Equality indicate that at year-end 
2018 the top ten registered22 nationalities, accounting for over 60 per cent of all 
persons registered, were: Brazil (16 per cent), India (15 per cent), US (9 per cent), 
China (8 per cent), Pakistan (4 per cent), Nigeria (3 per cent), Philippines (3 per 
cent), Malaysia (3 per cent), Canada (2 per cent) and Mexico (2 per cent) 
(Department of Justice and Equality, 2019b).  
 
BOX 1.1  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION IN IRELAND 
 
                                                            
 
22  All non-EEA nationals living in the State for longer than 90 days must register with INIS or An Garda Síochána, depending 
on where they live. Those living in Dublin must register with INIS whereas those living outside Dublin must register with 
An Garda Síochána. 
23  Direct provision accommodation centres are state-run full board facilities for persons seeking protection. Residents 
also receive a living allowance, which was increased to €29.80 for children and €38.80 for adults from 25 March 2019, 
the level recommended by the McMahon Report 2015. 
24  Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner, Annual Report 2015. www.orac.ie. 
25  Note not all protection applicants in Ireland reside in the direct provision system: some live independently. 
26  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report for 2014. www.ria.gov.ie. 
27  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report for 2015. www.ria.gov.ie. 
28  Reception and Integration Agency Annual Report for 2016. www.ria.gov.ie. 
29  Reception and Integration Agency Monthly report for December 2017. www.ria.gov.ie.  
30  For example, 1,210 were issued leave to remain under the 1999 act in 2015. See Groarke and Brazil, 2020, Table 1.2. 
31  This was the report of the 2014 Working Group Report to Government on Improvements to the Protection Process, 
including Direct Provision and Supports to Asylum Seekers.  
 
 
The International Protection Act 2015 commenced in December 2016. The Act 
introduced a single application procedure for the first time. It was foreseen that asylum 
applicants would spend less time awaiting a decision, and thus spend less time out of 
work and less time in the direct provision system.23 However, due to a backlog of cases 
and the process of transitioning to the new asylum system, waiting times for first 
interview actually increased from 13 weeks at the end of 201524 to 18-20 months in 
2017 (Arnold, et al., 2018). In 2019 waiting times for first interview were estimated to 
be 8-10 months (AIDA, 2019).  
By contrast, the proportion of residents living in direct provision accommodation 
centres for more than five years recently began to decrease.25 In 2014, around 38 per 
cent of residents in direct provision centres were in the system for five years or more,26 
decreasing to around 24 per cent in 2015,27 and around 13 per cent in 2016.28 The 
latest available published figures, for November 2018, indicate that there were 5,928 
residents, around 6 per cent of whom were living in direct provision for more than five 
years.29 Much of the decline comes from people given leave to remain on foot of 
recommendations in the McMahon report (2015).30 The McMahon Report (2015)31 
noted that in 2015 around 55 per cent of protection applicants resided outside direct 
provision accommodation centres or had left the State. However, it was reported that 
in 2018-2019 a higher than normal proportion of applicants taking up the offer of direct 
provision accommodation has led to capacity problems in the system, increasing the 
use of emergency accommodation such as hotels. By 1 December 2019, 6,013 persons 
were residing in direct provision, with a further 1,559 residing in emergency 
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32  https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-12-10/271. 
33  In June 2018, the European Communities (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2018, which transposed the EU (recast) 
Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU), came into effect. Under the Regulations, co-operating asylum applicants 
who have not received a first instance decision within nine months may apply for permission to access the labour 
market or vocational training. Arrangements have recently been revised, see https://www.gov.ie/en/press-
release/59532-minister-ogorman-and-minister-mcentee-publish-the-report-by-the-advisory-group-on-direct-
provision-and-announce-a-reduction-in-the-waiting-period-for-international-protection-applicants-to-access-work/, 
and discussion in Box 2.1. 
34  Recent figures suggest that in June 2020, 900 people were residing in the direct provision system despite having been 
granted a legal status to remain in Ireland as at end May 2020: http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PQ-16-06-2020-
359. 
 
accommodation.32 National Standards for accommodation centres prepared by an 
Advisory Group including UNHCR Ireland and NGO representatives were published in 
August 2019 and are due to come into force legally in 2021 (Houses of the Oireachtas, 
2019). Use of emergency accommodation, combined with rising numbers of applicants 
and improvements in accommodation standards, has contributed to escalating costs 
of the direct provision system (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019c).  
An Expert Group on the Provision of Support, including Accommodation, to asylum 
seekers was established in late 2019 and produced a report which was published in 
early October 2020. The report recommends measures such as exploration of various 
housing models, extending the right to work,33 moving away from emergency 
accommodation and providing own door accommodation within three months of 
application, permitting bank accounts and driving licences for applicants (Government 
of Ireland, 2020). As part of the recently agreed Programme for Government there is a 
commitment to ending the direct provision system. It would be important that any 
replacement is durable and meets the needs of applicants and is not just direct 
provision by another name (Ombudsman for Children’s Office, 2020; Houses of the 
Oireachtas, 2019). The report also recommends the amount of time taken to process 
positive decisions needs to be reduced with binding deadlines set for decisions 
(Government of Ireland, 2020). Supporting successful applicants to transition out of 
direct provision centres would also be a key element, given that around 11 per cent of 
residents of direct provision centres have actually been granted protection status 
(Houses of the Oireachtas, 2019).34 These supports could include assistance to find 
housing, access to education and childcare and labour market access (see below 
discussion of supports currently offered to resettled refugees and also Arnold et al., 
2019a). Assisting voluntary return of unsuccessful applicants might also form part of a 
comprehensive strategy to reform the system.  
Ireland’s Response to the Refugee Crisis 
While the flow of displaced persons into Ireland has been much lower than in many EU 
Member States, in response to the steep increase in applications, the Irish government 
established the Irish Refugee Protection Programme in 2015. This programme 
committed to accepting persons in need of protection, mainly through EU relocation 
and resettlement, and established a cross-departmental task force. In general, in 
Ireland resettled refugees are given programme refugee status on arrival and relocated 
asylum seekers have an accelerated asylum procedure.  






                                                            
 
35  All figures from Groarke and Brazil (2020, Table 1.2) in this paragraph combine grants at first instance and at appeal 
(or review) of first instance decision to reduce the level of detail. 
36  Leave to remain under section 3 of the 1999 Act may be granted for reasons that are not protection-related. 
37  Data on persons who came through the international protection process and were granted leave to remain under 
section 3 of the 1999 Act are included in this total. Leave to remain under section 3 of the 1999 Act may be granted for 
reasons that are not protection-related. 
38  Resettled refugees are generally granted the status of ‘Programme Refugee’ in Ireland, whereas refugees who arrive 
spontaneously must apply for ‘Convention Refugee’ protection on arrival.  
Convention refugees, subsidiary protection holders and programme refugees have 
similar rights to Irish citizens, including access to the labour market and third-level 
education (Arnold et al., 2018). Between 2010 and 2018, 3,272 persons were granted 
Convention refugee status, and a further 1,015 persons were awarded subsidiary 
protection in the same period (Groarke and Brazil, 2020, Table 1.2).35 A further 307 
people were granted permission to remain under section 49 of the International 
Protection Act 2015 between 2017 and 2018. In the period 2010 to 2018, 4,676 people 
were granted leave to remain under section 3 of the 1999 Act, following submission of 
an unsuccessful application for international protection.36 Finally, 1,480 persons were 
granted programme refugee status in the period 2010-2018, and 119 granted status 
under the Syrian Humanitarian Admission Programme (SHAP) (Groarke and Brazil, 
2020. The total number of people granted a residence status for a protection-related 
reason in the period 2010-2018 in Ireland was 10,869.37  
Beneficiaries of international protection avail of various supports including in respect 
of social protection, housing, education and labour market access, though Arnold et al. 
(2019a) note that resettled refugees are offered substantially more integration 
supports than spontaneous38 refugees.  
While the numbers of beneficiaries of international protection, programme refugees 
and asylum seekers in Ireland have been increasing in recent years, information on 
their integration outcomes such as employment and unemployment rates, poverty and 
social exclusion, or any socio-cultural integration measures cannot be extracted from 
existing data sources and are thus not reported in this Integration Monitor (see also 
Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 1 APPENDIX 
 
Of all non-Irish nationals living in Ireland in 2019, 12.5 per cent of the population, 
the largest proportions were nationals of Eastern European countries (5.2 per cent) 
and the United Kingdom (2.3 per cent) (see Table A1.1). These proportions have 
remained relatively stable since 2015. There has been a slight increase in the 
proportion of Western European nationals, who made up 1.7 per cent of the 
population living in Ireland in 2019. Among non-EU nationals, Asian nationals make 
up the largest share. The proportion of Asians living in Ireland has also risen slightly 
in the past few years, and this group make up 1.3 per cent of the population in 
2019. The proportion of nationals from the ‘Rest of the World’ (chiefly non-EU 
Eastern Europe and South America) has also risen slightly to 1.1 per cent in 2019. 
This compares to a more stable 0.5 per cent African nationals and 0.4 per cent of 
nationals of North America/Australia/Oceania.  
 
Taking age into account, the largest proportion of non-Irish nationals were aged 25 
to 44 years (see Table A1.2). Migrants from the ‘Rest of the World’ category 
(68.5 per cent), Africa (64.7 per cent) and Asia (64.2 per cent) recorded the highest 
proportion in this age range. UK nationals were over-represented in the age range 
‘45 to 65 years’ (38.4 per cent) compared to other nationalities. The UK also had 
the highest proportion of nationals in the age range ‘65+ years’ at 21.6 per cent 
followed by North America, Australia and Oceania at 6.3 per cent and Western 
European migrants at 2.6 per cent. Migrants from Eastern Europe (15.4 per cent), 
‘Rest of the World’ (12.6 per cent) and Africa (12.5 per cent) had the highest 
proportion of non-Irish national children aged 0-14 (see Table A1.2). The gender of 
non-Irish nationals in Ireland in 2019 was largely balanced across all groups 
(Table A1.3) with the exception of migrants from North America, Australia and 
Oceania who were more likely to be female (58.9 per cent).  
 
Non-Irish nationals also differ considerably as to how long they have been living in 
Ireland. Table A1.4 shows that 77.3 per cent of UK nationals had been living in 
Ireland for more than ten years: nearly 40 per cent of them had been living in 
Ireland more than 20 years. Over half (56.4 per cent) of people from EU-East had 
been living in Ireland for over ten years. Other migrant groups have come to Ireland 
relatively recently. Around 30 to 38 per cent of people from Africa, EU-West, and 
North America, Australia and Oceania had been in Ireland for over ten years. The 
proportion of ‘Rest of the World’ who had come in the past ten years was much 
lower at 8.4 per cent. Almost half of North America, Australia and Oceania and 
Asian migrants and over 60 per cent of migrants from the ‘Rest of the World’ group 
had been living in Ireland five years or less.  
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TABLE A1.1  NATIONALITY BY YEAR, LFS Q1 2015-Q1 2019 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Weighted N 
in pop  % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count 
Irish 88.6 45,032 88.5 37,632 88.2 40,053 88 32,925 87.5 35,375 4,277,106 
Non-Irish 11.4 4,165 11.6 3,653 11.8 3,973 12 2,660 12.5 3,214 612,011 
Of Which:            
UK 2.3 631 2.2 647 2.2 743 2.3 545 2.3 559 112,410 
EU-West 1.3 485 1.4 528 1.4 505 1.5 372 1.7 440 80,602 
EU-East 5.3 1,981 5.3 1,649 5.2 1,755 5.3 1,186 5.2 1,409 256,047 
Rest of the 




0.4 141 0.3 102 0.4 141 0.4 84 0.4 98 18,036 
Africa 0.4 183 0.5 145 0.4 139 0.5 95 0.5 126 25,104 
Asia 1.0 404 1.0 278 1.1 360 1.1 203 1.3 313 64,669 
Total 100 49,197 100 41,285 100 44,026 100 35,585 100 38,589 4,889,117 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2015-Q1 2019.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. Final column ‘weighted N in pop’ refers to the estimated total number in 
each group in the population in 2019. 
 
 
TABLE A1.2  NATIONALITY BY AGE, LFS Q1 2019 








years Total % 
Total 
Count 
Irish 21.7 12.9 24.8 25.3 15.4 100 35,375 
Non-Irish 11.0 10.6 55.2 18.1 5.1 100 3,214 
Of Which:               
UK 5.5 7.6 26.9 38.4 21.6 100 559 
EU-West 6.4 8.8 63.6 18.5 2.6 100 440 
EU-East 15.4 10.8 59.5 13.1 1.2 100 1,409 
Rest of the World 12.6 12.0 68.5 6.9 0.0 100 269 
Nth America, Australia 
and Oceania 5.6 16.1 45.3 26.8 6.3 100 98 
Africa 12.5 6.2 64.7 14.2 2.4 100 126 
Asia 8.1 16.2 64.2 10.8 0.6 100 313 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2019.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. 
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TABLE A1.3  NATIONALITY BY GENDER, LFS Q1 2019 
  Male (%) Female (%) Total (%) Total Count 
Irish 49.5 50.5 100 35,375 
Non-Irish 50.0 50.0 100 3,214 
Of Which:         
UK 52.5 47.5 100 559 
EU-West 48.5 51.5 100 440 
EU-East 49.2 50.8 100 1,409 
Rest of the World 50.4 49.7 100 269 
North America, Australia and Oceania 41.1 58.9 100 98 
Africa 54.4 45.6 100 126 
Asia 51.5 48.5 100 313 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2019.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. 
 
 
TABLE A1.4  NATIONALITY BY DURATION OF RESIDENCE IN IRELAND, LFS Q1 2019 






years Total (%) 
Total 
Count 
Irish 92.5 0.4 0.9 3.3 3.0 100 35,329 
Non-Irish 3.6 25.9 22.9 37.6 10.1 100 3,163 
               
UK 0.6 10.4 11.7 38.0 39.3 100 551 
EU-West 1.5 40.4 28.8 17.6 11.8 100 430 
EU-East 6.1 13.0 24.5 55.1 1.3 100 1,392 
Rest of the World 1.9 62.6 27.1 7.9 0.5 100 264 
North America, 
Australia and Oceania 1.7 48.4 16.9 15.2 17.9 100 97 
Africa 1.3 35.1 25.9 35.5 2.3 100 125 
Asia 4.0 45.3 25.9 23.8 1.0 100 304 
 
Source:  Own calculations from LFS microdata Q1 2019.  
Notes: Percentages are weighted; N of cases are unweighted. N = 199 missing cases for ‘years of residence’. 
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CHAPTER 2  
Employment and integration 
By Ivan Privalko and Shannen Enright 
 
Access to employment is often described as the most important measure of 
integration, since work allows migrants an income and a chance to find their place 
in the host society (OECD, 2018a; 2015a; McGinnity et al., 2020). 
 
Employment also helps migrants avoid poverty, deprivation and social exclusion – 
at least for many. For migrants born outside the EEA, employment is also a key 
mechanism by which many of these migrants arrive in Ireland (McGinnity et al., 
2020). Further, the OECD notes two important benefits to having a diverse 
workforce with a strong migrant presence. First, migrants contribute to Ireland’s 
productivity39 and are particularly over-represented in new and growing sectors of 
the economy, where the Irish population lack skill and experience. Second, 
migrants typically contribute more in taxes and other contributions than they 
receive, when compared to non-migrant groups (OECD, 2018a).  
 
This year’s Monitoring Report will confirm that Ireland’s gradual recovery from the 
economic shock of 2008 improved labour market access for Irish and non-Irish 
nationals alike in the period 2012-2019; this point was also made in the previous 
Monitoring Report. However, the economic impact of COVID-19 will likely affect 
Irish and non-Irish nationals differently, making data with a distinction between 
these groups prior to the pandemic especially important for understanding the 
labour market impact of the crisis. The impact of COVID-19 on the Irish labour 
market is the focus of an accompanying publication to this, COVID-19 and non-Irish 
nationals in Ireland (Enright et al., 2020).  
 
In this chapter, we will consider four indicators of employment by nationality and, 
in places, country of birth. The core indicators are employment, unemployment, 
labour market activity, and self-employment. In addition to these we also compare 
non-Irish and Irish nationals in terms of the nature of their jobs (occupations) and 
the economic activity of the organisations they work for (sector). Of course, not all 
jobs are created equal: employment will be less positive for integration and 
inclusion where it involves anti-social hours, poor pay and conditions and may 
make it harder for migrants to learn English and participate in other aspects of 
 
                                                            
 
39  https://www.oecd.org/migration/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202.pdf. 
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society and economy. Further analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is 
a point we return to in the conclusion.40 
 
We will focus on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) throughout, which is a large-scale 
nationally representative survey of households in Ireland. It is conducted by the 
Central Statistics Office (CSO). The 2018 Integration Monitor showed that 
employment rates between Irish and non-Irish nationals were similar at 64 per cent 
in 2016 and 66 per cent in 2017. However, that report also showed significant 
differences between Irish and non-Irish respondents by their region of origin. We 
will explore the basic differences in this chapter, as well as the broader differences 
between Irish workers, and workers from other regional categories.  
 
We will use Q1 2018 and Q1 2019 of the Labour Force Survey (LFS) throughout, 
unless otherwise stated. In order to remain consistent with previous Integration 
Monitors, we will focus on the working population (those aged 15-64 years of age) 
and consider the same definitions of employment, unemployment, activity, and 
self-employment. These are standard definitions used by the International Labour 
Office.  
2.1  EMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY 
Before considering group differences in employment, we will first summarise the 
general trend in these measures for everyone. The total participation rate between 
2010 and 2019 remains at roughly 62 per cent (CSO, 2020a). As seen in previous 
Monitoring reports on integration, the employment rate increased, from 59 per 
cent in 2012 to 69 per cent in 2019; while the unemployment rate has fallen from 
15 per cent in 2012 to 4.5 per cent in 201941 (ibid.). In short, the period marks a 
slow recovery after the 2008 recession. This recovery reflects a sustained 
improvement in the labour market since the recession began in 2008 although it 
will likely be challenged by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
Figure 2.1 lists the employment, unemployment and activity rates for Irish and 
non-Irish nationals aged 15-64 for the first quarters of 2018 and 2019. The 
employment rate is measured as the proportion of working-age adults who did any 
paid work in the week prior to the survey, expressed as a proportion of the total 
working-age population. The rate gradually increased for both Irish nationals and 
non-Irish nationals since 2012, where 58.2 and 58.9 per cent of Irish and non-Irish 
 
                                                            
 
40  See also analyses from earlier years, e.g. McGinnity et al., 2010 for a detailed comparison of working conditions, such 
as working hours, job security and work pressure in 2009; McGinnity et al., 2020 for more recent data on occupational 
positions (from 2016 data). On pay, see Voitchovsky, 2014; Barrett et al., 2017.  
41 The Unemployment rate reported by the CSO considers respondents aged 15-74. 
https://statbank.cso.ie/px/pxeirestat/Statire/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?maintable=QLF18&PLanguage=0. 
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nationals were employed respectively (McGinnity et al., 2014). Between 2018 and 
2019, the rate increased from 67 per cent to 69 per cent for Irish nationals, and 
from 71 per cent to 73 per cent for non-Irish nationals. As in previous Monitors, 
non-Irish nationals record a higher employment and participation rate when 
compared to Irish nationals. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS FOR IRISH AND NON-IRISH NATIONALS, Q1 2018 
AND Q1 2019  
 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (Q1 2018, Q1 2019). 
Note: Respondents aged 15-64. 
 
The next indicator is the unemployment rate, which is the number of unemployed 
expressed as a percentage of the labour force (the sum of the numbers employed 
plus unemployed).42 Unemployment decreased slightly for both Irish and non-Irish 
nationals between 2018 and 2019. The unemployment rate of Irish nationals 
remained at 5 per cent in both years. The unemployment rate fell among non-Irish 
nationals from 8 per cent in 2018 to 6 per cent in 2019. The gap between Irish 
nationals and non-Irish nationals was significant in 2018, but not in 2019, 
suggesting the fall in unemployment for non-Irish nationals closed the difference 
between both groups by 2019.  
 
The final indicator is the activity rate, calculated as the share of working-age adults 
in the population who are in the labour force. This figure combines the number of 
people employed and unemployed. Those outside of the labour market have done 
 
                                                            
 
42  Unemployment is defined using the International Labour Organization definition. To count as unemployed, 
respondents must have done no paid work in the week preceding the survey; be available for work and have actively 

















2018 2019 2018 2019 2018 2019
Employment rate Unemployment rate Labour market activity rate
Non-Irish national Irish national
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no paid work in the week preceding the survey and have not been actively seeking 
or available for work. In the working-age population, this group typically includes 
students, those with full-time unpaid caring responsibilities, those with a disability 
or those cannot work for another reason, one of which may be that their residence 
permission does not permit them to do any paid work.43 The activity rate remained 
at 77 per cent for non-Irish respondents between 2018 and 2019, and increased 
for Irish respondents from 71 per cent to 72 per cent. In general, migrants report 
a higher rate of labour market activity when compared to Irish nationals, although 
this varies by national group. Glimartin and Dagg (2020) highlight that labour 
market outcomes for non-Irish nationals vary by region of residence: those in 
border counties, and also the West region, have much higher unemployment rates 
than non-Irish nationals who live in Dublin. The gap between Irish and non-Irish in 
terms of unemployment is also lower in Dublin than the other regions.44  
 
Table 2.1 digs deeper and turns to differences in the same measures between 
nationality groups.45 In addition to these categories, we will also split the Irish 
group into two groups; those born in Ireland and those Irish nationals who were 
born outside the Republic of Ireland. The latter are a diverse group that includes 
the descendants of Irish emigrants, many of whom were born in the UK but are 
now resident in Ireland. This group also includes foreign-born immigrants without 
Irish parents, who acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation (see Chapter 5). 
It is important to note that respondents born in Northern Ireland who 
automatically receive Irish citizenship are also recorded in this group. Given that 
UK nationals did not naturalise in significant numbers since 2016, (see Chapter 5) 
many of these foreign-born Irish may be Irish citizens by birth or descent, rather 
than by naturalisation. Table 2.1 lists employment outcomes for Irish nationals 
born in Ireland and those born abroad. There is no difference in terms of 
employment between Irish nationals born in Ireland (67 per cent) and Irish 
nationals born abroad (67 per cent). This is true for both 2018 and 2019. In terms 
of unemployment, there is a significant difference between groups in both 2018 
and 2019, with Irish nationals born abroad reporting a higher unemployment rate 
(7 per cent) when compared to Irish nationals born in Ireland (5 per cent). This 
difference is significant in 2018 data and 2019, despite a fall in unemployment for 
2019. Finally, the activity rate for Irish nationals born in Ireland (71 per cent) is 
similar to Irish nationals born elsewhere (71 per cent). Once again, there is a minor 




                                                            
 
43  However note if respondents have done any paid work they are counted as employed (this would apply to students 
working less than 20 hours, for example).  
44  This is based on Census 2016 data, which uses a different definition of unemployment from the one presented in this 
chapter (see McGinnity et al., 2020 for a discussion).  
45  These groups are based on nationality classifications used by the EU Labour Force Survey since 2011. 
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We further consider these differences between wider nationality groups. 
Regarding employment, for 2018 Irish nationals have similar employment levels to 
respondents from the UK, North America, Asia, and those from the ‘Rest of the 
World’. However, respondents from EU-West and EU-East show significantly 
higher employment rates when compared to Irish nationals, while African 
respondents show significantly lower employment than Irish nationals. In 2019 the 
employment rate increased for some groups including Irish nationals, and those 
from the UK, EU-East, and Africa. The rate fell for respondents from EU-West, 
North America, Asia, and those from the ‘Rest of the World’. In that year 
respondents from Ireland, the UK, North America, Australia and Oceania, and 
Africa had similar rates of employment, while respondents from EU-West, and EU-
East had significantly higher employment rates, when compared to Irish nationals. 
Respondents from Asia had significantly lower employment rates when compared 
to Irish nationals. With some yearly variation, the general pattern is that compared 
to Irish nationals, employment rates are higher among EU-West and EU-East 
nationals, lower among non-EU nationals and similar among UK nationals; EU 
migrants typically come to Ireland to work and have high employment rates. 
Non-EU migrants have a diverse range of reasons for coming to Ireland: to study, 
to work, to seek international protection, or to join family members (see Figure 
1.5). Non-EU migrants may be working although the primary motivation for 
migration was different,46 but given diverse mechanisms of arrival, unemployment 
is perhaps a more instructive measure of labour market disadvantage. 
Unemployment captures individuals who are in the labour market – they would 
like a job and are actively seeking work.  
 
 
                                                            
 
46  For example, most non-EU migrants on student visas are allowed to work up to 20 hours per week; since 2019 the 
partners/spouses of those on Critical Skills permits are allowed to apply for an employment permit.  
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TABLE 2.1 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY NATIONAL GROUP Q1 2018 AND Q1 2019 
 Employment (%) Unemployment (%) Activity (%) 
 2018 2019 2018 2019 2018 2019 
Irish 67 69 5 5 71 72 
Non-Irish 71 73 8 6 77 77 
UK 64 72 9* 7 71 78* 
EU-West 84* 80* 5 4 88* 84* 
EU-East 75* 76* 7 5 80* 80* 
North America and Oceania [60] [62] [11] [7] [68] [67] 
Africa [54*] [60] [15*] [12*] [64] [69] 
Asia 63 61* 7 6 68 65* 
Rest of the World 72 64 10 5 80* 67 
       
Irish, born elsewhere 67 69 7* 6* 72 74 
Irish-born 67 69 5 5 71 72 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (Q1 2018, Q1 2019). 
Notes: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05. Estimates in square brackets have low 
 denominators and should be read with caution (> 50 but < 100).  
 
In terms of unemployment, there are significant differences between migrant 
groups in 2018, with respondents from the UK and Africa showing significantly 
higher unemployment compared to Irish nationals. Beyond these groups, 
respondents from North America, Australia and Oceania also show a high 
unemployment rate (11 per cent), although their rates are not significantly 
different from their Irish group.47 In 2019, the difference between Irish nationals 
and UK nationals is no longer significant, although the difference between Irish 
nationals and African nationals remains significant, consistent with previous 
research (O’Connell et al., 2019). We consider these differences further in a logistic 
regression (see Chapter 2 Appendix Table A2.1), and note that age, gender, and 
family status do not explain the unemployment gaps between the Irish group, and 
the UK and African groups. These findings reflect other studies although it is 
important to note that African migrants are a diverse and heterogeneous group, 
especially in terms of unemployment rates (McGinnity et al., 2020). In short, 
migrants from Zimbabwe and migrants from Libya who live in Ireland will likely 
have different unemployment rates. However, the LFS prevents us from 
considering these differences further. 
 
In 2018 migrants from EU-West, EU-East and the ‘Rest of the World’ category have 
significantly higher labour market activity rates when compared to Irish nationals. 
The remaining groups show similar rates of activity. For 2019, respondents from 
EU-West and EU-East show significantly higher activity rates when compared to 
 
                                                            
 
47  Table A2.1 shows a logistic regression using pooled data, where North American, Australian and Oceania nationals have 
higher unemployment once a range of compositional measures are controlled for.  
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Irish respondents. However, migrants from Asia have significantly lower rates of 
activity when compared to Irish respondents, though not higher unemployment. 
Part of this may be linked to why this group came to Ireland, for example as 
students (Groarke and Durst, 2019).  
 
Several mechanisms may be limiting non-EU migrants’ lower employment rates: as 
discussed above this may be linked to why non-EU migrants came to Ireland. While 
we cannot rule out that some non-EU migrants outside the labour market would 
like to work if they could find a job, given this is not true for all, it is perhaps better 
to focus on unemployment as an indicator of disadvantage. Here it is African 
nationals who remain at significantly higher risk of unemployment than others. 
McGinnity et al. (2020) argue that the mechanisms used by migrants to arrive in 
Ireland have a significant impact on their risk of unemployment, even when 
controlling for their individual language ability and education, with those who are 
likely to have come through the protection system at higher risk of unemployment 
(see also O’Connell et al., 2019). Some of the effect may also stem from racial 
discrimination, in the same research McGinnity et al. (2020) find that Black 
respondents are particularly likely to be unemployed, even when international 
protection channels are considered, and measures of human capital are controlled 
for. The disadvantage experienced by African migrants is also reflected in a study 
using Ireland’s Jobseeker’s Longitudinal Database (JLD), an administrative 
database. Cronin et al. (2018) show that African migrants have longer 
unemployment durations, and fewer exits to employment when compared to 
other unemployed. They also find a high rate of first-time jobseekers among this 
group, where 38 per cent of African migrants claim never to have formally worked 
before.  
 
TABLE 2.2 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY NATIONALITY AND AGE Q1 2018 AND Q1 2019  
 Employment  Unemployment Activity  
Age Nationality 2018 % 2019 % 2018 % 2019 % 2018 % 2019 % 
15-24 
Non-Irish 41 40 17 9 [49*] [44] 
Irish 37 39 12 11 42 44 
25-44 
Non-Irish 78* 79* 7* 5 84 83* 
Irish 81 82 5 4 85 86 
45-64 
Non-Irish 66 71 9* 7* 73 76 
Irish 69 70 4 3 72 73 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (Q1 2018, Q1 2019) 
Notes: * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05. Estimates in square brackets have low 
denominators and should be read with caution (> 50 but < 100). 
 
We further split the main employment indicators by age and nationality. In general, 
we find a similar trend where younger groups have lower employment and higher 
unemployment compared to older groups, who show slightly lower levels of 
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employment than the middle groups. Lower activity rates among young Irish stem 
from participation in education and so this group is less likely to look for a job. 
Lower activity among older groups may stem from early retirement, early leave for 
family reasons, or disability (Russell et al., 2019).  
 
The employment and activity rates among non-Irish nationals are higher than 
among natives for those aged 15-24. However, among those aged 25-44, Irish 
respondents display significantly higher employment, lower unemployment and 
higher activity, when compared to non-Irish nationals, especially in 2019. The 
oldest age group contains few significant differences between migrants and non-
migrants, although older migrants show a significantly higher unemployment when 
compared to older Irish nationals in both 2018 and 2019. This difference suggests 
that older migrants are particularly vulnerable to unemployment, although 
previous research has shown that this group contains significant variation 
(McGinnity et al., 2020), and a smaller share of non-Irish nationals are aged 45-64 
than Irish nationals (see Table A1.2). 
 
FIGURE 2.2 KEY EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS BY GENDER Q1 2018 AND 2019 
 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (Q1 2018, Q1 2019). 
Note: * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05.  
 
We can split these rates further by considering gender instead of age; we again find 
that migrants have a higher rate of employment when compared to non-migrants, 
although this difference appears to be stronger among men than women. Migrant 
men show significantly higher rates of employment when compared to Irish men, 
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There is no significant difference between migrants and non-migrants for 
measures of unemployment. The only exception is among women in 2018, where 
migrant women have higher unemployment rate compared to non-migrant 
women. However, this difference becomes insignificant in 2019 as migrant 
women’s unemployment falls to 5 per cent. These differences are again reflected 
in the general activity rate. The difference between migrants and non-migrants 
emerges for men in both years. However, the difference between migrants and 
non-migrants only emerges for women in the 2018 wave of data, most likely due 
to the fall in unemployment that we mentioned earlier. 
 
We can also consider rates of self-employment among migrants and non-migrants. 
Table 2.3 shows the rate of self-employment by nationality groups, and for Irish 
respondents, between those born in Ireland and those born abroad. Since farming 
is an especially important aspect of self-employment, we also consider the rate of 
self-employment without this sector.  
 
TABLE 2.3 SELF-EMPLOYMENT RATES BY NATIONAL GROUP Q1 2018 AND 2019  
 Self-employment Self-employment without agriculture 
 2018 % 2019 % 2018 % 2019 % 
Ireland 15 14 12 11 
United Kingdom 15 16 14 15* 
EU-West 8* 7* 8* 7* 
EU-East 8* 6* 8* 6* 
North America, Australia 
and Oceania 16 8 16 8 
Africa 5 9 5 9 
Asia 7* 3* 7 3* 
Rest of the World 6* 5* 6 5* 
     
Irish-born 14 12 14 12 
Irish, born elsewhere 15 14 12 11 
     
Non-Irish national 9* 8* 9* 8* 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (Q1 2018, Q1 2019), provided by the ISSDA. 
Note: * signals that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05.  
 
Considering Irish respondents born abroad and born in Ireland, we find no 
significant difference in their rates of self-employment. Irish nationals born in 
Ireland have a similar rate of self-employment (14 per cent in 2018 and 12 per cent 
in 2019) when compared to Irish nationals born elsewhere (15 per cent in 2018 and 
14 per cent in 2019). Removing respondents working in agriculture does not 
change the distribution in a meaningful way, although the rate of self-employment 
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does fall slightly for both years. However, the similarity of self-employment for 
both groups remains.  
 
If we consider differences between nationalities, we note that migrants show 
lower rates of self-employment when compared to Irish nationals. In 2018, 
migrants from EU-West (8 per cent) and EU-East (8 per cent) show significantly 
lower rates of self-employment when compared to Irish nationals (15 per cent). 
This also emerges for respondents from Asia (7 per cent) and the ‘Rest of the 
World’ category (6 per cent) who also display significantly less self-employment 
when compared to Irish nationals. These differences remain in place in 2019, with 
less self-employment among migrant groups when compared to the Irish group. 
Removing agricultural workers from the self-employed does not change the 
distribution, although the results for workers born in the UK appears significant in 
2019. African migrants do not show a significant difference from Irish workers in 
either year. 
2.2 SECTOR AND OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
This section considers the nationality breakdown of economic sectors and 
occupations. Sector refers to the economic activity of the organisation someone 
works for, based on the NACE international classification scheme (Table 2.4).48 
Occupation refers to the role a worker plays in the organisation. For occupational 
groups, jobs are classified in terms of their skill level and content using 1-digit 
ISCO 08 categories (Table 2.5). So for example, an organisation which processes 
food will be counted as in the manufacturing sector (Table 2.4), but will comprise 
a whole range of occupations (Table 2.5), which could include plant and machine 
operatives, clerical staff, managers and technicians.49 In Table 2.4, broad sectors 
are presented to give an overview of which sectors Irish nationals and non-Irish 
nationals work in. This approach is useful for presenting sectors where migrants 
are particularly likely to work. In order to make the comparison, we compare the 
proportion of migrants in each sector, compared to the proportion of Irish 
nationals in each sector.  
 
 
                                                            
 
48  The Labour Force Survey uses the new version of the European industrial activity classification (NACE Rev.2). For further 
details of what is included in each major category, see  
 https://statbank.cso.ie/px/u/NACECoder/NACEItems/searchnace.asp. 
49  Sectors do vary in terms of the distribution of occupations within them, and not all occupations are found in each 
sector, but they are distinct measures of the nature of employment.  
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TABLE 2.4 EMPLOYED IRISH AND NON-IRISH NATIONALS BY SECTOR Q1 2018 AND 2019 
(POOLED) 
Sector Ireland United Kingdom EU-West EU-East Non-EU Total 
Agriculture, forestry 4.5 1.4 0.2 1.0 0.9 3.9 
Industry 12.2 14.2 14.5 21.4 9.3 12.8 
Construction 6.6 5.4 1.3 7.2 2.5 6.3 
Wholesale and retail 13.2 15.0 8.8 18.4 10.3 13.4 
Transportation and storage 4.5 3.4 3.5 5.3 2.5 4.4 
Accommodation and food 6.3 9.4 11.4 15.8 20.2 7.8 
Information & communication 4.6 6.2 21.0 3.7 12.5 5.3 
Financial, insurance 5.2 4.8 6.4 1.4 3.5 4.9 
Professional, scientific 6.3 6.9 6.5 3.1 4.2 6.0 
Administrative and support 4.0 5.0 7.2 9.7 8.0 4.7 
Public administration  5.6 3.3 0.9 0.8 1.1 4.8 
Education 8.6 6.1 6.1 1.5 4.4 7.8 
Human health and social work activities 13.3 12.9 8.4 5.9 15.0 12.7 
Other NACE activities 5.3 6.12 3.6 5.0 5.7 5.3 
       
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (Q1 2018, Q1 2019 pooled) provided by the ISSDA. Population aged 15-64 at work. Accessed via the Irish 
Social Science Data Archive – www.ucd.ie/issda. 
Notes:  Major sectors of activity using the European industrial activity classification (NACE Rev.2). 
 
Starting with UK migrants, they are over-represented in Industry (14 per cent) and 
Wholesale and retail (15 per cent). A significant portion of UK migrants also work 
in Health and social work activities (12 per cent). However, overall, their 
distribution is not too different from Irish workers. Migrants from EU-West are 
especially reliant on the Information and IT sector (21 per cent), much more than 
the Irish population. These migrants are also likely to work in Industry (14 per cent). 
Migrants from EU-East are especially prominent in Industry (21 per cent), 
Wholesale and retail (18 per cent), and Accommodation and food (15 per cent). 
Migrants from the ‘Rest of the World’ are especially concentrated in the 
Accommodation and food sector (20 per cent) and the Human health and social 
work sector (15 per cent), where fewer Irish workers are found.50 As noted by 
Gilmartin and Dagg (2020), average earnings in Accommodation and food are much 
lower than other sectors of economic activity in Ireland. 
 
 
                                                            
 
50  Using data from 2016, Gilmartin and Dagg show not so much variation in sector of activity for non-Irish nationals in 
different regions, with the exception of manufacturing, which is less prevalent among non-Irish nationals in Dublin than 
either the Border or West regions.  
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TABLE 2.5 EMPLOYED IRISH AND NON-IRISH NATIONALS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS Q1 2018 
AND 2019 (POOLED) 
 Ireland United Kingdom EU-West EU-East Non-EU  Total 
Occupational groups       
Armed forces 0.28 0 0 0 0 0.25 
Managers 9.00 14.01 5.90 5.15 6.09 8.76 
Professionals 24.58 25.14 31.37 8.05 31.88 23.98 
Technicians and associate technicians 11.32 10.56 23.80 9.20 14.06 11.47 
Clerical support work 9.37 7.10 14.02 5.51 6.09 9.13 
Service and sales workers 19.77 17.66 15.13 21.00 20.43 19.74 
Skilled agricultural 4.02 0.96 0 0.73 0.43 3.63 
Craft and related trades 8.84 8.45 4.43 16.34 6.67 9.12 
Plant and machine operatives 5.72 7.68 1.85 11.44 1.74 5.90 
Elementary occupation 7.10 8.45 3.51 22.58 12.61 8.03 
       
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey (Q1 2018, Q1 2019), provided by the ISSDA. Accessed via the Irish Social Science Data Archive – 
www.ucd.ie/issda.  
Notes:  Jobs are classified in terms of their skill level and content using 1-digit ISCO 08 categories. 
 
Regarding the occupational groups we show their nationality breakdowns in 
Table 2.5. Workers from the UK are especially prevalent in Professional 
occupations (25 per cent) and Service and sales positions (17 per cent), although 
these rates are similar to the total and the rate for Irish workers. UK workers are 
not prominent among Agricultural workers (1 per cent). Workers from EU-West are 
heavily concentrated in Professional occupations (31 per cent) and in Technical 
roles (23 per cent), they are less often located in Agricultural occupations or in 
Plant and machinery occupations (4 per cent). Migrants from EU-East are especially 
likely to hold Elementary occupations (22 per cent) and Craft and related positions 
(16 per cent), they are unlikely to work in Agricultural positions (1 per cent) and in 
Management positions (5 per cent). Migrants from the ‘Rest of the World’ are 
located in Professional positions (31 per cent) and in Service and sales positions 
(20 per cent).  
2.3 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
Finally, we will consider Ireland’s indicators relative to the UK, and the average 
figures for EU28 countries. We list these figures in Table 2.6 focusing on 
employment, unemployment, and activity rates for Ireland, the UK (where labour 
market conditions and institutions are similar to Ireland), and average rates for the 
EU28 countries in 2018 and 2019. We split these figures by nationality considering 
rates for Irish nationals, non-Irish nationals and for non-EU nationals. Note that the 
figures for Ireland presented here are slightly different to those shown in Table 2.1 
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because they relate to the entire year, rather than just the first quarter of 
2018-2019. 
 
TABLE 2.6 COUNTRY COMPARISONS Q1 2018 AND 2019 
Reporting 
country Nationality Employment rate 
Unemployment 
rate Activity rate 
  2018 2019 2018 2019 2018 2019 
Ireland 
Non-EU Nationals 64.8 64.8 8.7 7.2 70.9 69.8 
All non-Irish nationals 72.6 72.7 6.9 5.7 78.0 77.2 
Irish Nationals 67.9 68.9 5.7 4.9 72.0 72.5 
UK 
Non-EU Nationals 62.9 64.7 6.8 6.7 67.6 69.4 
All non-UK nationals 74.0 74.8 4.6 4.5 77.5 78.3 
UK nationals  74.8 75.2 4.0 3.7 77.9 78.1 
EU28 
Non-EU Nationals 56.6 58.0 15.2 14.1 66.8 67.5 
All foreign nationals 
living in EU28 countries  64.0 65.0 11.5 10.7 72.3 72.8 
 Host country nationals 
(natives) 69.0 69.7 6.5 6.0 73.8 74.1 
 
Source: Eurostat, Employment, unemployment, and activity rates (2018 and 2019). Series lfsa_ergan, lfsa_urgan, and lfsa_argan. 
Notes: Analysis is restricted to the working-age population (15-64) in all cases. Respondents are classified according to whether they 
are citizens or not of the country they are living in. All foreign nationals includes those born in other EU countries and non-EU 
countries. The data in Table 2.5 refer to annual averages for 2018 and 2019, which may lead to discrepancies between these 
data and indicators reported in Table 2.1, which refer to Quarter 1 of both years. 
 
The employment rate among natives in Ireland (68 per cent in 2018 and 69 per 
cent in 2019) was just below the EU average (69 per cent in 2018 and 2019), and 
both were substantially lower than the equivalent rate in the UK, which has 
achieved higher overall employment rates in recent years (75 per cent in 2018 and 
2019). The employment rate of all foreign residents in Ireland, at 72 per cent, was 
higher than the average rates of foreign residents elsewhere in the EU. However, 
these Irish and EU rates fell below the employment rate of 75 per cent among 
foreign residents in the UK. In general, the employment rates of those from non-
EU countries were lower than the average for all foreign residents throughout 
Europe, including both Ireland and the UK. The employment rate among non-EU 
nationals in Ireland and the UK are similar (65 per cent) and both are a good deal 
higher than the EU average (56 per cent). 
 
In general, unemployment rates are higher among non-nationals than natives. 
Ireland follows this pattern, though the gap is not likely to be significant. The 
average unemployment rate among all non-nationals in Ireland in 2018 was 7 per 
cent, compared to 6 per cent among natives. This gap between nationals and non-
nationals is much lower in Ireland than is found, on average, in the EU28 (see 
Table 2.6). The unemployment rate among non-EU nationals living in Ireland was 
higher than the average for all non-Irish nationals, though among this group the 
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unemployment rate in Ireland, at 8 per cent in 2018, was substantially lower than 
the EU average for non-EU nationals at 15 per cent. 
 
The activity rate reflects patterns of both employment and unemployment. The 
activity rate of Irish natives, 72 per cent, is similar to the corresponding EU average 
and nearly six percentage points lower than that for natives in the UK. However, 
overall activity rates of non-Irish in Ireland (78 per cent) are higher than among 
Irish nationals, while activity rates among non-nationals are comparable with 
natives, on average, in the UK and on average across the EU (77 and 72 per cent 
respectively). The lowest activity rates were to be found among immigrants from 
non-EU countries – 70 per cent in Ireland, and marginally lower than that, on 
average, in the EU and the UK.  
2.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
Ireland’s recovery from a deep and prolonged recession may soon be challenged 
by a second downturn. Previous Integration Monitors have shown that non-Irish 
nationals were disproportionally affected by the recession, at least when 
compared to Irish nationals, in terms of both employment and unemployment. 
Although the current report presents an optimistic picture where differences are 
slight, it serves as an important reminder of these potential gaps. In the context of 
improving labour market conditions, the gaps between Irish and non-Irish 
residents have receded to the point where they are no longer statistically 
significant. The employment gap between Irish nationals (67 per cent) and non-
Irish nationals (71 per cent) is minor and suggests that migrants are in fact more 
likely to be employed. By 2019, the unemployment gap between Irish nationals 
(5 per cent) and non-Irish nationals (6 per cent) is not statistically significant. The 
unemployment rate was low for both groups.  
 
While these wider averages are informative, we show elsewhere that there are 
substantial differences within the non-Irish group. This is particularly true for 
migrants from outside the EU, who often have lower employment rates when 
compared to Irish nationals. Some of this is linked to lower labour market 
participation rates, for example among Asian nationals. Part of this explanation for 
lower labour market participation rates is linked to the nature of the residence 
permissions: many non-EU migrants came to Ireland to study (see Figure 1.5). As 
noted in Chapter 1, around one-quarter of residence permissions in 2019 were for 
the purposes of work – though some non-EU nationals on different residence 
permits may also work, for example students may work up to 20 hours, and other 
non-EEA nationals in certain categories may also work without an employment 
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permit.51 By 2019, the unemployment rate (that is those in the labour market and 
actively seeking work but not currently employed) among many non-EU groups 
(Asian, North American/Australian/Oceania nationals, ‘Rest of the World’) was 
similar to the unemployment rate among Irish nationals.  
 
Of non-Irish nationals the most disadvantaged group is African nationals, who have 
much lower employment and activity rates, and higher unemployment, than any 
other group of immigrants. However, some of these gaps have closed between 
2018 and 2019, with an increase in employment, and a fall in unemployment for 
this group. By 2019 however the African unemployment rate was 12 per cent, more 
than double that of Irish nationals (5 per cent).  
 
An important qualification is that this chapter does not consider common 
indicators of job quality, such as job security, wages, working hours including 
unsocial hours, harassment, or health and safety. Previous research has found that 
East Europeans, for example, have high employment rates but are much less likely 
to be in professional/managerial jobs and earning higher wages (McGinnity et al., 
2020; Barrett et al., 2017). A detailed current comparison of the working conditions 
of Irish and non-Irish nationals would be a useful complement to labour market 
indicators presented in this chapter.  
 
By comparing labour market indicators for Irish and non-Irish nationals 
immediately prior to the pandemic in 2019, which varied by national group but 
were favourable for most overall, the analysis in this chapter also forms an 
important backdrop to any analysis of COVID-19 and its impact on non-Irish 
nationals in the Irish labour market in 2020.  
  
 
                                                            
 
51  These include family members of Irish/EEA nationals; people with permission to remain; Start-up/entrepreneurs/ 
immigrant investor and long-term residence holders who apply for exemption. As of March 2019, for example, the 
spouses and partners of Critical Skills employment permit holders may also access the labour market without an 
employment permit (see Arnold et al., 2019a). 
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BOX 2.1  ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT 
All nationals of the European Economic Area (EEA) may migrate to Ireland to take up 
employment without restriction. Barrett et al., 2017 outline the different means of 
access to employment applicable to non-EEA nationals. Labour migration policy is 
developed and administered by the Department of Business, Enterprise and 
Innovation in co-operation with the Department of Justice and Equality. As of 2018, 
asylum applicants, who have been waiting on a first instance recommendation on their 
protection application for nine months, may access the labour market by way of a 
permission issued by the Minister for Justice and Equality: the waiting period has 
recently been shortened to six months.52 Since its introduction in June 2018, over 5,500 
permissions to access the labour market have been issued, including over 4,200 
permissions to direct provision residents.53,54 
Most newly arrived non-EEA workers hold a Stamp 1 registration certificate and an 
employment permit. The eight main types of employment permit are: Critical Skills; 
general; intra-company transfers; contract for services; reactivation; internship 
employment permit holders; sport and cultural employment permit holders; and 
exchange agreement employment permit holders.55 As of March 2019, the spouses 
and partners of Critical Skills employment permit holders may access the Irish labour 
market without needing an employment permit. The spouses and partners of other 
employment permit holders may not work unless they hold an employment permit in 
their own right (Arnold et al., 2019). 
The Critical Skills Employment Permit is designed to attract highly skilled non-EEA 
persons to the Irish labour market for occupations deemed critically important to the 
Irish economy or which are experiencing skills shortages. Critical Skills permits are 
issued to non-EEA workers earning a minimum of €60,000 per year. Additionally, a 
restricted number of permits are issued to workers earning a minimum of €30,000 per 
year. General Employment Permits are available for occupations with an annual salary 
of €30,000 or more and for a restricted number of occupations with salaries below 
this.56  
In general, holders of employment permits may only change employers after 12 
months and must apply for a new permit to do so. The Atypical Working Scheme 
administered by the Department of Justice and Equality provides for short-term 
employment contracts in the State, which are not facilitated by the employment 
 
                                                            
 
52  The duration of a labour market access authorisation will increase from six to 12 months. The revised arrangements 
will remove the restriction preventing people accessing employment with public health employers, subject to them 







54  As of the end of July 2020, there were 8,812 applicants for protection awaiting decision (Government of Ireland, 2020c; 
Table 2.2.1). Note until recently a permission was valid for six months and any individual can have multiple permissions, 
and not all applicants are eligible to apply for one (i.e. if they haven’t been waiting for a decision for the required 
amount of time). 
55  See https://dbei.gov.ie/en.  
56 See https://dbei.gov.ie/en/What-We-Do/Workplace-and-Skills/Employment-Permits/Permit-Types. 
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permit system. A total of 2,911 applications were approved under this scheme in 2017 
(Sheridan, 2019).  
In 2018 the Department of Business, Entrepreneurship and Innovation published a 
Review of Economic Migration Policy; Report of the Inter-Departmental Group 
(Department of Business, Entrepreneurship and Innovation, 2018). One finding was 
the need to introduce a seasonal work permit. A Pilot Scheme in the Agri-Sector was 
introduced, with employment permit quotas for occupations in agriculture, previously 
deemed ineligible. The quotas were filled, and the sector submitted a request for an 
extension of the scheme (see Polakowski, forthcoming). 
A total of 13,398 employment permits were issued during 2018. The top nationality 
was Indian with 4,313 permits. The top three sectors were the Service industry, 
Medical and nursing, and Industry (Sheridan, 2019). Despite a significant increase in 
the numbers issued in recent years, holders of employment permits still account for a 
very small proportion of migrant workers in Ireland.  
Self-employment 
An Immigrant Investor Programme was introduced in 2012 and facilitates non-EEA 
nationals and their families who commit to an approved investment in Ireland.57 The 
Start-Up Entrepreneur Programme, introduced to attract ‘high-potential start-ups’ in 
2012 was renewed in 2020 (See McNamara and Quinn, 2020). 
Support with accessing employment 
Several support organisations may be accessed by migrants in Ireland, including Intreo, 
a service of the DEASP, which was formed through the merger of social welfare offices, 
FÁS and community welfare officers. The EPIC programme in Business in the 
Community Ireland is one of several migrant employability programmes funded by the 
Department of Justice and Equality.58 Migrants who are in receipt of Jobseeker’s 
payments may also be referred to JobPath, a job-seeking support service provided by 
private companies on contract from DEASP. These services may be accessed by EU 
citizens and non-EEA citizens with Stamp 4 residence permission.  
Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI) has a range of responsibilities, including 
facilitating the recognition of qualifications gained outside the State. An online 
international qualifications database is maintained, which lists certain foreign 
qualifications and provides advice regarding the comparability of a qualification to one 
gained in Ireland. Individuals whose qualifications are not listed in the database may 
apply to the qualifications recognition service, part of Quality and Qualifications 
Ireland, to have their qualification recognised.59 
  
 
                                                            
 
57  Investment terms range from a minimum investment of €450,000 to €2 million, See: www.inis.gov.ie/en. 
58  RISE, the Refugee Interactive Skills for Employment project, https://rise-project.eu and the Immigrant Integration 
Initiative, run by NASC, are two others.  
59  www.qqi.ie. 
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CHAPTER 2 APPENDIX  
 
TABLE A2.1  LOGISTIC REGRESSION, UNEMPLOYMENT LFS Q1 2018 AND 2019 (POOLED)  
 M1 Unemployed M2 Unemployed 
Ref: Irish 1 1 
UK 1.60** 1.85*** 
EU-West 0.96 1.17 
EU-East 1.20 1.08 
North America, Australia and Oceania 1.82 2.44* 
Africa 2.95*** 2.74*** 
Asia 1.41 1.61 
Rest of the World 1.48 1.54 
Ref: Female  1 
Male  1.11 
Age  0.98*** 
Ref: Couples no kids  1 
Couples kids  1.02 
Lone parent family  2.12*** 
Single  1.469*** 
Ref: Does not hold third-level degree 1 
Holds third-level degree 0.445*** 
Observations 31,383 31,383 
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled LFS Q1 2018 and 2019. Labour force participants only.  
Note:  ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
The models above consider the odds of unemployment. Model 1 looks only at 
migrant groups relative to Irish nationals. UK and African nationals have 
significantly higher odds of unemployment when compared to Irish nationals, and 
the other migrant groups have similar odds of unemployment relative to Irish 
nationals. Model 2 considers three explanatory measures as well as nationality 
groups, which are gender, age, household type, and a binary measure for 
third-level education. These measures do not explain migrant differences in 
unemployment. Even when we consider these measures, UK and African migrants 
have higher odds of unemployment relative to Irish nationals.  
 
Education and integration | 41 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Education and integration 
By Merike Darmody and Shannen Enright 
 
Educational attainment plays a key role in the integration of both adult and child 
migrants. Limited action by governments, education systems and wider society in 
supporting the integration of migrants can lead to poorer economic and social 
outcomes which can span more than one generation (OECD, 2019). Third-level 
graduates are more likely to be employed compared to non-graduates in all OECD 
countries (OECD, 2012). Higher educational attainment is also associated with 
higher income levels: in 2016, individuals aged 25 to 64 with third-level degrees 
earned 54 per cent more than those with upper secondary education (OECD, 
2018b). Individuals with higher educational attainment also have better physical 
health, improved socio-emotional wellbeing and are more actively involved in their 
societies (Ibid.).  
 
Reflecting Ireland’s immigration history, many non-Irish nationals are first-
generation immigrants who arrived in Ireland as adults (McGinnity et al., 2020). 
Compared to countries with a longer history of immigration, the proportion of 
second-generation immigrants, defined as children born in Ireland with immigrant 
parents, is notably lower. Considering the age profile, the majority of migrants 
completed their formal education in their home countries, which impacts any 
assessment of possible benefits accrued to them through participation in Irish 
education. As migrants in Ireland are a very heterogeneous group, the levels of 
educational attainment among this group are likely to vary between and within 
countries of origin.  
 
Section 3.1 of this chapter compares the levels of educational attainment of the 
Irish and non-Irish population, focussing on third-level education. It also explores 
the level of early school leaving among Irish and non-Irish nationals. This section 
also discusses the levels of educational attainment of migrant groups who received 
their formal education in Ireland or abroad. The educational outcomes for 
immigrant children who have received (at least some of) their schooling in the Irish 
educational system are examined in Section 3.2. 
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3.1  EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES FOR ADULTS IN IRELAND 
3.1.1  Educational attainment 
Educational attainment refers to the highest level of education that an individual 
has successfully completed. Educational attainment levels of foreign-born 
working-age populations vary across European countries. In Luxembourg, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Ireland, Poland and Estonia half of this group had attained 
third-level education in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020a). 
 
Table 3.1 uses Labour Force Survey (LFS) data to present a comparison of 
educational attainment between working-age Irish and non-Irish nationals. 
Conforming to previous issues of the Integration Monitor, data available at the 
time of writing from the first quarter of the previous two years, 2018 and 2019, 
were combined to boost sample size. The measure of educational attainment used 
here is a recoded version of the standard ISCED variable. There are four categories: 
a group with no education beyond lower-secondary level (including people with no 
formal education); respondents with upper secondary (Leaving Certificate or 
equivalent) only; people with Post-Leaving Certificate qualifications,60 and people 
with third-level qualifications. The ‘Post-Leaving Certificate’ group is relatively 
small, making up only 13 per cent of the population, meaning that estimates for 
some groups need to be considered with some caution. The analysis is restricted 
to the working-age population, between the ages of 15 and 64.  
 
In line with previous Integration Monitors, the results show large statistical 
differences in educational attainment between the non-Irish and Irish populations 
with the former group holding a significant advantage. The probability of having no 
formal education or just secondary education is over twice as high for the Irish 
population (24 per cent) compared to the non-Irish (11 per cent). Over half of the 
non-Irish population (52 per cent) has a third-level degree compared to 38 per cent 
of the Irish population. This may be explained by the selection effect whereby 
people with higher propensity to migrate tend to be highly educated, particularly 
college-educated individuals and younger individuals (between 20-40 years of age) 
(Peri and Sparber, 2011). For non-EU nationals, this may be linked to selective 
migration policy, whereby work permits are typically issued for high-skilled jobs 
that require non-EU migrants to be highly skilled (McGinnity et al., 2020). However, 
as discussed earlier in the report, low employment rate among some non-EU 
groups (e.g. relatively highly educated African nationals) is of concern. This could, 
in part, be explained by discrimination of certain migrant groups in the labour 
 
                                                            
 
60  A Post-Leaving Certificate course is taken after a student has passed their Leaving Certificate, and is generally a one- 
or two-year course. PLC courses are aimed primarily at students who would like to develop vocational or technological 
skills in order to enter an occupation, or go on to higher education. 
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market or policy of excluding asylum seekers from the labour market in the direct 
provision system (McGinnity and Lunn, 2011; O’Connell, 2019). 
 
TABLE 3.1  HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT BY NATIONALITY, Q1 2018 AND Q1 2019 














(%) Total (000) 
Irish  23.6 24.9 13.2 38.3 6,538.7 
Non-Irish 11.4* 24.3 12.7 51.5* 980.0 
Of which      
UK 19.4* 19.7* 15.0 45.9* 204.4 
EU-West 4.9* 15.0* 6.6* 73.4* 135.5 
EU-East 12.7* 33.3* 16.4* 37.6 391.3 
N. America, Australia & Oceania 4.1* 11.5* 5.3* 79.1* 31.6 
Africa 15.8* 21.4 13.8 49.0* 40.5 
Asia 5.9* 15.8* 6.9* 71.4* 94.0 
Rest of the World 6.9* 21.5 9.3* 62.3* 82.9 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2018 and Q1 2019 (pooled) weighted. Working-age respondents (15-64). 
Notes:  ‘Third level’ includes non-honours degrees and honours degrees or above; *denotes that the indicator for this group is 
significantly different from Irish nationals at p≤ 0.05.  
 
Although the non-Irish population have an educational advantage in comparison 
to Irish nationals, this varies significantly within the non-Irish group. Educational 
attainment tends to be higher among individuals from high income countries such 
as North America, Australia, Oceania and Western Europe. Approximately 
four-fifths of immigrants from North America, Australia and Oceania and just under 
three-quarters of those from Western Europe had a third-level education, while 
fewer than 5 per cent of each group had the lowest levels of educational 
attainment. The probability of having a third-level qualification was almost twice 
as high for Western Europeans compared to those from Eastern Europe. In line 
with previous Monitors, Eastern European immigrants who comprise the largest 
immigrant group in Ireland, had the lowest levels of educational attainment, with 
13 per cent having educational attainment up to lower secondary school level. 
About a third of these immigrants had upper secondary education and 16 per cent 
had Post-Leaving Certificate equivalent qualifications. The high rates of Post-
Leaving Certificate qualifications among Eastern European migrants may be 
reflective of the vocational nature61 of the education systems in some EU-East 
countries (Ulicna et al., 2016). However, this may also be explained by the profile 
 
                                                            
 
61  Vocational education and training (VET) in Eastern Europe is provided either during secondary or post-secondary 
education with some differences between countries. For example, in the Baltic countries after the completion of 
nine-year Basic School, students move either to a college-bound gymnasium, or secondary vocational schools. The 
latter provides secondary education as well as skills to enter into a specific trade. Vocational education can also be 
undertaken after the completion of gymnasium. 
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of immigrants who had decided to move abroad, namely those with lower levels 
of educational attainment seeking higher paid employment opportunities abroad. 
It could also be driven by the openings in specific employment sectors in Ireland 
(e.g. hospitality, building, manufacturing, service sector). Immigrants from the 
United Kingdom were found to have higher levels of educational attainment than 
Irish nationals. Nearly half (46 per cent) of immigrants from the UK had third-level 
qualifications and were significantly less likely to have no formal education or 
education up to a Junior Certificate level or less (19 per cent) compared to Irish 
nationals (24 per cent). 
 
Asian immigrants and immigrants from the ‘Rest of the World’ group (e.g. Central 
America, South America and Middle East among other countries) also fared better 
than Irish nationals in terms of their levels of educational attainment, in line with 
McGinnity et al., 2020. Both Asian (71 per cent) and ‘Rest of the World’ immigrants 
(62 per cent) had a significantly higher probability of having a third-level 
qualification compared to Irish nationals (38 per cent), although as McGinnity et 
al. (2020) find using 2016 Census data, educational attainment varies considerably 
between different country of origin groups in both the Asian and the ‘Rest of the 
World’ groups. In addition, the proportion of both groups with less than upper 
secondary education is very low indeed (Table 3.3)  
 
While African immigrants had higher educational attainment compared to the Irish 
population, their attainment levels were lower relative to some other immigrant 
groups (with the exception of Eastern European and UK immigrants). The African 
group (49 per cent) is significantly more likely to have a third-level education 
compared to the Irish population (38 per cent). Similarly, African immigrants 
(16 per cent) are significantly less likely to have a Junior Certificate qualification or 
less compared to the Irish population (24 per cent). This finding may reflect Irish 
immigration policy that favours highly educated entrants from non-EU countries. 
 
It is possible that some of the educational advantage enjoyed by migrants in Ireland 
can be attributed to their age profile. Younger people are more likely to have 
third-level education in both the Irish and non-Irish populations. The analysis 
showed that when considering the working-age category as a whole, all immigrant 
groups (with the exception of the UK) were younger than the Irish population. This 
is especially true for immigrants from the ‘Rest of the World’ group, as well as those 
from Asia and Africa who had median ages of 30, 32, and 34 compared to 42 for 
Irish nationals. In order to determine whether differences in educational 
attainment are partially due to the age of immigrant groups, we compare 
attainment of third-level education while restricting the age group to those aged 
25 to 34 (see Figure 3.1). 
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As predicted, utilising this approach, the probability of having a third-level 
education increased substantially for Ireland rising from 38 per cent to 53 per cent. 
The non-Irish groups also show an increase in the attainment level from 52 per cent 
to 60 per cent; however, this increase is smaller than that seen with the Irish group. 
Despite the increase in educational attainment among Irish nationals while 
considering the younger age category, a significant difference is still found 
between non-Irish and Irish nationals. 
 
FIGURE 3.1  SHARE OF 25-34 YEAR AGE GROUP WITH THIRD-LEVEL EDUCATION, Q1 2018 AND 
Q1 2019 (POOLED) 
 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2018 and Q1 2019 (Pooled) weighted. Age 25-34 years.  
Notes:  Figure lists proportions and 95 per cent confidence intervals by group. 
 
The largest differences can be seen for migrants from Africa (60 per cent),62 ‘Rest 
of the World’ (73 per cent), Western Europe (84 per cent) and North America/ 
Australia/Oceania (88 per cent). The probability of having third-level education 
increases 11 per cent when the analysis is restricted to young adults in these 
regions. We also find that the educational advantage migrant groups have over 
Irish nationals decreases when age is restricted to those aged 25-34. In the 
unrestricted analysis (see Table 3.1), non-Irish nationals had a 13-percentage point 
advantage to Irish nationals compared to 7 percentage points when age is 
restricted to 25-34. Although this advantage decreases, migrants from North 
America, Australia and Oceania, Western Europe, Asia and ‘Rest of the World’ still 
have a significantly higher educational advantage over Irish nationals.  
 
 
                                                            
 
62  Note that despite high qualifications, the unemployment rate for African nationals in this age group is still very high – 
























Africa Asia Rest of
World
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Migrants from Eastern Europe are a distinct group among the other migrants in 
terms of their age and levels of educational attainment. While their levels of 
educational attainment at a third level are similar to that of Irish nationals when a 
wider range of respondents’ ages (15-64) are considered, the likelihood of having 
a third-level education is significantly lower for the younger age category when 
compared to the Irish nationals (39 per cent versus 53 per cent) (see Figure 3.1).  
 
In order to determine whether differences in third-level education were due to the 
age gradient between groups, a regression analysis was carried out which 
controlled for respondent’s age (see Table A3.1). The results show that even after 
accounting for age and gender, the odds of having third-level education were 
significantly higher for all migrant groups compared to the Irish nationals, with the 
exception of Eastern European migrants. However, there was no significant 
difference between Eastern European migrants and Irish nationals after accounting 
for respondent’s age. 
 
Considering the way age and education related data are grouped in the dataset, it 
is not possible to establish to what extent the educational advantage experienced 
by migrants is a result of immigrants doing well in the Irish education system, or of 
selective migration of graduates from source countries. Existing studies indicate 
that in many cases immigrants lag behind their peers in the education systems of 
the host countries due to language difficulties, economic deprivation, low levels of 
prior education and unfamiliarity with the new education system, with low levels 
of attainment reported for some groups such as Eastern Europeans in the UK 
(Demie, 2019). However, despite disadvantaged backgrounds many migrants have 
high educational aspirations, expectations and motivation to do well in school 
(Friberg, 2019; Faas et al., 2019). 
 
In order to gauge the link between educational attainment and region where 
migrants obtained their education, an analysis is undertaken utilising LFS data. 
Table 3.2 uses LFS data to present a comparison of education attained in Ireland 
and abroad between Irish and non-Irish nationals. Respondents were classified as 
having been educated abroad if the years since a respondent completed their 
formal education was greater than their length of time in the country.63  
 
 
                                                            
 
63  Educated in Ireland or abroad was calculated using the best available variables. However, it only represents the highest 
level of educational attainment achieved by respondents. For example, if someone arrived in Ireland five years ago and 
completed their third-level education a year ago, they would be defined as educated in Ireland despite receiving most 
of their formal education abroad. 
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TABLE 3.2  COUNTRY WHERE THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF FORMAL EDUCATION WAS COMPLETED, 
Q1 2018 AND Q1 2019 (POOLED) 
 Educated in Ireland (%) Educated Abroad (%) N (000) 
Irish  96.1 3.9 5,574.8 
Non-Irish 22.0* 78.0* 907.4 
Of which    
UK 27.4* 72.6* 185.7 
EU-West 17.6* 82.4* 124.2 
EU-East 21.6* 78.4* 365.9 
North America, 
Australia & Oceania 20.5* 79.5* 29.4 
Africa 37.5* 62.5* 36.8 
Asia 21.1* 78.9* 87.6 
Rest of the World 11.9* 88.1* 77.9 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2018 and Q1 2019 (pooled) weighted. Working-age population (18-64). 
Notes:  *denotes that the indicator for this group is significantly different from Irish nationals at p≤ 0.05.  
 
As expected, non-Irish nationals (78 per cent) were significantly more likely to have 
received their highest level of formal education outside Ireland compared to Irish 
nationals (4 per cent). Migrants from the ‘Rest of the World’ (12 per cent), Western 
Europe (18 per cent) and North America, Australia and Oceania (21 per cent) are 
the least likely to have received their education in Ireland whereas those from 
Africa (38 per cent) and the UK (27 per cent) are the most likely to have received 
their highest level of education in Ireland.64 Despite a significant proportion having 
been educated in Ireland, African-origin migrants have higher level of 
unemployment and work in lower skill jobs, as discussed earlier in the report. 
 
Table 3.3 shows the proportion of Irish nationals educated in Ireland or abroad 
with a third-level education. The analysis presented here shows that for most 
migrant groups (except the ‘Rest of the World’) educational attainment did not 
differ by the country where education was completed. Just under half of migrants 
from ‘Rest of the World’ (48 per cent) who were educated in Ireland have a 
third-level education compared to 68 per cent of those educated abroad. As 
mentioned previously, this may be linked to selective migration policy which 
favours highly skilled and educated applicants from non-EU countries. There is also 
likely to be variation within this group.  
 
 
                                                            
 
64  Numbers are too small in the sample to explore whether the highest qualification achieved differs systematically 
between those educated in Ireland and those educated abroad.  
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TABLE 3.3  PROPORTION NON-IRISH EDUCATED IN IRELAND OR ABROAD WITH THIRD-LEVEL 
EDUCATION, Q1 2018 AND Q1 2019 (POOLED) 
  Educated in Ireland Educated Abroad 




All non-Irish 49.2 472 53.3 1,800 
          
UK 48.1 124 47.0 320 
EU-West 73.3 81 73.1 364 
EU-East 39.0 156 38.9 587 
Rest of the World# 48.3 61 67.8 325 
Asia 69.1 50 72.3 204 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2018 and Q1 2019 (pooled).  
Notes:  #The African, North American groups needed to be merged with ‘Rest of the World’ given small numbers in some cells.  
3.1.2  Early school leaving among young adult immigrants  
In Ireland, there has been a notable decline in early school leaving over the last 
decade (Smyth et al., 2019). The legal definition of early school leaving in Ireland 
refers to non-participation in school before reaching the age of 16 years or before 
completing three years post-primary education, whichever is later. Young people 
who leave the education system prematurely, without qualifications, are likely to 
face a number of barriers when entering the labour market as well as increased 
levels of social exclusion. Early school leaving can be predicted by educational 
expectations of the individuals, including expectations to drop out of school as 
these expectations are closely linked to realised educational career patterns (Hippe 
and Jakubowski, 2018). Drawing on PISA and Eurostat data, the report indicates 
that the reasons why students expect to leave school early are the same for both 
immigrant students and natives across Europe. The school environment appears to 
play a key role in shaping educational expectations. 
 
In Table 3.4 we examine the lowest educational attainment levels by analysing 
early school leavers among nationality groups. This Monitor uses the Eurostat 
definition of early school leavers which is defined as the proportion of ‘those aged 
18-24 with, at most, lower secondary education and who were not in further 
education or training’ (Eurostat, 2020b). As the analysis of age groups is restricted 
by the groups within the LFS, we focus on the proportion of early school leavers 
aged 20-24. In line with previous Monitors we find no significant difference in the 
proportion of early school leavers between Irish (4.3 per cent) and non-Irish 
nationals (3.7 per cent). We find that migrants from the UK (5.3 per cent) and 
Eastern Europe (6.7 per cent) have higher probabilities of leaving the education 
system prematurely, compared to Irish nationals. Similar to the educational 
advantage of non-EU nationals seen in Table 3.1 we see lower proportions of early 
school leavers among non-EU migrants compared to Irish nationals. Due to very 
small numbers of early school leavers, the analysis cannot present figures for North 
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America/Australia/Oceania, Africa and ‘Rest of the World’ (see Chapter 3 
Appendix). Asian migrants were found to have a very low probability of leaving 
school early. As mentioned previously, the educational advantage possessed by 
non-EU migrants is likely due to the selection effect of Irish immigration policy 
which favours individuals holding high skilled occupations. It is important to note 
that the differences between migrant groups and Irish nationals are not statistically 
significant; however, this is likely due to the small numbers within the migrant’s 
early leaver groups. 
 
TABLE 3.4  SHARE OF NATIONALITY GROUPS AGED 20-24 DEFINED AS EARLY SCHOOL LEAVERS, 
Q1 2018 AND Q1 2019 (POOLED) 
 Early School Leavers (%)  Number of Early Leavers (Weighted) 
Irish  4.3 21,658 
Non-Irish 3.7 2,735 
UK 5.3 586 
EU-West 2.5 204 
EU-East 6.7 1,625 
North America, Australia & Oceania ** ** 
Africa ** ** 
Asia 2.3 320 
Rest of the World ** ** 
 
Source:  Labour Force Survey Q1 2018 and Q1 2019 (Pooled). Eurostat indicator of early school leaving.  
3.2  IMMIGRANT CHILDREN IN IRISH SCHOOLS 
Section 3.1 focused on educational differences between Irish and non-Irish adults. 
In this section we turn our attention to differences in the educational attainment 
for children still in the formal education system. The education of the children of 
immigrants, raised and educated in the host country, is seen as a major integration 
outcome and is considered a benchmark for integration (OECD, 2015b). School 
participation and educational achievement are important protective factors for 
immigrant children as they build their lives in the host countries (McGinnity and 
Darmody, 2019). A considerable body of evidence reviewing educational 
achievement of young people refers to a gap between immigrant and native 
children, although differences exist between countries as well as between groups 
of immigrants (Volante et al., 2018; OECD, 2015b; Demie, 2019). First-generation 
immigrant students,65 and, to a smaller extent, second-generation immigrant 
students66 tend to be less successful than their native peers (Algan, et al., 2010; 
Dustmann et al., 2012; OECD, 2015b). Immigrant-origin children are also found to 
 
                                                            
 
65  Students born outside the destination country whose parents were also born outside that country. 
66  Those born in the destination country to parents who were born outside of the country. 
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experience greater difficulties in making a transition to post-primary schools, 
compared to the native young people (Williams et al., 2018).  
 
Previous research has found that immigrants experience educational disadvantage 
compared to natives, though this varies across countries and groups (Sylke, 2007; 
Volante et al., 2018). This section examines educational differences between 
immigrant and native children using the 2018 PISA data, an international survey 
conducted every three years. The PISA survey focusses on academic achievement 
of 15-year-old learners in formal assessments in reading, Mathematics and 
Science. In general, Ireland performs higher than the OECD average in all three 
domains. Fifteen is the target age because this represents the end of compulsory 
schooling in many countries. While the 2018 assessment focussed mainly on 
reading literacy, it also collected information on Science and Mathematics. This 
section will focus on scores across all three dimensions for consistency with the 
previous Integration Monitors and as these are generally recognised as core skills. 
 
In Ireland 167 secondary schools took part in PISA 2018, with 5,577 students 
completing the assessment. The OECD calculates an immigrant background index 
(IMMIG) based on variables within the survey and differentiates between native 
students, first-generation students and second-generation students. Native 
students are defined as those who were born in Ireland and who have at least one 
parent born in Ireland,67 first-generation students are defined as those born 
abroad whose parents were also born outside of Ireland, and second-generation 
students are defined as students who were born in Ireland but whose parents were 
born outside of the country (OECD, 2011). Using the IMMIG classification, 18 per 
cent of students have an immigrant background with 10 per cent of students 
classified as first-generation immigrants and 8 per cent classified as second-
generation immigrants. Ireland’s proportion of second-generation students (8 per 
cent) does not differ from the OECD average (8 per cent). However, Ireland has a 
substantially larger proportion of first-generation students (10 per cent) compared 
to the OECD average (6 per cent) reflecting its immigration history and profile of 
immigrants. Previous research has emphasised the importance of language in 
academic achievement, specifically whether the language spoken in the home 
matches the language of instruction in schools (Darmody and Smyth, 2018a). 
Grouping students by background and language we find that 82 per cent of 
students are native Irish; 9 per cent of students have an immigrant background 
with English or Irish spoken in the home; and 9 per cent of students have an 
immigrant background with another language spoken in the home. Table 3.4 
presents mean achievement scores in English reading, Mathematics and Science 
by immigrant status and language spoken in the home. 
 
                                                            
 
67  It is unclear how those from Northern Ireland are counted in the PISA data.  
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TABLE 3.5  MEAN SCORES IN ENGLISH READING, MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE BY STUDENTS’ 
IMMIGRANT AND LANGUAGE BACKGROUND IN IRELAND, PISA 2018 
 
Source:  Results generated from OECD PISA data explorer. https://pisadataexplorer.oecd.org/ide/idepisa. 
Note:  * significantly different from Irish nationals at the p<.05 level. 
 
Mean English reading scores do not differ significantly between Irish 15-year olds 
and immigrants from an English-speaking background. First-generation immigrants 
from an English-speaking background were found to have higher English scores 
than Irish students but this difference is not statistically significant. However, first-
and second-generation immigrants who speak another language at home have 
significantly lower reading scores than Irish students, with their reading scores 
falling 22 to 28 points below the Irish average. For Mathematics, first-generation 
immigrant students were found to have similar scores to Irish students. In contrast, 
second-generation students from an English-speaking background and other 
language background have Mathematics scores 10 to 11 points below the Irish 
average although again this difference is not statistically significant. For Science 
scores, we find that first-generation migrants outperform Irish students, with those 
who speak English in the home scoring 12 points higher on average. Similar to the 
results found for Mathematics we find that second-generation immigrants score 
worse than Irish students with those who speak another language at home scoring 
11 points lower. Again, differences in Science scores are not statistically significant 
(see Table 3.5). 
 
These findings are consistent with previous studies for reading, Mathematics and 
Science scores using 2015 PISA data (McGinnity et al., 2018; Darmody and Smyth, 
2018a), and for studies on reading and Mathematics using earlier waves of PISA 
data (2006, 2009 and 2012) (McGinnity et al., 2011; 2012; 2014). Using PISA data 
from 2015, Darmody and Smyth (2018a) found that students from a non-English 
speaking household had significantly lower scores across all three subjects than 
students from English speaking households. Students of immigrant origin at age 
nine were also found to have significantly lower Drumcondra scores in reading and 
Mathematics than Irish students (ibid.). However, at age 13, differences in 










Irish 522 502 498 82% 
First-Generation, English Speaking 
Background 526 498 510 3% 
First-Generation, Other Language 500* 501 499 7% 
Second-Generation, English Speaking 
Background 514 492 494 6% 
Second-Generation, Other Language 494* 491 487 2% 
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Overall, these data show that immigrant students who do not speak English in the 
home have lower PISA reading scores at age 15 compared to their Irish 
counterparts. It is worth noting that English language background has more of an 
effect on reading scores than whether immigrant students are first or second 
generation. This highlights the importance of language proficiency in shaping 
educational outcomes. As English is used in a large proportion of subjects in 
secondary school, poor English language ability may negatively impact 
performance in other subjects.  
3.3  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter examined the educational attainment of the non-Irish national and 
Irish population, as well as subject scores at age 15. Non-Irish adults aged 15 to 64 
were significantly more likely to have a third-level educational qualification 
compared to Irish adults. This is partly due to the fact that non-Irish nationals are 
on average younger than Irish nationals (with the exception of UK immigrants). 
Focusing on younger respondents (aged 25-34), we find that the gap in third-level 
education between non-Irish and Irish nationals narrows, however non-Irish 
nationals still have significantly higher attainment. The rate of early school leavers 
was low among immigrants and the Irish population. Non-Irish nationals are 
slightly less likely to be early school leavers compared to Irish nationals, but this 
difference was not significant. 
 
In order to counter early school leaving and longer-term disadvantage it is 
important to provide opportunities for early intervention and support not just for 
all disadvantaged individuals, but also families and communities (Darmody and 
Smyth, 2018b). For young people, participation in school engagement programmes 
helps them to engage with schools more fully and, in so doing, assists in addressing 
the issue of early school leaving (Smyth et al., 2015). The importance of such 
interventions cannot be underestimated, as the early leaver group are becoming 
more disadvantaged and require greater levels of assistance (Smyth et al., 2019). 
There is some evidence suggesting that migrant youth seem to be less likely to 
participate in programmes such as Youthreach (making up an average of 6 per cent 
of the learners across centres; see Smyth et al., 2019). Low participation rates may, 
in part, be explained by lack of information about such support programmes (ibid.). 
 
There is substantial variation in educational attainment among nationality groups. 
North American, Australian and  , Western European and Asian immigrants have 
the highest levels of third-level educational attainment among the working-age 
population. Eastern Europeans, UK, and African immigrants have the lowest levels 
of third-level educational attainment among all immigrant groups (see Table 3.1). 
Eastern European and UK nationals have higher levels of early school leaving 
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compared to Irish nationals though these differences are not significant (see 
Table 3.4). 
 
Although the majority of non-Irish nationals received their education abroad (see 
Table 3.2), a significant proportion of African and UK migrants received their 
education in Ireland. There is an increasing population of students of migrant origin 
passing through the Irish school system, with first or second-generation migrants 
constituting 18 per cent of 15-year-old students in the PISA student survey (see 
Table 3.5). This compares to 8 per cent of 15-year-old students in the 2006 PISA 
data when this integration monitoring exercise began (McGinnity et al., 2011). 
Reading scores are significantly lower for immigrant students who speak a 
language other than English in the home compared to Irish nationals, regardless of 
whether they are first or second-generation immigrants. Second-generation 
students have lower scores than Irish nationals or first-generation students on all 
three subjects (reading, Mathematics and Science) however, differences in 
Mathematics and Science scores were not significant. The findings presented in 
this chapter confirm the information presented in previous Monitors showing 
differences between countries regarding educational attainment among the adult 
population. As for migrant children in schools, the chapter has shown differences 
in academic achievement that vary by language spoken in the home and by 
generation.  
 
BOX 3.1  INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS 
 
While not considered ‘immigrants’, international students form a notable proportion 
among the student body in Irish higher education institutions. The Stay Back Option 
allows non-EU/EEA students who have graduated from Irish higher education 
institutions to remain in Ireland for up to 24 months to seek employment. Information 
about their numbers and profile adds another dimension to understanding the profile 
of non-Irish individuals in Ireland.  
In previous years, the sector of international students in Ireland has grown 
substantially, reflecting international trends in the developed countries. The number 
of international student enrolments in Ireland grew from just over 13,600 in the 
2007/2008 academic year to more than 20,600 in 2014/2015 (HEA, 2020a), and 
increased further to more than 27,500 in the 2018/2019 academic year (HEA, 2020b). 
International students accounted for 12 per cent of all enrolments in higher education 
institutions in Ireland in 2018/2019. However, due to COVID-19 related restrictions, 
the numbers of these students are expected to drop substantially. Information 
gathered annually by the Irish Survey of Student Engagement (see 
http://studentsurvey.ie/) indicates that the profile of these students has changed over 
time; while in 2016, 29 per cent of internationally domiciled respondents were from 
the EU, this decreased to 22 per cent in 2019. The proportion of internationally 
domiciled respondents from India, for instance, has increased from 6 per cent in 2016 
to 22 per cent in 2019, making it the country of permanent address of the greatest 
54  |  Monitoring report on integration 
 
proportion of internationally domiciled students to take the survey. There were more 
international students in 2019 studying at postgraduate level, reflecting the rise in the 
numbers of those 24 years of age and above. The students demonstrate high indicator 
scores across all nine of the engagement indicators: higher order learning, reflective 
and integrative learning, quantitative reasoning, learning strategies, collaborative 
learning, student-faculty interaction, effective teaching practices, quality of 
interactions, supportive environment. However, while international students were 
generally positive about their teaching and learning experiences, they experienced 
difficulties in social interaction with other (native) students. 
 
BOX 3.2  NEW INITIATIVES 
 
Compared to the previous Integration Monitor, there have been few changes to 
initiatives targeting migrants or non-native English speakers in the education system 
(see McGinnity et al., 2018, Box 3.1 for a summary of access to education and supports 
available).  
As a response to calls for providing greater diversity within the teaching profession, 
Marino Institute of Education provides a bridging programme for foreign-qualified 
teachers to help them to integrate into Irish schools. The three-year programme is 
funded by the Department of Justice and Equality through the EU Asylum Migration 
and Integration Fund (AMIF) with co-funding provided by the Department of Education 
and Skills and is expected to run until 2022. The initiative offers annual Bridging 
Programmes, for Immigrant Internationally Educated Teachers (IIETs), and supports 
them through the process of registration as a teacher with the Teaching Council and 
seeking employment. The first bridging programme participants included 34 teachers 
from 17 countries. The programme was supported by DJE, Migrant Integration 
Strategy, National Funding Programme. 
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CHAPTER 3 APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A3.1  LOGISTIC REGRESSION (ODDS RATIO) OF HAVING THIRD-LEVEL EDUCATION, LFS Q1 
2018 AND 2019 (POOLED)  
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled LFS Q1 2018 and 2019. 
Note:  ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
The results show that even after accounting for age and gender, the odds of having 
third-level education were significantly higher for all migrant groups with the 
exception of Eastern European migrants. After accounting for age and gender, East 
European nationals are not significantly more likely to have third-level education 
than Irish nationals.  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Nationality (ref. Irish)   
UK 1.509*** 1.56*** 
EU-West 4.98*** 4.75*** 
EU-East 1.15** 1.07 
Rest of the World 3.16*** 2.90*** 
North America, Australia and Oceania 6.84*** 6.50*** 
Africa 1.83** 1.73** 
Asia 4.68*** 4.42*** 
Age  0.99*** 
Gender (ref. Male)   
Female  1.30*** 
Observations 57,742 57,742 
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CHAPTER 4 
Social Inclusion and integration 
By Bertrand Maître 
4.1  INCOME AND POVERTY 
The Irish government definition of poverty establishes clearly the relationship 
between the experience of living in poverty and social exclusion outcomes: 
People are living in poverty if their income and resources (material, 
cultural and social) are so inadequate as to preclude them from having a 
standard of living which is regarded as acceptable by Irish society 
generally. As a result of inadequate income and resources, people may be 
excluded and marginalised from participating in activities which are 
considered the norm for other people in society. (Government of Ireland, 
1997) 
 
This definition highlights the crucial role of income as a contributing factor to 
people’s economic and social outcomes. While important for all, the role of 
financial resources is likely to be even more crucial for migrants. Indeed, being able 
to generate enough financial resources is a key condition to meet essential and 
basic needs, to good healthcare but also to adequate and good housing. Those 
achievements are essential for successful integration in the host country.  
 
In this chapter we present the key Zaragoza social inclusion indicators by 
nationality including the level of household income, the at risk of poverty rate, self-
reported health status and property ownership. The results presented in this 
chapter are based on the analysis of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC). The SILC survey is the primary data source to measure and monitor poverty 
and social exclusion in Ireland with indicators such as income poverty and material 
deprivation (NAP Inclusion, 2007; Department of Employment Affairs and Social 
Protection, 2018). The analysis is based on a pooled sample for the years 2017 and 
2018. By pooling two years of data we increase the total number of migrants 
classified by nationality so that we can report reliable statistics as well as following 
the CSO statistical disclosure guidelines in relation to insufficient sample cases. In 
2017 the SILC sample included 5,029 households and 12,612 individuals and in 
2018 it was 4,982 households and 11,130 individuals.  
 
Since 2016 the Irish economy growth, as measured by GDP, increased annually by 
8 per cent in 2017 and 2018 (McQuinn et al., 2019) and unemployment rate fell 
below 5 per cent in early 2020 (CSO Statbank). Between 2016 and 2018 the 
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disposable household income increased by 12 per cent and there was an 
improvement in poverty and standard of living. The at risk of poverty rate fell by 
two percentage points and material deprivation by six percentage points to reach 
a low 15 per cent, half of the level at the peak of the recession in 2013.  
 
In this chapter we examine whether the differences we observed in income, 
poverty and standard of living in previous Monitors between Irish and non-Irish 
nationals have been reduced over the recent period. In order to be consistent both 
with other chapters of this volume and with the previous Integration Monitor 
publications, we use the SILC nationality variable to identify the migrant 
population. Therefore, migrants who have settled in Ireland and have since 
naturalised as Irish citizens are identified as Irish nationals (see Chapter 5, also 
Appendix Table A4.a).68  
4.1.1  Household income 
The SILC survey is conducted every year by the CSO since June 2003 and 
households are interviewed throughout the year on a weekly basis. While much of 
the information collected relates to the household current circumstances during 
the year of the interview, the income reference period is the 12 months prior to 
the date of the interview.69 The total annual disposable household income is the 
sum of all sources of income (employment, private pensions, rental income, 
interests, savings, social transfers) of all individuals living in the household, less 
their total tax and social insurance contributions. The vast majority of the income 
information is drawn from two data sources; the Department of Employment 
Affairs and Social Protection social welfare data, and the Revenue Commissioner 
employee income data, which makes the SILC income data extremely reliable. As 
households differ in terms of size and age composition, in order to allow 
comparison between households we adjust household income to these differences 
with an equivalence scale. There are many international equivalence scales 
available, but we use the official national scale as used by CSO. The Irish scale gives 
a weight of 1 to the first adult (aged 14+) and a weight of 0.66 to each additional 
adult and a weight of 0.33 to each child (aged less than 14). The equivalence scale 
for each household is the sum of these weights. The equivalised disposable income 
is then the total disposable household income divided by the equivalence scale. 
The equivalised disposable income is then attributed to each individual in the 
household. Equivalised and non-equivalised household disposable income are 
used by CSO and the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection to 
monitor the trend of household income over time (CSO, 2019; Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection, 2018). The median equivalised and 
 
                                                            
 
68  See Section 5.1 in Chapter 5 for the trend in the number of naturalisations. 
69  For example, during the 2017 survey the income reference period ranges from January 2016 to December 2017. 
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non-equivalised household disposable income is one of the social inclusion 
Zaragoza indicators. 
 
In Table 4.1 we report the median annual disposable household income and 
median annual equivalised disposable household income across the various 
groups. All groups have experienced an increase in the disposable household 
income since 2016.70 The median disposable household income for Irish nationals, 
at €51,658, is significantly higher than for the non-Irish at €46,132. This figure 
represents 89 per cent of the value for Irish nationals, a slightly improvement to 
the gap of 86 per cent observed in 2016 (McGinnity et al., 2018).  
 
The ranking pattern of distribution across groups remained unchanged since the 
2014 and 2016 results (Barrett et al., 2017; McGinnity et al., 2018). UK nationals, 
at €41,268, still report the lowest median income followed by the non-EU at 
€42,771 and the EU-East at €45,188. The EU-West migrants have the largest 
household income at €67,943, 30 per cent higher than Irish national households.  
 
Using the equivalence scale does not change the ranking pattern across groups. 
Irish nationals still have higher median equivalised income (€22,125) than non-
nationals (€19,869). The UK nationals have the lowest median equivalised income 
at €17,757, followed closely by the non-EU and EU-East groups at €18,401 and 
€19,335 respectively. The EU-West nationals at €32,864 is now 49 per cent higher 
than the Irish nationals one as the average household equivalence scale of the 
former (2.1) is lower than the latter (2.3). 
 
TABLE 4.1  YEARLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALISED INCOME, 2017 AND 
2018 (POOLED) 
 Disposable Household Income (Median) € 
Equivalised (needs adjusted) 
Income (Median) € 
No of individuals in each 
group (unweighted) 
Irish 51,658 22,125 21,662 
Non-Irish 46,132* 19,869* 1,898 
Of which:    
UK 41,268* 17,757* 437 
EU-West 67,943* 32,864* 250 
EU-East 45,188* 19,335* 833 
Non-EU 42,771* 18,401* 378 
All 50,762 21,849 23,560 
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled SILC 2017 and 2018, weighted.  
Notes:  Equivalised income is income adjusted for the size and composition of the household, see text for further details. * is to signal 
that the group median is significantly different from the Irish median at p < 0.05. 
 
                                                            
 
70  The median income is the mid-point of the income distribution once incomes have been sorted by from lowest to 
highest. 
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4.1.2  Poverty rates 
In Ireland and at a European level, policymakers use a wide range of economic 
indicators to monitor poverty and social exclusion. We report in Table 4.2 three 
official poverty indicators that are used in Ireland to monitor poverty and social 
exclusion (NAP Inclusion, 2017; Department of Employment Affairs and Social 
Protection, 2018). The most widely used indicator in poverty research is the at risk 
of poverty measure. The at risk of poverty rate identifies individuals that are living 
below a certain percentage of the average (or median) household income of the 
total population. Different proportions of the average (or median) can be used but 
the most widely used poverty threshold is the 60 per cent of the median measure. 
The 60 per cent median poverty threshold is the official poverty line used in Ireland 
and in the EU.  
 
All poverty indicators have their strengths and limits and there is no perfect single 
indicator of poverty that captures the complexity of poverty and social exclusion. 
One of the limits of the at risk of poverty measure is that it is a relative measure 
with a poverty threshold that can change as the economy fluctuates over time, and 
it might fail to capture any change in the standard of living of the population. This 
is why the Irish Government also uses a measure of material deprivation designed 
by the ESRI (Nolan et al., 2002; Whelan et al., 2003) in addition to the at risk of 
poverty indicator. Unlike the at risk of poverty indicator, the advantage of the 
measure of deprivation is that it captures an absolute standard of living and any 
absolute change in people living circumstances.  
 
The basic deprivation measure includes 11 basic items (shoes, clothes, heating etc.) 
that are regarded as essential to fully participate in our society with a minimum 
standard of living.71 A household is materially deprived if its members cannot 
afford to have two or more of these 11 items.  
 
The last indicator is the consistent poverty measure and it is the overlap of the two 
previous measures. A household is consistently poor when it is both at risk of 
poverty and materially deprived.  
 
We report in Table 4.2 the percentage of persons that are experiencing poverty 
according to each of these poverty indicators by groups of the population. 
 
                                                            
 
71  Two pairs of strong shoes; a warm waterproof overcoat; to buy new (not second-hand) clothes; to respectively eat a 
meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; to have a roast joint or its equivalent once 
a week; to have had to go without heating during the last year through lack of money; to keep the home adequately 
warm; to buy presents for family or friends at least once a year; to replace any worn out furniture; to have family or 
friends over for a drink or meal once a month; and to have a morning, afternoon or evening out in the last fortnight for 
entertainment. 
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Since the last Integration Monitor publication, the at risk of poverty rate for the 
total population continued to fall from 16.2 per cent in 2016 to 15.7 per cent in 
2017 and then to a low 14 per cent in 2018. Irish nationals have a much lower at 
risk of poverty rate than non-Irish, 14.5 per cent and 18.1 per cent respectively, 
but large variation within this latter group exists.  
 
The EU-West at 9 per cent has the lowest at risk of poverty rate of all nationalities 
followed by the EU-East at 13 per cent, but it is not significantly different from Irish 
nationals. The at risk of poverty rates for the UK and non-EU groups are much 
higher at 25.3 per cent and 34.8 per cent respectively. Because the latter group is 
quite heterogeneous in composition including people from North America, Asia 
and Africa, we can also expect large variation in at risk of poverty rates within this 
group. 
 
Unlike the at risk of poverty rate, the reduction in the level of deprivation was much 
sharper between 2016 and 2017 and more particularly up to 2018. Indeed, the 
overall percentage of the population materially deprived went from 21 per cent in 
2016 to 18.8 per cent in 2017, to reach 15.1 per cent in 2018 with an average of 
17.1 per cent for the latter two years.  
 
Excluding the very low rate for the EU-West, the percentage range on the 
deprivation measure is also narrower between nationality groups, and there are 
no significant differences in deprivation between the Irish (17 per cent) and the 
non-Irish groups (18 per cent) and the EU-East (19 per cent). We observed the same 
pattern as in 2016 (McGinnity et al., 2018). The UK nationals, at 23 per cent, report 
the highest level of deprivation followed by the non-EU group at 21 per cent. The 
latter group experienced a very sharp reduction in poverty after 2016 as their 
deprivation rate dropped from 35 per cent in 2016 to 21 per cent in 2017/2018. 
 
There are no significant differences for consistent poverty between Irish nationals 
and non-nationals both at 6 per cent, showing a slight improvement from the 
overall consistent poverty result of 8 per cent in 2016. The consistent poverty rates 
for the EU-West and EU-East are lower than for the Irish nationals while they are 
above for the UK and non-EU at almost 10 per cent and 12 per cent respectively. 
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TABLE 4.2  ‘AT RISK OF POVERTY’, DEPRIVATION AND CONSISTENT POVERTY RATES, 2017 AND 
2018 (POOLED) 
 
At Risk of Poverty 
(under the 60 median 
poverty line) (% ) 
Deprivation 
(enforced lack of 2 
or more items) (%) 
Consistent Poverty 
(At Risk + 
Deprived) (%) 
No of individuals 
(unweighted) 
Irish 14.5 17.0 6.2 21,662 
Non-Irish 18.3* 18.0 6.5 1,898 
Of which:     
UK 25.4* 22.8* 9.5* 437 
EU-West 9.1* [4-10] [1-6] 250 
EU-East 13.1 18.7 4.7* 833 
Non-EU 34.8* 21.1* 11.6* 378 
All 14.9 17.1 6.2 23,560 
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled SILC 2017 and 2018, weighted.  
Notes:  * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05. [ ] indicates that the value is in the 
range reported but has to be interpreted with caution due to the small count in the cell.  
4.2  HEALTH STATUS 
Poverty and social exclusion have many and a diverse range of negative outcomes 
on people. There is an extensive body in the poverty and health literature showing 
the strong association between social exclusion and health inequality (Mathieson 
et al., 2008; WHO, 2010; Watson et al., 2016). As migrants might tend to be more 
exposed to poverty and social exclusion there is a strong concern that such 
exposure could have an impact on their physical and mental health and therefore 
on their chances of participation within society. This is the reason why a health 
measure is included in the Zaragoza indicators. In this section we explore the 
general health status of migrants as compared to the Irish population.  
 
In the SILC survey all individuals aged 16 and over have been asked to self-assess 
their health condition from the following question ‘How is your health in general?’. 
From five possible answers ranging from ‘very good’ to ‘very bad’ we report the 
percentage of people reporting having ‘very good’ and ‘good’ health in Table 4.3. 
This is a very standard and widely used approach to measure people’s health 
status. 
 
There has been no change in the overall percentage of the population reporting 
very good or good health (83 per cent) since SILC 2014 and 2016. The pattern and 
level across migrant groups is also almost identical to the one observed in 2016 
(McGinnity et al., 2018). The only difference is in the percentage of UK nationals 
reporting very good or good health which has decreased to 77 per cent from 80 per 
cent in 2016. Overall, non-Irish nationals report better health outcome (88 per 
cent) than the Irish nationals (82 per cent), and there is very little variation across 
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migrant groups with the exception of UK nationals. Western Europeans report the 
highest level of good general health at 92 per cent.  
 
The Irish result showing in general a better health outcome for migrants than for 
the natives is called the ‘healthy immigrant effect’ in the literature. This is not a 
general feature as there are many contradictory country studies showing that 
migrants have poorer health outcomes than the natives such as in France and the 
UK (Dourgnon et al., 2008; Cooper, 2002), while other studies like in Canada and 
Australia (McDonald and Kennedy, 2004; Chiswick et al., 2008) find a ‘healthy 
immigrant effect’. In Ireland, Nolan (2012) also found some evidence for a healthy 
immigrant effect as well as other factors such as education, household income and 
age. Because age is also a contributing factor to better general health, we note that 
indeed non-Irish nationals are much younger on average (39) than Irish nationals 
(47). With the exception of UK migrants with an average age of 53, the average age 
of migrants ranges between 35 and 38. It is quite likely that the poorer health 
outcomes among UK migrants can be partially explained by the older average age 
of this group. Indeed, results from a statistical regression model presented in the 
Chapter 4 Appendix (Table A4.1) show that once we take account of people’s 
characteristics such as age, non-nationals (with the exception of EU-East) are no 
longer significantly different from the Irish nationals in terms of health outcomes.  
 
TABLE 4.3  SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH STATUS BY NATIONALITY, 2017 AND 2018 (POOLED) 
 Very Good or Good health ( % ) 
Mean Age 
(rounded) 
No of individuals 
(16 and over) 
Irish 83.1 47 16,654 
Non-Irish 87.7* 39 1,756 
Of which: 
 UK 76.5* 53 415 
 EU-West 91.9* 38 235 
 EU-East 89.9* 35 751 
 Non-EU 88.1* 35 355 
All 82.8 46 18,410 
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled SILC 2017 and 2018, percentages weighted; N unweighted.  
Notes:  * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05. 
4.3  HOUSING TENURE AND CONDITIONS 
In many societies, for both natives and non-natives, homeownership is very often 
considered as a marker of social and economic success. But more importantly for 
the host country and for migrants, homeownership is also the manifestation of 
social integration in the host country. Across OECD countries, the vast majority of 
migrants are less likely to own their home compared to the natives of the host 
countries (OECD, 2015c). This can be explained by a large number of factors such 
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as the fact that the host country has only a recent history of migration but also by 
the characteristics of the migrant population such as household size, length of stay, 
being young and therefore being more likely to have lower income from work 
(OECD, 2015c; Mundra and Uwaifo Oyelere, 2017; Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra 
2012; Gobillon and Solignac, 2015). In addition to the fact that migrants are more 
likely to have lower household income and savings, the characteristics of the 
property market, the banking sector and credit regulations of the host country can 
also contribute to lower homeownership among migrants.  
 
Since the beginning of the economic recovery, the average first-time buyer house 
prices increased by 56 per cent between 2013 and 2018 (Allen-Coghlan et al., 2019) 
and rental prices increased by 51 per cent on the rental market over the same 
period.72 The recovering economy, rising demand for property and a shortage of 
supply were all factors that contributed to the surge of prices on both markets. 
 
During the survey interviews, some general questions about the household were 
only asked to one person in the household (generally the head of household). 
Therefore, in this section we select this person’s answers (and nationality) about 
the housing conditions. The results reported in the next Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are 
based on a household level rather than at individual level unlike all the previous 
results.  
 
There has been no change for homeownership among Irish nationals since 2016 
unlike all other groups (McGinnity et al., 2018). Indeed, almost 80 per cent of Irish 
nationals own their home while it is only 28 per cent for non-Irish nationals, a fall 
of 6 percentage points since 2016 (McGinnity et al., 2018). Detailed results in 
Table 4.4 show that homeownership fell for the UK and EU-West nationals since 
2016. It went from 74 per cent to 69 per cent for the former group and from 52 per 
cent to 44 per cent for the latter one. There is also large variation in 
homeownership among non-Irish Nationals as unlike the two former groups, 
homeownership does not reach 20 per cent for the EU-East and non-EU groups. 
 
Overall, there has been an increase in the population of private renters since 2016, 
from 12 per cent to 16 per cent, mostly due to the increase among Irish nationals 
on the rental market. The fall in homeownership among non-Irish nationals is 
explained by their sharp rise in privately rented accommodation. In 2016, 51 per 
cent of migrant groups were private renters and it increased to a high 65 per cent 
in 2017/2018. The increase was spread among all non-Irish nationals, but the UK 
 
                                                            
 
72  Author’s calculation based on the RTB Rent index. RTB Rent Index 2019 Quarter 4  
https://onestopshop.rtb.ie/images/uploads/Comms%20and%20Research/RTB_Rent_Index_2019_Q4_%284%29_FIN
AL_WEB.pdf. 
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group had the lowest increase of all, going from 10 per cent in 2016 to 15 per cent 
in 2017/2018. It increased more dramatically for the non-EU and EU-East groups 
going from 62 per cent to 79 per cent and from 72 per cent to 83 per cent 
respectively. There was also a slight increase of private renters among Irish 
nationals as it went from 7 per cent in 2016 to 11 per cent in 2017/2018. The large 
increase of private renters among non-Irish nationals could be due to increased 
difficulty to enter the homeownership market (property price, tighter financial 
regulations for home mortgage etc.). Finally, only half of the EU-West are renting 
private accommodation, much less than the EU-East and non-EU groups. 
 
TABLE 4.4  HOUSING TENURE BY NATIONALITY, 2017 AND 2018 (POOLED) 
Nationality Homeowners (%) Private rented Local Authority Rented  
No of households 
(unweighted) 
Irish 78.4 10.5 11.1 8,392 
Non-Irish 28.3* 64.7* 7.0* 818 
Of which:     
UK 69.0* 14.9  16.2* 235 
EU-West 44.6* [48-61] [<=5] 105 
EU-East [10-15] 83.2* [3-7] 307 
Non-EU [11-19] 78.9* [2-7] 109 
All 73.0 16.4 10.6 9,210 
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled SILC 2017 and 2018, percentages weighted; N unweighted. A small number of households living 
rent-free have been excluded from the analysis.  
Notes:  The questions on homeownership were answered by the person who answered the household questionnaire, and their 
nationality is used. The total number of households does not add up because we have a few cases of non-Irish with no precise 
info about the nationality. * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05. [ ] indicates 
that the value is in the range reported but has to be interpreted with caution due to the small count in the cell (see Chapter 3 
Appendix). 
 
With fewer homeowners and more private renters, Table 4.4 shows that fewer 
people live now in Local Authority (LA) rented accommodation as it went from 
14 per cent in 2016 to 11 per cent in 2017/2018. This reduction could be due to 
the shift in the recent years from the provision of social housing by LA and 
Approved Housing Bodies to a model relying on the private sector through various 
rental subsidies such as rent supplement (Malone, 2019). The fall was modest 
among Irish Nationals as it went from 14 per cent to 11 per cent between 2016 and 
2017/2018, but it was halved for non-Irish Nationals reaching 7 per cent in 
2017/2018. As there was no change for the UK nationals at 15-16 per cent at both 
periods, the large fall took place among the other migrant groups ending with low 
rates in 2017/2017 up to a maximum of 7 per cent.  
 
Poor housing conditions, living in deprived and disadvantaged areas are important 
contributing factors to social exclusion and they affect people in a wide range of 
domains. To cite a few, people living in such circumstances are more exposed to 
lower quality of life and wellbeing (Barnes et al., 2011) and poor physical and 
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mental health (Marmot, 2015; Mendell, 2015). With the exception of a few 
countries, an OECD study found that migrants were more likely to live in poorer 
accommodation standards and in deprived neighbourhoods compared to the 
country natives (OECD 2015c). In Ireland, Grotti et al. (2018) found that non-EU 
nationals were more likely to report higher levels of housing deprivation, live in 
overcrowded accommodations, and that Black people were much more likely to 
experience housing discrimination than White Irish nationals. In a recent study of 
discrimination in the Irish private rental market testing Irish, Polish and Nigerian 
applicants, Gusciute (2019) found that, compared to Irish applicants, Polish 
applicants were less likely to be invited to view a rental property, and Nigerian 
applicants were much less likely to be invited to view a property. 
 
During the SILC interviews, household respondents were asked a few questions 
about the quality of the dwelling, the housing facilities as well as their 
neighbourhoods. From this information we construct two dimensions of 
deprivation, relating to housing and the neighbourhood’s environment as used 
previously by Maître et al. (2006). 
 
The housing deprivation dimension is a four-item scale capturing the lack of 
facilities in the accommodation for hot water, a bath or a shower, indoor toilets 
and central heating. A household is deprived on this dimension if they lack any of 
these four items. 
 
The neighbourhood environment is based on a five-item scale about the area 
where households live as well as poor housing conditions. The environment items 
are about noise from neighbours or from the street, pollution, grime or other 
environmental problems and finally living in an area with crime, violence or 
vandalism. The housing condition items are presence of leaks or dampness in the 
accommodation and having inadequate light. A household is deprived on this 
dimension if they lack any of these five items. 
 
In Table 4.5 we report the percentage of households experiencing any of these 
housing and environmental issues. Overall, non-Irish households are one-and-a-
half times more likely than Irish households to experience housing deprivation at 
15 per cent and 10 per cent respectively while there was no significant difference 
in 2016 (McGinnity et al., 2018). Overall, housing deprivation has slightly increased 
for non-Irish, but it has increased for both Irish and non-Irish private renters since 
2016 with no significant difference between these groups.  
 
Non-Irish households are significantly more deprived on the environment 
dimension than Irish households but there is no significant difference between 
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Irish private renters and non-Irish private renters. Unlike housing deprivation, the 
trend in the level of environment deprivation that we observed since 2014 
(McGinnity et al., 2018) has continued to improve and has been quite sharp among 
non-Irish. 
 
Overall, Irish nationals who are private renters are worse off on both housing and 
environment deprivation than Irish nationals in general, while this is only the case 
on housing for non-Irish nationals.73  
 
TABLE 4.5  HOUSING CONDITIONS, 2017 AND 2018 (POOLED)  
 All Households Private Rented 
 % deprived on 
housing 




% deprived on 
environ. 
Irish 9.6 17.3 15.3 25.7 
Non-Irish 15.0* 20.3* 18.1 21.8 
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled SILC, 2017 and 2018, weighted percentages.  
Notes:  * is to signal that the group value is significantly different from the Irish value at p < 0.05.  
4.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the latest Monitoring report (McGinnity et al., 2018) we highlighted that as the 
economy was recovering from the recession the overall median annual disposable 
household income was increasing for all nationality groups between 2014 and 
2016. While the overall increase is now more modest at 6 per cent (17 per cent 
between 2014 and 2016), the pace of increase has been greater among 
non-nationals (9 per cent versus 6 per cent for Irish nationals). However, there is 
large variation among migrants themselves from a low 8 per cent for the EU-East 
to 32 per cent for the EU-West and the overall gap between Irish nationals and 
non-Irish nationals remained the same as observed in 2016.  
 
During the period 2016 to 2017/2018 the overall at risk of poverty fell slightly from 
17 per cent to 15 per cent and the improvement was spread across all nationality 
groups. The reduction of the at risk of poverty rate was much more pronounced 
among non-Irish nationals which could be due to the faster pace of increase of their 
median annual disposable household income. This was particularly true among the 
non-EU group (though they still report the highest at risk of poverty rate) but the 
heterogeneous composition of this group could hide large variation across 
countries of origins that we cannot explore due the small number of people in 
some cases. In addition, we also observed a general improvement with the 
 
                                                            
 
73  It is likely that non-Irish nationals are living in more recent, and typically better-quality accommodation than many Irish 
nationals. 
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measures of material deprivation and consistent poverty. The improvement 
in material deprivation was particularly important among EU-West migrants 
mirroring the progress achieved with the at risk of poverty measure.  
 
Overall, since 2016 the living standard of the overall population as well as for all 
migrant groups has improved and quite considerably for the latter group. However, 
among this group we have to be careful about the interpretation of these results 
for the non-EU group as the large improvement in their living standard could be 
due to a change in the composition of this group rather than an absolute increase 
in living standards. Table A1.1 shows that the proportion of non-EU nationals in 
Ireland who are Asian has increased modestly since 2016, whereas the proportion 
of other groups within this category such as UK or Africa has not changed 
significantly since 2016. 
 
Since 2016 there has been no change in the level and pattern of the distribution of 
self-assessed health status of migrants and Irish nationals. Non-nationals report 
better health than Irish nationals particularly among EU-West migrants, while it is 
the opposite for UK nationals. With the exception of the UK nationals, who have a 
mean age (53), that is higher than Irish nationals (47), non-Irish nationals tend to 
be much younger than Irish nationals which helps to explain their better health 
outcomes (see Table 4.3). Previous Monitoring reports have already highlighted 
that UK nationals tend to report worse health and poverty outcomes than other 
EU groups (McGinnity et al., 2018; 2014; 2012). This could be because they are 
older on average, and that they have also a labour market history of more 
precarious employment than other EU groups. This would require further 
investigation which is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
Compared to the situation in 2016, there has been some change in relation to 
housing tenure both for Irish and non-Irish. Indeed, while the proportion of 
homeowners among Irish nationals remained identical at 78 per cent, there has 
been an increase among this group into the private rental market due to a 
reduction in LA rented accommodation. We observe a similar situation among 
migrants but with the exception that not only there has there been a substantial 
increase of private renters and a strong reduction in LA renters but also there has 
been a small reduction in the proportion of homeowners. The housing tenure 
pattern shift among migrants is quite likely to be the result of the continuous rising 
prices in the property market, and the more severe restrictions to getting access 
to the mortgage market. Moreover, the absence of significant development of 
social housing during the recent period, and the shift from provision of social 
housing to rental subsidies might have contributed to constraining migrants to the 
private rental market. 
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Finally, migrants are more likely to experience housing and environment 
deprivation than Irish nationals. Since 2016 migrants have also experienced an 
increase in housing deprivation particularly among private renters (as well as for 
their Irish counterparts) but both groups, migrants and Irish nationals have enjoyed 
an improvement in their environment. 
 
In this report findings about the UK migrant groups have been consistent with 
findings from previous Monitoring reports showing that this group tend to report 
worse poverty and health outcomes than other EU groups. This could be due to 
specific current and historic labour market characteristics that would require 
further investigation to fully understand. 
 
BOX 4.1  SOCIAL WELFARE  
 
The social welfare system is administered by the Department of Employment Affairs 
and Social Protection. It is divided into the following main types of payments: 
• Social insurance payments; 
• Social assistance or means tested payments; 
• Universal payments.  
To qualify for social insurance payments an individual must have made the necessary 
number of social insurance (PRSI) payments for the scheme in question and satisfy 
certain conditions. Social assistance payments are made to those who do not have 
enough PRSI contributions to qualify for the equivalent social insurance-based 
payments. Universal payments, such as child benefit, do not require a means test or 
insurance contributions.  
EU law requires that EU nationals are treated equally to Member State nationals in 
regard to accessing social welfare. In practice, national administrative rules lead to 
differing levels of access. This is evidenced in Ireland by the application of a Habitual 
Residence Condition (HRC) to social assistance payments and to child benefit, which 
means that applicants must show they are both resident in and have a proven close 
link to Ireland (Department of Social Protection, 2013).  
Pandemic Unemployment Payment and the Temporary Wage Subsidy Scheme 
Due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on unemployment levels and incomes, 
the government introduced the pandemic unemployment payment (PUP) and the 
temporary wage subsidy scheme (TWSS). PUP is available to both employees and the 
self-employed who lost their job on or after 13 March 2020 due to the pandemic. 
Individuals can apply for PUP if they: 
• are aged between 18 and 66 years old and 
• currently living in the Republic of Ireland and 
• have lost their job due to the COVID-19 pandemic or 
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• have been temporarily laid off due to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
• worked in the Republic of Ireland or were a cross border frontier worker and 
• are not in receipt of any employment income. 
    (COVID-19 Pandemic Unemployment Payment, 2020) 
 
The payment also applies to students, part time workers, and non-EU workers who 
have lost employment due to the pandemic. According to figures from the CSO 
(2020b), 498,750 people were availing of PUP in the week ending 14 June, of which 
28 per cent were non-Irish nationals while 17 per cent of the labour force were non-
Irish nationals (CSO, LFS Q2 2020b). This highlights the disproportionate impact of the 
pandemic on non-Irish nationals. The TWSS was introduced on 26 March 2020 and to 
enable employers to pay their workers during the pandemic. Employers qualify if they 
can prove that they have lost at least a quarter of their trade due to the pandemic. 
Employers who are part of this scheme can claim a percentage of a worker’s net wages 
back (Temporary COVID-19 Wage Subsidy Scheme, 2020). Overall, 244,755 people 
were availing of this scheme in the week ending 14 of June; similar to PUP figures 
23 per cent of those availing of TWSS were non-Irish nationals. 
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CHAPTER 4 APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A4.1  LOGISTIC REGRESSION (ODDS RATIOS) OF HAVING VERY/GOOD HEALTH, 2017 AND 
2018 (POOLED)  
Socio-economic characteristics Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Nationality: Irish(ref)    
UK 0.80 0.91 0.87 
EU-West 1.82** 1.38 1.10 
EU-East 1.97*** 1.39** 1.30* 
Non-EU 1.28 0.91 0.94 
Gender: Male (ref)    
Female  1.05 1.16** 
Age  0.27*** 0.68*** 
Education: Primary (ref)    
Secondary   1.82*** 
Post-secondary & third-level   2.48*** 
Principal economic status: Inactive (ref)    
At work   2.86*** 
Unemployed   0.78** 
Full-time education   3.83*** 
    
Observations 17,037 17,037 17,037 
 
Source:  Own calculations from pooled SILC 2017 and 2018. 
Note:  ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
 
Table A4.1 reports the results of a logistic regression on having very good or good 
health by comparing Irish nationals to several groups of non-Irish nationals. The 
results reported are expressed as odds ratios. An odd ratio greater than one means 
a greater likelihood to report the outcome of interest and an odd ratio less than 
one means to be less likely to report the same outcome. In the first model when 
we take account only of nationalities, we note that only EU-West and EU-East 
nationals are more likely to report a better health status than Irish nationals. In 
Model 2 there is no gender difference to explain better health status, but people’s 
health status is not as good as they get older and now only EU-East nationals are 
more likely to be healthier than Irish nationals. In Model 3, people’s education level 
and principal economic status explain better health outcomes but even controlling 
for these characteristics, EU-East nationals are still reporting better health status 
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Three indicators, designed to measure integration in the ‘active citizenship’74 
domain, are presented in this chapter. Firstly, the naturalisation rate, measured as 
the ratio of resident immigrants to those who acquired citizenship; secondly the 
share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits; and 
thirdly the share of immigrants among elected representatives. These indicators 
describe the context and the opportunities for integration in the domain of active 
citizenship, specifically in relation to naturalisation, long-term residence and 
political participation. The core indicators in this chapter do not draw direct 
comparisons of outcomes between Irish and non-Irish nationals, and therefore 
differ from others in the Monitoring report. This chapter presents the calculation 
of these indicators based on the best available national data, together with 
available supplementary information and data. We also present data on political 
engagement of non-Irish population in terms of interest in political affairs and 
participation in the elections since 2018, as well as sports volunteering.  
5.1  NATURALISATION 
Naturalised migrants may participate fully in the democratic process and are 
entitled to equal access to the institutions, goods and services of the State. Over 
153,000 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation 
between 2005 and 2019.75 Figure 5.1 shows that the number of naturalisation 
certificates issued annually accelerated rapidly from 2010, to peak in 2012 at 
25,088. Since then the number fell steadily, and stabilised at around 8,200 in 2017 
and 2018, before declining again in 2019 to just over 5,790. The decreasing trend 
in the number of naturalisations since 2012 reflects a decline in non-EEA residents 
during the 2008-2012 recession, as well as the introduction of processing 
improvements in 2011 which cleared a large backlog of applications.76  
 
                                                            
 
74  The term ‘active citizenship’ is used here as a broad concept embracing formal and non-formal, political, cultural, inter-
personal and caring activities (Taskforce on Active Citizenship, 2007) and as such is not limited to the activities of Irish 
citizens. However, due to data constraints, the indicators presented in this chapter measure integration with respect 
to only a limited part of the active citizenship domain. 
75  Exact figure 153,228 includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009 plus precise annual 
figures between 2010 and 2019. Source: Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality. These 
administrative data do not take account of the fact that not everyone who naturalises stays in Ireland (see further 
discussion in Section 5.1.2). Census 2016 records that approximately 310,000 Irish citizens were born abroad (see 
Table A4.a). However Irish citizenship may be acquired by way of several different ‘pathways’, for example by birth in 
Northern Ireland, Irish descent etc. See Box 5.1 and Groarke and Dunbar (2020) for further information. 
76  Approximately 22,000 applications were awaiting decision in March 2011 and this number had fallen to approximately 
8,500 applications pending decision in December 2013 (Barrett et al., 2017). 
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While application numbers remained relatively stable, between 11,777 and 13,018 
in the period 2015 to 2019, grants and refusal rates have fluctuated. During 2019 
the number of naturalisation certificates issued fell by 30 per cent to just over 
5,790 – a record low in the available data. This probably reflects a freeze in case 
processing between July and November 2019, arising from a High Court judgment, 
discussed further in Section 5.1.3. Refusals jumped significantly in 2018, to 1,255, 
more than double the 2017 figure of 522. The Department of Justice and Equality 
indicated that the 2018 refusals include cases processed in 2017 but concluded in 
2018. Just 38 refusals were issued in 2019 as a result of the processing freeze 
referred to above.77 
 
Figure 5.1 also shows that a significant proportion of naturalisation certificates 
issued each year are to the spouses of Irish nationals. In 2018, 17.8 per cent of 
certificates issued were on the basis of marriage to an Irish national increasing to 
21.3 per cent in 2019.78 
 
 
                                                            
 
77  Information received from Immigration Service Delivery, Department of Justice and Equality, September 2020.  
78  Data on the numbers of persons who naturalised on the grounds of marriage to Irish national: 1,234 (2019); 1,461 
(2018); 1,456 (2017); 2,004 (2016); 2,643 (2015); 3,167 (2014); 3,094 (2013); 1,686 (2012); 1,656 (2011); 422 (2010). 
Data received from the Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. 
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Source:  Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. Data 2014-2017 have been 
revised and therefore totals may differ from those presented previous Monitoring reports. 
 
The Department of Justice and Equality makes data available on processing times, 
which are defined to run from the date Immigration Service Delivery (ISD)79 within 
the Department of Justice and Equality deems an application complete, up to the 
date a decision is made. These data show that processing times for naturalisation 
applications increased significantly, from an average 80 of ten months in 2018 and 
11 months in 2019. The Department of Justice and Equality (2019b) noted that 
while the majority of applications are straightforward, some are more complex and 
take longer to check, referring in particular to the need to conduct checks related 
to the ‘good character’ requirement. See Groarke and Dunbar (2020) for further 
discussion of naturalisation conditions and the process involved in applying for 
naturalisation in Ireland. In May 2020 media reports indicated that more than 
20 per cent of live citizenship applications had been in the system for longer than 
24 months.81 In September 2020, the Minister reported that approximately 21,000 
applications were being processed.82 
 
 
                                                            
 
79  During 2019 the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service (INIS) was replaced with Immigration Service Delivery 
(ISD) as part of a broad departmental reorganisation.  
80  Average time taken to process all applications processed to a decision during the reference year. Source: Data received 
from the Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. 
81  The Irish Times, 26 May 2020. 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Certificates issued to EEA nationals
Certificates issued to non-EEA nationals
Valid applications received
Total rejected applications
Certificates issued on grounds of marriage to Irish national
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In 2018, three citizenship ceremonies were held. This was the first year in which 
large-scale citizenship ceremonies were held outside Dublin (Sheridan, 2019). Five 
ceremonies took place in 2019 and six in 2010. The first virtual citizenship 
ceremony took place during the COVID-19 pandemic in July 2020 (Groarke and 
Dunbar, 2020). 
5.1.1  Profile of naturalised Irish citizens83 
Prior to 2017, non-EEA nationals far outnumbered EEA nationals among recipients 
of naturalisation certificates. Table 5.1 shows that the proportion of EEA nationals 
naturalising has increased from 7 per cent in 2010 to 49 per cent in 2020. 
 
TABLE 5.1  PERSONS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP THROUGH NATURALISATION BY FORMER 
NATIONALITY GROUP (EEA AND NON-EEA): 2010-2019 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
EEA  417   392   1,352   1,770   2,953   3,143   3,332  3,730  3919 2,814 
Non-EEA 5,858  10,360  23,736  22,467  18,137  10,404   6,702  4,462  4,303 2,977 
Total 6,275  10,752  25,088   4,237  21,090  13,547  10,034  8,192  8,222 5,791 
% EEA 6.6% 3.6% 5.4% 41.8% 14.0% 23.2% 33.2% 45.5% 47.7% 48.6% 
 
Source:  Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. Data 2014-2017 have been 
revised and therefore totals may differ from those presented previous Monitoring reports. 
Note:  Where relevant, individuals recorded as stateless are shown in the non-EEA category as follows: 2010, three stateless persons; 
2011, three stateless persons; 2012, six stateless persons; 2014, two stateless persons. Non-EEA data include certificates issued 
to persons in respect of whom nationality information is ‘not readily available’ as follows: 2015, one person. Source: Research 
and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. 
 
Table 5.2 shows the top ten nationalities among people who naturalised between 
2014 and 2019. Since 2016, Polish nationals have formed the largest group among 
new Irish citizens, replacing Indian nationals in 2015 and Nigerian nationals in 2014. 
Polish nationals accounted for 18 per cent of recipients of naturalisation 
certificates in 2018 and 16 per cent in 2019. Census data show that the Polish 
population in Ireland has increased significantly in the last two decades, from just 
over 2,000 in 2002, to 63,276 in 2006 and 122,515 in 2016 (CSO, 2012; 2017). UK 
nationals are a particularly rapidly growing group among new Irish citizens and 
formed the second largest group in 2019. In 2015, just 0.4 per cent of new citizens 
were UK nationals (54 persons), increasing to 6 per cent in 2017 (525) and 12 per 
cent (665) in 2019.84 This trend is likely to be related to the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU on 31 January 2020. Romanian nationals were among the top ten 
nationalities in each year 2014-2019 and formed the third largest group in 2019 
with 552 persons naturalising.  
 
                                                            
 
83  Statistics on applications for citizenship disaggregated by age, gender and nationality are now published annually in 
line with Action 9 under the Migrant Integration Strategy. Department of Justice and Equality, 2018. 
84  UK nationals naturalising: 54 (2015); 98 (2016); 525 (2017); 686 (2018); 665 (2019). Data received from Research and 
Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality. April 2018; April 2020. 
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Over the period 2014-2019 declines were seen across all non-EEA national groups 
listed in the 2014 top ten. Some national groups saw particularly steep drops: 
naturalisation certificates issued to Nigerian nationals decreased by 91 per cent 
from 3,295 to 305. Certificates issued to Indian nationals saw an 82 per cent drop 
in the period, from 2,942 to 515, while certificates issued to Philippine nationals 
fell by 91 per cent between 2014 and 2019 from 2,184 to 191. Nigerian nationals 
accounted for 16 per cent of recipients in 2014, falling to 5 per cent in 2019. 
Similarly, Indian nationals accounted for 14 per cent of recipients in 2014, declining 
to 9 per cent in 2019.  
 
In order to interpret naturalisation trends, it is helpful to look at data on the 
relevant population at least five years prior to the year in question, as this is the 
minimum period a non-EEA national may be in the State before applying to 
naturalise. Residence permit data show that the Nigerian, Philippine and Indian 
nationality groups significantly reduced in size between 2010 (the earliest data 
available) and 2014.85 
 
As discussed in detail in the previous Monitoring Report on Integration, declines 
have been seen across non-EEA national groups naturalising since 2012. This partly 
reflects a fall during the recession (2008-2012) in the number of non-EEA nationals 
residing in Ireland for work purposes (see Figure 1.5). In 2011 some 49,504 non-
EEA nationals held employment-related residence permits in Ireland. By 2014 this 
number had fallen by 68 per cent to reach 15,831.86 
 
 
                                                            
 
85  Residence permissions in 2009: Nigeria, 13,938; Philippines, 11,368; India, 16,531. Residence permissions 2014: 
Nigeria, 5,306; Philippines, 4,104; India, 11,118. Source: Eurostat [migr_resvalid]. Extracted 16 September 2020. 
86  Total residence permissions issued fell from Eurostat [migr_resvalid]. Extracted 16 September 2020. 
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TABLE 5.2  TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALISATION BY FORMER NATIONALITY 2014-2019 (TOP 10) 













Nigeria 3,295 India 1,617 Poland 1,326 Poland 1,358 Poland 1,464 Poland 925 
India 2,942 Nigeria 1,363 India 1,028 Romania 762 Romania 819 UK 665 
Philippines 2,184 Philippines 1,165 Nigeria 776 India 665 UK 686 Romania 552 
Pakistan 1,246 Poland 1,158 Romania 756 UK 525 India 629 India 515 
Romania 1,029 Romania 902 Philippines 729 Nigeria 508 Nigeria 478 Nigeria 305 
Poland 939 Pakistan 732 Pakistan 418 Latvia 392 Pakistan 364 Latvia 221 
China 575 China 478 Latvia 380 Philippines 362 Philippines 320 Philippines 191 
S. Africa 563 Brazil 391 Brazil 304 Pakistan 340 Latvia 308 Brazil 188 
Ukraine 535 S. Africa 367 China 304 Brazil 264 China  233 China 162 
Brazil 457 Latvia 328 US 232 China 222 Brazil 220 US 154 
Other 7,325 Other 5,046 Other 3,781 Other 2,794 Other 2,701 Other 1,913 
Total  21,090  Total  13,547  Total  10,034  Total  8,192  Total 8,222 Total 5,791 
 
Source:  Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. 
Notes:  China includes Hong Kong. 
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Despite the upward trend of EEA nationals naturalising, the proportion of the 
resident EEA population choosing to naturalise annually remains very low, at 
0.9 per cent in 2018 (see Table 5.4), compared to 2.5 per cent for non-EEA nationals 
in the same period (see Table 5.3). This is not unusual in an international context. 
OECD (2018a) finds that 45 per cent of European immigrants resident in EU 
countries have sought to acquire their host-country’s nationality compared to 
around two-thirds of those from non-European countries. Citizenship acquisition 
is found to be much higher among Europeans in countries that are not part of 
mobility agreements, such as Australia and the United States (more than 80 per 
cent). Vink et al. (2013) showed that the level of economic development87 of 
migrants’ country of origin is important in understanding the likelihood to 
naturalise, with immigrants from highly developed countries much less likely to 
make this choice. Intra-EU migration may be also be more flexible, and less 
permanent, than non-EU immigration (Favell 2008).  
 
Non-EEA nationals in Ireland do not share the benefits of mobility and security of 
residence that EEA nationals enjoy, and therefore have a greater incentive to 
naturalise. Resident EEA nationals have rights and entitlements that are very 
similar to those held by Irish citizens, the main exception being that only Irish 
citizens have the right to stand and vote in all national elections and referenda. 
Recent research has shown that among non-EU migrants, being an Irish citizen is 
associated with lower unemployment rates, while the opposite is true for EEA 
migrants. Reporting Irish nationality has a strong, positive impact on the likelihood 
of being in a high-skilled occupation for both EEA and non-EEA migrants (McGinnity 
et al., 2020).  
 
In terms of age profile 17 per cent of non-EEA nationals who naturalised in 2019 
were children aged under 16 years. In the EEA group the proportion was 
substantially lower at 10 per cent. In 2018 children aged under 16 years 
represented 17 per cent of the non-EEA group and 8 per cent of the EEA group. In 
a further breakdown, the Department of Justice and Equality noted that of the top 
20 nationalities receiving citizenship in 2018, Bangladeshi nationals were youngest 
with an average age of 33 while the oldest were from the UK, with an average age 
of 56. In the same year 67 per cent of new citizens were aged between 25 and 45, 
and 11 per cent were aged over 55.88 New Irish citizens are almost evenly split 
between males and females in both 2018 (50 per cent female) and 2019 (51 per 
cent female).89  
 
                                                            
 
87  Using data from the Human Development Index, a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education, and 
standard of living. 
88  Department of Justice and Equality (2019). Media release ‘Minister Flanagan announces that over 10,000 people were 
granted Irish citizenship in 2018’. http://www.inis.gov.ie. 
89  Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. 
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5.1.2  Citizenship indicators 
The naturalisation rate is measured as the ratio of those who acquired citizenship 
to the number of resident immigrants in a given year. It captures information on 
the opportunities to naturalise (policies) as well as on a range of other contextual 
factors such as such as immigrants’ motivation to naturalise, duration of residence, 
and settlement in the country (European Services Network and Migration Policy 
Group, 2013). This section presents separate annual naturalisation rates for 
non-EEA and for EU nationals. In order to produce the most up-to-date and precise 
indicator possible we use administrative data on residence permissions to calculate 
a rate for non-EEA nationals. A similar rate is provided for EU nationals, however 
because residence permission data are not available for this group, we report an 
indicator compiled by Eurostat. These data are less up-to-date but have the 
advantage of allowing us to place Ireland in an EU context.  
Citizenship Indicator for non-EEA Nationals 
The annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals i.e. the ratio of the number of 
people who acquired citizenship through naturalisation in the reference year to 
the number of non-EEA persons holding ‘live’ immigration permissions, is shown in 
Table 5.3. As only non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over are required to register with 
Immigration Service Delivery/Garda National Immigration Bureau the indicator 
refers to the age group 16 and over.  
 
The annual naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over has declined 
steadily since the 2012 peak. As discussed above, this trend reflects the decline in 
overall residence permits issued to non-EEA nationals between 2008 and 2014, 
which was driven by the decline in employment-related permits issued as Ireland’s 
economy experienced a severe recession. This meant that reducing numbers of 
non-EEA nationals accrued the required residence period each year. 90 In addition, 
the annual naturalisation rate was inflated from 2011 by the working through of 
backlogs following processing improvements (see McGinnity et al., 2013), the 
effect of which tailed off in subsequent years. The rate fell slightly between 2017 
and 2018, from 2.9 to 2.5 per cent, and again by a full percentage point in 2019 to 




                                                            
 
90  While the number of permits issued for education-related reasons remained substantial in this period, periods spent 
in Ireland as a student are not considered when calculating reckonable residence. 
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TABLE 5.3  CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR NON-EEA NATIONALS AGED 16 AND OVER 2009-2019 
Annual Naturalisation Rate 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 




4,836 9,760 19,779 17,360 13,447 8,585 5,396 3,709 3,594 2,479 
Non-EEA aged ≥16 
holding immigration 
permissions 
133,232 128,104 120,281 107,435 105,569 113,914 110,927 128,066 142,286 168,297* 
Share of total 
number of non-EEA 
aged ≥16 holding 
permissions in ref. 
year who acquired 
citizenship in ref. 
year (%) 
3.6 7.6 16.4 16.2 12.8 7.5 4.8 2.9 2.5 1.5 
 
Source:  Data received from Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2020. Eurostat (migr_resvalid), 
August 2020: all valid residence permits on 31 December on reference year. *Data are provisional. 
 
A total of 108,94591 non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over naturalised between 2005 
and 2019, indicating that a substantial proportion of the population of non-EEA 
origin has now acquired Irish citizenship.  
 
In previous Monitoring reports we reported an estimate of the proportion of the 
population of non-EEA origin that had naturalised using data from the Department 
of Justice and Equality, recognising that it was likely to be an overestimation 
(McGinnity et al., 2018). Newly available Census 2016 microdata allow us to 
estimate the extent of this overestimation. Census data indicate that in 2016, 
43 per cent of the resident population aged 15+ who were born outside the EEA 
(197,748)92 were Irish citizens (84,049) (see Appendix 4 Table A4.b). This includes 
respondents who report dual citizenship, where one of these is an Irish citizen. A 
small number of these may have been Irish citizens by birth, but we expect this to 
be very small for those of non-EEA origin. In addition, this estimate includes 
15-year-olds, while the Integration Monitor Indicator age range is 16 and older, as 
no residence permit data exist in Ireland for non-EEA children under 16 (Fahey et 
al., 2019a).93 Naturalisation statistics from the Department of Justice and Equality, 
reported in the 2016 Monitoring Report on Integration, show that a total of 93,016 
non-EEA nationals aged 16 and over had acquired Irish citizenship in the period 
2005 to end December 2015 (Barrett et al., 2017). This suggests at minimum an 
outflow of around 10 per cent of naturalised citizens.94  
 
                                                            
 
91  Includes an estimation of 20,000 certificates issued between 2005 and 2009. 
92  I.e. those with valid information on citizenship and country of birth. 
93  It is not possible to exclude 15-year-olds using Census microdata. 
94  This is likely to be a slight underestimate of ‘ever naturalised’ as Census figures include 15-year-old Irish citizens of non-
EEA origin, and also some non-EEA origin Irish citizens who are Irish by descent, but we have no way of quantifying 
this.  
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Therefore, in the current report we have adjusted the indicator to take account of 
a 10 per cent outflow, i.e. emigration and deaths among naturalised Irish citizens. 
In 2019 we estimate that up to 37 per cent of the resident adult population of 
non-EEA origin (defined as the currently registered non-EEA adult population, plus 
those naturalised resident in Ireland) had acquired Irish citizenship through 
naturalisation.95 This compares to an estimated 13 per cent at end December 2009 
in the 2010 Monitoring Report on Integration (McGinnity et al., 2011). While this 
indicator is not without the problems discussed above, it does document a 
remarkable rise in the proportion of non-EEA residents in Ireland who have 
acquired Irish citizenship, consistent with the marked increase in naturalisation 
acquisition in the period 2010-2015 (see Table 5.3). To the extent that acquiring 
citizenship facilitates integration for this group, this is a very positive development 
in Ireland.  
Citizenship Indicator for EU Nationals 
Table 5.4 shows Eurostat estimates of the percentage of non-Irish EU nationals 
who acquired citizenship in the reference year. It is estimated that less than 1 per 
cent of the resident non-Irish EU population in Ireland acquired citizenship each 
year between 2009 and 2016, although the rate has increased steadily and 
significantly in the period from 0.06 per cent in 2009 to 0.9 per cent in 2018.  
 
TABLE 5.4  CITIZENSHIP INDICATOR FOR EU NATIONALS IN IRELAND 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
EU residents who 
acquired citizenship as a 
share of EU residents (%) 
0.06 0.09 0.09 0.33 0.45 0.72 0.76 0.80 0.87 0.90 
 
Source:  EUROSTAT (migr_acqs), extracted August 2020. 2013 and 2015 data are provisional. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows Ireland in an EU context, using Eurostat indicators on the share of 
EU citizens and non-EU citizens who acquired citizenship in 2018. The rate of 
naturalisation of EU citizens is calculated as the total number of persons of EU 
origin granted citizenship through naturalisation in the reference year, divided by 
the total estimated resident population of EU nationals. A similar method is used 
to calculate the non-EU rate.  
 
 
                                                            
 
95  The non-EEA adult population ‘ever naturalised’ (108,945) is reduced by 10 per cent to take account of outflows by 
2019 to estimate ‘naturalised remaining’ (98,078). This is expressed as a proportion of the ‘population of non-EEA 
origin’ (266,375). The latter is defined as the currently registered non-EEA population aged 16 and over (168,297), plus 
those ‘naturalised remaining’ (98,078).  
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FIGURE 5.2  RESIDENTS WHO ACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP AS A SHARE OF RESIDENT NON-CITIZENS 
BY FORMER CITIZENSHIP (%), 2018, IN EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER STATES PLUS 
NORWAY 
   
 
Source:  Eurostat.  
 
In 2016, Ireland lay 17th in the ranking of Member States plus Norway, according 
to the percentage of EU residents who acquired citizenship as a share of resident 
non-citizens. By 2018 Ireland had moved up to 11th place. In the case of non-EU 
nationals, Ireland was in 15th place among Member States in both years. 
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5.1.3  Policy issues related to naturalisation 
In July 2019 the judgment in Jones v Minister for Justice and Equality 96 led to the 
suspension of processing of all citizenship applications until November 2019. The 
case centred on the requirement for ‘reckonable residence’ of five years during the 
previous nine years, including one year of continuous residence prior to a 
naturalisation application. A discretionary ‘six-week rule’ operated on an 
administrative basis, which allowed absences from the State for short periods 
during the year prior to application. In July 2019 this six-week rule was found to be 
unlawful, with the Court holding that ‘continuous residence’, as set down in the 
1956 Act, means unbroken and uninterrupted residence.97 The judgment was met 
with concern from NGOs, who argued that the burden on applicants was illogical 
in a globalised society and pointed to the potential implications for thousands of 
applicants and prospective applicants.98 In November 2019 the Court of Appeal 
held that the previous judgment was unworkable and overly literal. The Court of 
Appeal held that the six-week rule was reasonable and pragmatic and ‘facilitates 
flexibility, clarity and certainty’ in establishing how the ‘continuous residence’ 
requirement must be satisfied by naturalisation applicants99 (Groarke and Dunbar, 
2020).  
 
Delays in the processing of naturalisation applications resulting from the 
processing freeze were exacerbated from March 2020 by COVID-19 shut-down 
measures. In May 2020 prospective applicants were ‘strongly advised’ to postpone 
submitting any new applications until mid-August 2020 (Department of Justice and 
Equality, 2020). Backlogs and delays were the subject of sustained media 
commentary during 2019 and 2020.100 The Immigrant Council of Ireland reported 
that almost 20 per cent of calls handled by its Information Service related to 
citizenship during 2019 (Immigrant Council of Ireland, 2020).  
 
The particular difficulties experienced by separated, stateless, asylum seeking and 
undocumented children accessing citizenship were highlighted in a report 
published by the Ombudsman for Children in June 2020. Such groups of children 
may not begin on a pathway to citizenship without already having an immigration 
permission. The fact that children may not apply for international protection 
independently, that no formal statelessness procedure exists, and that the 
 
                                                            
 
96  [2019] IEHC 519. 
97  Ibid. 
98  Immigrant Council of Ireland, ‘Citizenship Applications – Continuous Residence Requirement’, 18 July 2019, 
https://www.immigrantcouncil.ie/news/citizenship-applications-continuous-residence-requirement. 
99  Roderick Jones v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IECA 285. See also: Carolan, M. (2019) ‘”Unworkable” High 
Court finding on citizenship applications overturned’, The Irish Times, 14 November 2019. 
100  For example: Falvey, D. (2019) ‘Ireland's citizens in waiting: 16,000 people now “in limbo”’, The Irish Times, 5 October 
2019; Pollak, S. (2019). ‘Citizenship ceremonies to restart following five-month delay’, The Irish Times, 5 December 
2019; Pollak, S (2020). ‘Over 3,600 people waiting two years for citizenship application to be processed’, The Irish Times 
26 May 2020; The Irish Times 5 June 2020. 
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immigration status of non-asylum-seeking unaccompanied minors can be 
ambiguous, are among the potential barriers highlighted. Currently, non-EEA 
national children aged under 16 have no means of registering their presence in the 
State. They may be presumed to hold the same status as their parents and/or given 
incorrect immigration statuses upon turning 16, with implications for (future) 
naturalisation applications (Arnold, 2020).  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy 2017-2020 undertakes to finalise arrangements 
to enable registration of non-EEA migrants aged under 16 years ‘as a matter of 
urgency’. The Progress Report on the Strategy states that registration for minors 
will begin in 2022, when responsibility for it is fully transferred from the Gardaí to 
INIS (now ISD) (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019a).  
 
In terms of developments in the Courts, during 2019 the High Court quashed the 
Minister’s decision to deny a minor citizenship based on her father’s failure to 
satisfy the good character test.101 The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought 
by a refugee who had been refused naturalisation application for reasons of 
national security.102 The Minister’s decision not to disclose precise reasons for the 
refusal was upheld (Sheridan, 2019). 
 
The Irish Times reported in October 2016 that there had been a surge in citizenship 
applications, foreign birth registrations and passport applications following the 
June Brexit referendum result (Sheridan, 2017). Passport applications from UK 
nationals have continued to increase. In October 2019, media reports indicated 
that the number of applications increased from under 26,000 in 2016 to almost 
76,000 in 2018 and around 85,500 in the first eight months of 2019.103 As noted 
above, large increases have also been seen in UK nationals naturalising.  
 
Finally, a recurrent issue relates to the cost attached to applying for citizenship in 
Ireland (See Box 5 and Barrett et al., 2017). Commentators have noted high fees 
and the fact that there is no possibility to have the fee waived on economic or 
hardship grounds (Becker and Cosgrave, 2014). The Migrant Integration Strategy 
Progress Report states that Irish naturalisation fees compare favourably 
internationally and that they are reviewed annually; further than that Ireland has 
no plans to increase them at this time (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019a). 
EMN (2020) finds that naturalisation can be a lengthy and costly process across EU 
Member States, with limited available support. 
 
                                                            
 
101  Iurescu (a minor) v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] 535. 
102  AP v Minister for Justice [2018] IECA 112. 
103  The Irish Times, 3 October 2019. 
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5.2  LONG TERM RESIDENCE 
The provision of a statutory long-term residence status with ‘transparent rules, 
clearly articulated expectations and predictable benefits for law-abiding 
immigrants’ (European Commission, 2004) has been foreseen by Irish policymakers 
since 2008.104  
 
Long-term residence is a permanent residence status for migrants who have been 
resident in the host country for a period of time (often five years), which offers the 
same basic socio-economic rights as citizens of the host country. As such, it is a 
central element of integration policy offering the migrant almost full inclusion in 
the host society. Such a status is provided for in the majority of EU Member States, 
under Directives 2003/109/EC and 2011/51/EU.105 Ireland has not opted in to 
either Directive and resident non-EEA nationals have much more limited access to 
permanent residence than elsewhere in the EU.106 In Ireland an administrative 
long-term residence is open to employment permit holders (and their dependent 
spouses) and scientific researchers only.  
 
The number of applications for long-term residence in Ireland declined steadily 
between 2010 and 2016, falling from 2,415 to just 100. As noted in previous 
Monitoring reports and by the Department of Justice and Equality (2019a), this 
decline is probably related to the increase in naturalisation certificates issued since 
2011. Ireland’s long-term residence scheme has been criticised as having ‘the most 
unclear and discretionary procedure’ of all 38 countries reviewed in the MIPEX 
study (Huddleston et al., 2015). By comparison, naturalisation may well be 
preferable, particularly since the introduction of improved processing since 2011 
(see McGinnity et al., 2014). Since 2017 there has been a slight increase in 
applications each year reaching 160 in 2019. Holders of long-term residence 
accounted for just 0.9 per cent of non-EEA nationals with live residence 
permissions in 2018, and 0.7 per cent in 2019.  
 
 
                                                            
 
104  Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008. 
105  Directive 2011/51/EU of 11 May 2011 amends Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents to extend its scope to beneficiaries of international protection. Only Ireland, UK 
and Denmark do not participate in the Directives. 
106  Under the terms of the protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and 
to the Treaty establishing the European Community by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Ireland does not take part in the 
adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title IV of the EC Treaty unless Ireland opts in to the 
measure. 
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TABLE 5.5  APPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM RESIDENCE (LTR) 2010-2018 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
New applications 
for LTR  2,415 1806 703 287 173 83 100 108 144 160 
Non-EEA nationals 
holding LTR 8,367 7,721 5,771 3,392 2,309 2,019 1,473 1,484 1,272 1,125* 
Number non-EEA 
aged ≥16 holding 
immig. permissions  
133,232 128,104 120,281 107,435 105,569 113,914 110,927 128,066 142,286 168,297* 
Share of total 
number non-EEA 
aged ≥16 holding 
immig. permissions 
in ref. year who 
held long-term 
residence in ref. 
year 
6.3% 6.0% 4.8% 3.2% 2.2% 1.8% 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% 
 
Source:  Data received from the Research and Data Analytics, Department of Justice and Equality, April 2018. Data for total non-EEA 
nationals with live residence permission taken from Eurostat (migr_resvalid), extracted August 2018: all valid residence permits 
on 31 December of reference year. *Data are provisional. 
 
MIPEX (Huddleston et al., 2015) ranks Ireland 35th out of 38 countries on access to 
permanent residence (Huddleston et al., 2015). The 2019 Progress Report on the 
Migrant Integration Strategy states that a scoping exercise was undertaken in 2016 
to examine the feasibility of introducing a statutory long-term residence scheme. 
The various existing categories of residence were examined, and qualifying criteria, 
process and permissions considered. The review resulted in an interim 
recommendation to opt for an administrative rather than statutory scheme, partly 
due to the low number of applications (Department of Justice and Equality, 
2019a).107 Statistics on applications for long-term residence are now published 
annually in line with Action 13 under the Migrant Integration Strategy. 
5.3  POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
In the period 2018 – mid-2020, voters participated in three elections: presidential 
election on 28 October 2018, local elections and European Parliament election on 
24 May 2019, while general elections took place on 8 February 2020. The focus on 
the local elections is of special importance as all ‘usual’ residents are able to vote 
and run for office. In 2019, 56 migrant108 candidates ran in the local elections, 
almost double the number of candidates when compared with the 2014 local 
 
                                                            
 
107  The Immigrant Council of Ireland has highlighted the lack of clarity on rights and entitlements held by long-term 
residents under the existing administrative scheme and have argued that a statutory scheme would set transparent 
rules and predictable benefits (Cosgrave, 2011; Becker et al., 2012).  
108  This number is based on the study commissioned by the Immigrant Council of Ireland. Importantly, the study does not 
differentiate between naturalised Irish citizens and non-Irish individuals which means that the first category might be 
counted as ‘migrants’.  
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elections. In total, there were 1,980 candidates which means that migrant 
candidates equalled 3 per cent of all individuals who decided to run.  
 
Following the local elections in 2019, although still marginal, the share of 
councillors who are non-Irish increased from two to seven. Thus, out of 949 elected 
councillors, only seven have non-Irish citizenship which means that they constitute 
0.7 per cent of all councillors (as compared to 0.3 per cent for previous elections). 
While such share demonstrates continuing under-representation of individuals 
with migrant background, nonetheless it is progress when compared to the results 
of previous elections.  
 
Since the publication of the last Monitor in 2018, new European Social Survey (ESS) 
data have been published on various aspects of social and political involvement of 
individuals living in Ireland. As these data provided a general picture of differences 
between individuals born in Ireland and born abroad, they will be presented first. 
The next sections will provide more detailed description of migrants’ engagement 
in the elections.  
 
The recurring theme of this section is the (lack of) knowledge among migrants 
about electoral procedures and other aspects of running and voting in elections. 
As a response to this issue, Department of Housing, Planning and Local 
Government has prepared voter information packages in 16 language versions.109 
Such multi-language packages were proposed in the Migrant Integration Strategy. 
A blueprint for future in Action 60.110 The documents included information on the 
eligibility, registering to vote, electoral procedures and financial aspects of running 
a campaign. Also, non-governmental organisations involving individuals with a 
migrant background ran campaigns aimed at increasing political participation.111  
5.3.1  Political engagement of migrants in Ireland 
Across Europe, migrants display lower levels of political activity compared to host 
societies (de Rooij, 2012). At the same time, political activity of migrants, especially 
voting, is seen as the culmination of integration in a host society (Heath et al., 
2013). The international comparative research points to a number of factors which 
contribute to a low voting turnout; lack of resources, smaller social networks or 
insufficient knowledge of how political institutions and actors operate (Chaudhary, 
 
                                                            
 
109  Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government prepared leaflets in several languages entitled ‘The Register 
of Electors’ devoted to description of the Register; ‘How Ireland's MEPs are Elected’ on various aspects of electoral 
process in European Parliament voting; ‘How Members of Local Authorities are Elected’ extensively discussing local 
elections; and another, longer information package on the Register of Electors. 
110  Action 60 of the Migration Integration Strategy: ‘Multi-lingual materials on voter registration and on elections will be 
made accessible and available’. 
111  The examples of campaigns aiming at increasing turnout are ‘Register, vote, run!’ by the Immigrant Council of Ireland 
and ‘You’re at home. Vote’ (Jesteś u siebie. Zagłosuj) by Forum Polonia.  
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2018). The European Social Survey (ESS) 2018 data for Ireland to a large degree 
confirm such results. The following presentation is based on a general breakdown 
for individuals born in Ireland and for those who were born outside of the State 
(see Appendix Table A5.1). 
 
In 2018 the foreign-born population in Ireland scored somewhat lower on a 
number of dimensions of political activity compared to those born here. First, 
when it comes to interest in politics, 52 per cent of those born outside of Ireland 
stated they are very or quite interested, while for Irish-born this share equalled 
56 per cent (see Appendix Table A5.1). Further, when asked about contacting a 
politician or a government official within 12 months before the survey, 16 per cent 
of respondents with born abroad background did so and the respective share of 
those born in Ireland was higher (22 per cent). Second, membership in trade unions 
is lower for migrants: 10 per cent of the foreign-born are members of a trade union 
as compared to 14 per cent for those born in Ireland. This may be linked to how 
recently they arrived in Ireland and the nature of their jobs. Finally, the only 
dimension where migrants engaged more often is participation in a lawful public 
demonstration (13 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively). Given what we know 
from other countries, these differences in political engagement between foreign-
born and Irish-born are not large, though ideally we would distinguish between 
different groups of migrants, as elsewhere in this report; the level and nature of 
political engagement may differ between those from an English-speaking 
background and other migrants for example.112 
5.3.2  Non-Irish individuals and local elections 
The research conducted by the Immigrant Council of Ireland (Lima, 2020) among 
migrant candidates running for the 2019 local elections made a number of 
observations. First, non-Irish who registered to vote constituted from one-third to 
half of those eligible depending on the county (as can be seen in Table 5.6). Second, 
such individuals constituted only 3 per cent of all candidates. Importantly, a higher 
proportion of migrants in the local communities did not translate into a bigger 
share of migrant candidates. Third, whereas in general the total pool of candidates 
was male dominated, the proportion of female migrant candidates was higher 
(35 per cent) as compared to all candidates (28 per cent). 
 
An important insight concerns whether candidates ran as an independent or with 
a party. All the candidates elected to the local councils were running from party 
lists (25 candidates out of the total 56 were running from party lists). Migrant 
candidates may be reluctant to run from a party list due to a lack of political 
 
                                                            
 
112  Further analysis would also be required to check whether these findings were statistically significant given the sample 
size.  
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alignment or lack of experience with the Irish political system. Conversely running 
from a party ticket may offer ideological alignment, as well as organisational and 
financial support including access to training. The assessment of parties’ 
engagement in support of migrant candidates varies; in general the report 
indicates further need to incorporate migrants in their activities. Lima (2020) 
proposes reasons why political parties reduced their interest in promoting migrant 
candidates, including under-representation of migrant voters in the voting register 
but also under-representation of migrant communities in the party ranks. 
 
Why did migrants decide to run in elections? The main reason given by candidates 
interviewed was a desire to engage in local matters. Other, less frequently 
mentioned reasons touched on the motivation to increase migrant voices in Irish 
politics and to promote migrant integration, as well as a personal need to ‘give 
back’ to the local community. 
 
At the same time, one-third of interviewed candidates experienced racist incidents 
during their campaign. Further, all migrant female candidates interviewed who 
participated in the research had experience of sexual harassment while 
campaigning. A recent study in the UK shows that BAME female politicians receive 
much more abuse on social media than their White colleagues.113 The research 
concludes that problems which female candidates face in general are amplified in 




                                                            
 
113  The type of abuse often focuses on gender and race, and includes threats of sexual violence. See 
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/online-violence-women-mps. 
Active citizenship | 91 
 
TABLE 5.6  PERCENTAGE OF NON-IRISH REGISTERED TO VOTE (2019) COMPARED TO 
PERCENTAGE OF NON-IRISH IN USUALLY RESIDENT POPULATION AGED 18 YEARS 
AND OLDER IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 Non-Irish on Voting 
register (A) % 
% Non-Irish resident 
population aged 18+ (B) % 
Difference  
(Ratio of B to A) 
Carlow 3.9 11.7 3.00 
Cavan 4.1 12.9 3.15 
Clare 5.3 11.0 2.08 
Cork 5.8 15.5 2.67 
Donegal 3.0 8.4 2.80 
Dublin 5.7 19.2 3.37 
Dún Laoghaire Rathdown 4.4 12.6 2.86 
Fingal 8.7 18.8 2.16 
Galway 9.0 19.7 2.19 
Kerry 6.2 12.1 1.95 
Kildare 3.3 12.0 3.64 
Kilkennny 3.4 9.5 2.79 
Laois 5.5 11.3 2.05 
Limerick 4.0 10.6 2.65 
Leitrim 7.3 12.6 1.73 
Longford 8.0 16.4 2.05 
Louth 5.5 11.4 2.07 
Mayo 5.1 11.1 2.18 
Meath 4.1 11.7 2.85 
Monaghan 6.3 12.2 1.94 
Offaly 4.4 9.5 2.16 
Roscommon 5.8 11.5 1.98 
Sligo 4.5 10.3 2.29 
Tipperary 5.0 10.0 2.00 
Waterford 4.0 11.0 2.75 
Wexford 4.0 10.1 2.53 
Wicklow 4.3 10.8 2.51 
 
Source:  Lima, 2020. 
 
The main challenges identified by migrant candidates concern the lack of 
information. To start with, many migrants do not know that if they reside in Ireland, 
they are entitled to vote and run in local elections. Further, there is a lack of 
knowledge as to how the Irish political system works in terms of political parties 
functioning but also the nuances of politics. The research finds that individuals with 
a migrant background embedded in local communities and active in fields such as 
sport have a greater chance of being elected, underlining the importance of local 
networks.  
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5.3.3  European Parliament elections 
The voting behaviour of mobile EU citizens in the context of the last European 
Parliament elections was explored by the recent Eurobarometer study (European 
Parliament, 2020). While the study has some limitations,114 it provides unique 
insights into several dimensions of expatriates’ political activity. 
 
In all but three Member States (Czech Republic, Malta and Slovak Republic), EU 
citizens can vote either for candidates in their country of origin or for candidates 
running in their countries of residence.115 Looking at the EU as a whole, expatriates 
tend to vote in their country of origin (53 per cent of respondents).116 A factor 
which differentiates between voting for a party from their country of origin or a 
party in their country of residence is length of residence (the longer the residence, 
the bigger the share of voters choosing to vote in the host country). Difficulties 
were faced by 35 per cent of expatriates (for example access to polling station or 
the lack of knowledge on parties running) when voting. Importantly, this share is 
substantially higher in the case of those who cast a vote in their country of origin. 
The most frequent problem related to access to a voting station: this might be 
explained by the fact that such voting is only possible in diplomatic and consular 
representations of a given country. Finally, those who did not vote in the EP 
elections are on average younger, less educated, live in rural areas and have 
resided in another host Member State for a shorter period. A comparison of 
abstainers’ characteristics between host societies and mobile EU citizens reveals 
similarities. The only noted difference is that abstainers from host society tend to 
live in big cities while expatriates live in smaller towns and in rural areas. 
 
The Eurobarometer study presents the data for Ireland from the perspective of 
Polish expatriates; however due to the small sample detailed inferences are 
difficult. Some insights come from Lesinska et al. (2019) who studied political 
activity of Poles in Ireland. The very preliminary results of their study indicate that 
while over time Poles lose interest in Polish politics, it has not been compensated 
for by a growing interest in Irish politics.  
 
The results of the survey of Poles living in Ireland conducted in June-October 2018 
find that 33 per cent of Poles who live in Ireland voted at least once in Polish 
general elections during their stay. However, when asked about the Irish local 
government elections, more than three-quarters of those surveyed stated that 
 
                                                            
 
114  The survey is based on the convenience sample and focuses on biggest expatriate groups in the European Union. 
115  This is a guaranteed right – every EU citizen residing in Ireland, older than 18 years and listed in the Register of Electors 
can vote in EU elections. At the same time, they can choose to vote in their home countries by registering with an 
embassy/consulate. 
116  In practice they don’t typically vote ‘in’ their country of origin but in an embassy or consulate of their country of origin 
in their host country. 
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they never participated. A similar proportion stated they did not participate in 
European Parliament elections.  
 
When asked about the reasons for not participating with respect to Polish and Irish 
elections, in both cases 41 per cent of respondents stated a lack of interest in 
politics. In turn, a lack of knowledge of the elections was more frequently stated in 
respect of the Irish elections – 22 per cent compared to 13 per cent in the case of 
the Polish elections. Similarly, a lack of knowledge of voting eligibility was noted 
(Polish elections, 11 per cent; Irish elections, 18 per cent).  
 
As for the political involvement of Poles in Ireland, 79 per cent of respondents 
indicated that they were not involved in social or political actions: 8 per cent had 
signed a petition; 6 per cent wore or displayed a badge/sticker, whereas 2 per cent 
took part in public demonstration or rally. Such lack of involvement is striking as 
only a minority of Poles living in Ireland state that they find it difficult to engage in 
a local community or organisation (ibid.). 
5.3.4  Volunteering in sports 
Sports volunteering is one aspect of active citizenship in on which data became 
available during the monitoring period. The issue was analysed in a report by 
Volunteer Ireland117 from 2019 (Volunteer Ireland, 2019). While the report was not 
based on a representative sample of non-Irish individuals and targeted only those 
registered on i-VOL, it delivers some interesting insights as to how and why non-
Irish individuals volunteer. In many respects, the report delivers findings similar to 
those presented in the Integration Monitor 2011 (McGinnity et al., 2012).  
 
Based on the survey the study shows that the scale of volunteering is considerably 
smaller among the non-Irish than the Irish population. The main factors that 
contribute to smaller scale volunteering are different preferences regarding 
particular sports, and a lack of knowledge about opportunities to get involved. Why 
do migrants volunteer in sports? The main reasons indicated were a wish to be 
involved in the local community, to play an active role in sport, and to meet people 
and make friends. These and other reasons have a strong social and integration 
component, including a willingness to learn the language (especially important 
among migrants with a shorter stay) (Volunteer Ireland, 2019). 
 
                                                            
 
117  National volunteer development organisation and a support body for all local volunteer centres and volunteering 
information services in Ireland. See https://www.volunteer.ie/ 
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5.4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Over 153,000 non-Irish nationals acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation 
between 2005 and 2019. In 2019 we estimate that 37 per cent of the resident adult 
population of non-EEA origin had acquired Irish citizenship through naturalisation. 
This means that a large group of migrants should now be able to participate fully 
in the democratic process and access to the institutions, goods and services of the 
state, on a par with native Irish. International research indicates that naturalised 
immigrants have better socio-economic outcomes than immigrants who do not 
take on the host country citizenship (Hoxhaj et al., 2019; Bloemraad, 2017; Liebig 
and Von Haaren, 2011). A recently published Irish study shows the positive effects 
of naturalisation on the unemployment of naturalised Irish nationals who were 
born outside the EEA (McGinnity et al., 2020). 
 
The above shows that the number of naturalisations in Ireland declined steadily 
from a peak in 2012, levelling off in 2017-2018, before dropping further in 2019. 
The naturalisation rate for non-EEA nationals was steady at 2.9 and 2.5 in the years 
2017 and 2018, and it declined to just 1.5 in 2019. While some of the decrease is 
most likely due to processing problems, it is undesirable from an integration 
perspective. Backlogs built up due to the processing freeze in 2019 are likely to be 
added to in the context of the 2020 COVID-19 restrictions. Long processing times 
and the associated uncertainty for applicants may also hamper integration.  
 
Ireland’s first Migrant Integration Strategy 2017-2020, which aims to ensure all 
migrants can actively participate in Irish communities, workplaces and politics, is 
now nearing the end of its term. While the Strategy Progress Report showed 
positive developments in some areas, others are slower to progress. Actions to 
introduce the registration of non-EEA migrant children and a statutory long-term 
residency scheme are among those facing ‘major difficulties’ (Department of 
Justice and Equality, 2019a). These delays underscore the importance of a timely 
follow-up strategy.  
 
While non-EEA nationals represented 95 per cent of naturalised Irish citizens in 
2012, by 2019 the group was split almost evenly between non-EEA (51 per cent) 
and EEA nationals (49 per cent). This is a significant shift from a decade ago when 
EU nationals represented around 5 per cent of persons naturalising each year. 
However, the overall proportion of resident EU nationals choosing to naturalise 
remains low, at less than 1 per cent.  
 
The research presented in Section 5.3 indicates that migrants are less engaged with 
politics than the native population. While migrants tend to be less interested in 
politics, their political engagement is considerably lower. The recent local 
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government elections substantiated the under-representation among voters, 
candidates and elected councillors. Importantly, research by Fanning et al. (2020) 
based on a 2018 survey of 22-44-year-old migrants, points out the positive impact 
of naturalisation on political participation; it is substantially higher among 
individuals who have naturalised. The recurrent topic in the analyses of political 
engagement is the importance of knowledge and experiences which go beyond 
politics – local involvement and activity in non-political bodies such as sports clubs. 
McGinnity et al. (2018) showed that social contact generally promotes fewer 
negative attitudes to immigration and immigrants, and suggest that enhancing 
opportunities for meaningful and positive interactions may help to reduce 
anti-migrant sentiment.  
 
Actions under the Strategy designed to increase political participation, for example 
encouraging migrants to register to vote and become involved in politics, have 
been progressed with the organisation of a range of events and improved 
information dissemination (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019a). However, 
the results of this chapter underline that much work is needed to ensure migrants 
are included in the political life of the State. 
 
The growth in the naturalised migrant population has important implications for 
future monitoring, as a large cohort of migrants are no longer identifiable in 
datasets that use nationality as identifier (McGinnity et al., 2018; Fahey et al., 
2019a). This is discussed further in the next chapter (Section 6.1). 
 
BOX 5.1  ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP 
Irish Nationality and Citizenship 
The process by which a non-Irish national may become, or be recognised as, an Irish 
national is through a grant of citizenship (see Groarke and Dunbar, 2020). Citizenship 
describes the particular legal bond between an individual and the State, acquired by 
birth or naturalisation, whether by declaration, choice, marriage or other means 
according to national legislation (European Migration Network, 2020). In the Irish 
Constitution, the individual member of the State is referred to as a ‘citizen’, but the 
status is referred to as ‘nationality and citizenship’.118 The Irish Nationality and 
Citizenship Act, 1956 provides for the issue of ‘certificates of nationality’.  
Citizenship by descent may be granted to a person whose parent was, or would have 
been if deceased, an Irish citizen at the time of the person’s birth, irrespective of their 
 
                                                            
 
118  The EUDO Citizenship Observatory notes that the two terms describe different elements of the relationship between 
the individual and the Irish State. Nationality relates to the external (international) dimension, whereas citizenship 
relates to the internal (domestic) dimension. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, ‘Translations and a brief discussion of the 
use of the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality in legal documents and political debates’. http://eudo-citizenship.eu.  
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country of birth. The granting of such citizenship is automatic at birth.119 Persons born 
in Ireland may be granted citizenship where they are born on the island to at least one 
parent who has Irish or British citizenship.120 Persons born to non-Irish citizens may 
also be entitled to Irish citizenship where at least one of their parents has been legally 
resident in Ireland for three out of the previous four years prior to the birth121 (see 
Groarke and Dunbar, 2020). Irish citizens may hold the citizenship of another country 
without giving up their Irish citizenship.  
Naturalisation 
An application for a certificate of nationality is considered under the Irish Nationality 
and Citizenship Act, 1956, as amended. Foreign nationals living in Ireland may apply to 
the Minister for Justice and Equality to become an Irish citizen by naturalisation if they 
are over 18 years, or a minor who was born in the State after 1 January 2005. In 
general, the applicant must ‘be of good character’ and have had a period of one year’s 
continuous reckonable residence in the State immediately before the date of 
application and, during the previous eight years, have had a total reckonable residence 
in the State amounting to four years. The applicant must intend in good faith to 
continue to reside in the State after naturalisation and make a declaration of fidelity 
to the nation and loyalty to the State. Applicants are usually required to have been 
‘self-supporting’ i.e. not dependent on social welfare for the three years prior to 
application. Periods spent in Ireland as an asylum applicant or as a student are not 
considered when calculating reckonable residence.  
There is now an obligation on the State to provide reasons for a refusal of an 
application for naturalisation (although this issue continues to be a source of some 
debate).122 Aside from judicial review of proceedings there is no mechanism for 
challenging the refusal of an application. Currently Irish citizenship acquired through 
naturalisation may be withdrawn no matter how long a person has been an Irish citizen 
(though not if it would make them stateless). 
Application Fees 
The standard application fee payable by all applicants is €175. A further €950 is payable 
by successful adult applicants for naturalisation. The naturalisation fee is €200 in the 
case of minors and widows or widowers of Irish citizens. Persons granted refugee 





                                                            
 
119  Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended), s 7(1). 
120  Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended), s 6(6). 
121  Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956 (as amended), s 6A. 
122  In AP v Minister for Justice and Equality, the Court stated the primary objective should be to seek the maximum 
disclosure possible (AP v Minister for Justice and Equality [2019] IESC 47 [5.12]). Source: Groarke and Dunbar, 
forthcoming. 
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BOX 5.2  ACCESS TO LONG-TERM RESIDENCE  
 
Ireland does not have a statutory long-term residence status. The current 
administrative scheme allows persons who have been legally resident in the State for 
a continuous period of five years or more on the basis of an employment permit (and 
their dependent spouses) or scientific researchers, to apply for a five-year residency 
extension. They may also then apply to work without the need to hold an employment 
permit. A €500 fee for processing applications under this scheme was introduced in 
2009. This long-term residency scheme is available to those who are still in 
employment and to those with an employment permit who, having completed five 
years’ work, have been made redundant. 
A small number of non-EEA nationals who have lived in Ireland for at least eight years 
and who are of ‘good character’ are be permitted to remain in Ireland ‘without 
condition as to time’. They receive a Stamp 5 registration on their passport and can 
work without an employment permit (Becker, 2010). In 2019, 1,231 persons held a 




                                                            
 
123  Provisional data received from INIS, June 2020. 
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CHAPTER 5 APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A5.1  SELECTED DIMENSIONS OF ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP FOR IRISH AND NON-IRISH BORN 
INDIVIDUALS (2018) 
Born in Ireland Born in Ireland Born Abroad 
How interested in politics?  
 Very interested 16.3 13.8 
 Quite interested 39.6 37.9 
 Hardly interested 24.3 24.8 
 Not at all interested 19.9 23.5 
 Total 100 100 
 N=2,210 
Member of trade union or similar organisation 
 Yes, currently 14.1 10.3 
 Yes, previously 21.0 12.6 
 No 64.8 77.1 
 Total 100 100 
 N=2,193 
Contacted politician or government official last 12 months 
 Yes 22.4 16.3 
 No 77.6 83.7 
 Total 100 100 
 N=2,201 
Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months 
 Yes 9.6 12.6 
 No 90.4 87.4 
 Total 100 100 
 N=2,200 
 
Source:  European Social Survey 2018, http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview.  
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CHAPTER 6  
Challenges for policy and data collection 
By Frances McGinnity 
 
The key focus of this Integration Monitor is integration outcomes. This chapter 
considers some implications for future data needs, as well as highlighting policy 
issues that have persisted or emerged.  
 
Ireland continues to have one of the highest proportions of the population born 
abroad of any OECD country (17 per cent were born abroad in 2019). Yet the 
migrant population in Ireland differs from many other EU countries. One distinctive 
feature is that most migrants to Ireland come from other EU countries: EU migrants 
make up around three-quarters of residents born abroad in 2019, one of the 
highest proportions of all EU countries (Figure 1.1). EU migrants primarily come to 
work, non-EU migrants come here primarily to study or to work; family 
reunification plays less of a role here than in many other countries (OECD, 2018a; 
Groarke et al., forthcoming). Thus, a second distinctive feature of migrants in 
Ireland is that the employment and participation rates of non-Irish nationals is 
actually higher in 2019 than Irish nationals, though some groups are struggling in 
the labour market (Chapter 2). A third feature is that in general migrants are highly 
educated. Many have higher educational qualifications than Irish nationals, 
particularly those from Western Europe and Asian countries (Chapter 3). A final 
distinctive feature of migrants in Ireland is that a significant minority of those of 
non-EEA origin are now Irish citizens (see Chapter 5 and Appendix 4). This, and the 
growing second generation, underlines the need for a long-term proactive 
approach to policy on integration.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy, published in early 2017, represents a significant 
statement of policy intent and brought new energy and focus into efforts to 
integrate migrants in Ireland. The 2019 review of this strategy highlighted 
particular areas where outcomes for migrants need to be improved, and some of 
these are discussed in light of evidence below. Some additional concerns emerging 
from findings in this report are also considered. 
6.1 ISSUES FOR FUTURE DATA USE AND COLLECTION  
The OECD and the EU continue to emphasise the importance of monitoring 
integration (European Services Network and Migration Policy Group, 2013; OECD, 
2018a). Yet the usefulness of such monitoring will only be as good as the data and 
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evidence on which they are based, and an understanding of the strengths and 
limitations of the data.  
 
This Integration Monitor is largely based on repeated national social surveys, to be 
cost-effective, to allow comparisons with the host population and to allow 
comparisons of the same indicators over time. But these surveys were not 
designed to survey migrants, so it is important to consider how well the migrant 
population is represented. The Labour Force Survey and the SILC are both surveys 
of private households in Ireland. Some groups, both Irish and non-Irish nationals, 
are thus excluded – those residing in institutions, communal accommodation, 
direct provision centres and the homeless, a group that may be particularly 
disadvantaged and has grown considerably in recent years. To the extent that 
non-Irish nationals are disproportionately excluded from survey (for example we 
know some migrant groups are over-represented in the homeless population, see 
e.g. Grotti et al., 2018), and residents of direct provision centres are all non-Irish; 
their disadvantage may be underestimated. Other groups, while not excluded from 
the data by the design of the survey, may be under-represented in the surveys due 
to language issues, frequent mobility or fear of state agencies (Font and Mendez, 
2013).  
 
In the short term, it is important that efforts be continued to encourage the 
participation of non-Irish nationals in the SILC and the LFS, the major sources of 
information on income, poverty and the labour market in Ireland. Immigrant or 
ethnic minority boost samples; common practice in some other European 
countries – Germany and the UK being prominent examples – could address the 
problem of small sample sizes in these ongoing large-scale surveys (Fahey et al., 
2019a). Small sample size is a particular problem for SILC. Chapter 4 showed high 
rates of deprivation and poverty among non-EU nationals, yet we know this is a 
very diverse group. As we know that employment rates vary considerably in the 
non-EU group (Chapter 2), it would be of considerable benefit to the monitoring of 
integration in Ireland to know which national groups are most at risk of poverty 
and deprivation, the depth of that poverty, and poverty among migrant children. 
Is the fall in consistent poverty among non-EU nationals due to a shifting balance 
of nationalities within the group, or a fall in poverty for certain groups? Ireland 
needs a survey that allows us to track poverty and deprivation more accurately 
among migrant groups.  
 
The census of the population plays an important role in our understanding of 
migration and integration, though due to expense it is only carried out every five 
years. The census allows the CSO to adjust ongoing surveys and create valid 
estimates of the migrant population, given that Ireland lacks a population register. 
The census microdata also have excellent potential for measuring the outcomes of 
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smaller population groups. McGinnity et al. (2020) shed new light on integration 
patterns by showing the diversity within the regional groups used in this Monitor, 
and by also examining the role of language in labour market outcomes and 
estimating the potential effect of having come to Ireland seeking international 
protection. Gilmartin and Dagg (2020) use census data to report on variations in 
the integration of non-Irish nationals in particular regions of Ireland. In this 
Monitor the census microdata were used to check the accuracy of previous 
estimates of the proportion of non-EEA who naturalised and stayed in Ireland 
(Chapter 5; see also Appendix 4 Table A4.a for estimates of EEA born and non-EEA 
born who are Irish citizens in 2016 using census microdata).  
 
Of course, some indicators are specific to the migrant population and will never be 
collected on national surveys. Migrants’ feeling of belonging in Ireland, their 
intentions to stay, motives for migration, migration history, the nature of social 
contacts and social networks, and efforts to acquire English language skills could 
only be collected in a dedicated survey of migrants. Qualitative studies can 
enhance our understanding of many aspects of integration but are typically limited 
to a small number from one particular group. Some smaller scale surveys of 
immigrants have been collected – for example a longitudinal survey of new Polish 
immigrants in 2011 and 2013 (Diehl et al., 2015) and a survey of migrant 
remittances (Batista and Narciso, 2018) – but very few, particularly compared to 
other European countries.124 Ireland still lacks a large representative survey of the 
migrant population.  
 
The fact that a significant group of immigrants are now Irish citizens presents a 
challenge for monitoring integration, as measuring integration on the basis of 
nationality is likely to miss an increasing number of naturalised citizens (see 
Appendix 4 Table A4.a). Analysis by McGinnity et al. (2020) suggests that labour 
market outcomes may be better for naturalised migrants of non-EEA origin, an 
estimated 37 per cent of whom may have become Irish citizens by the end of 2019. 
To partly address this issue, Chapter 2 examines outcomes of foreign-born Irish 
nationals. This is useful, yet many of these were born in the UK and came to Ireland 
many years ago. Their profile is likely to be rather different to more recent migrants 
who naturalised in the past 15 years.  
 
What are the alternatives to monitoring based on nationality and/or place of birth? 
An exciting development planned for 2021 is to include a question on standard 
social surveys (LFS, SILC) about the country of birth of the respondents’ parents. 
This will allow us to distinguish and compare both first- and second-generation 
 
                                                            
 
124  A database of approximately 800 surveys of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Europe since 2000 is currently under 
construction. For more information see: https://ethmigsurveydatahub.eu/emmregistry. 
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migrants, increasingly important as the second-generation grows in Ireland. Some 
commentators argue it is the integration of the second generation that is the 
‘litmus test’ for integration (OECD, 2018a). Motives for migration will also be added 
to these surveys, allowing us to distinguish those who came to Ireland to work, to 
study, to seek international protection or other reasons, such as joining family 
members. This too will considerably enhance our understanding of the integration 
process.  
 
Yet with evidence of discrimination against some minority ethnic groups, 
particularly the Black ethnic group in various areas of life (McGinnity et al., 2017; 
2018; 2020), and renewed focus in public and policy debate on racism and 
discrimination; collecting data on ethnicity becomes increasingly urgent. 
Information on ethnicity must be collected separately from nationality or country 
of birth because people in ethnic minorities may be Irish nationals (McGinnity et 
al., 2018), and/or may be born in Ireland (second-generation). The fact is we know 
relatively little about differences between ethnic groups because ethnicity is very 
rarely collected from survey or administrative data (Fahey et al., 2019a; IHREC, 
2019). Changing this situation is now more urgent than ever.  
 
Administrative data have the potential to form an important complement to survey 
data in measuring integration outcomes. The big advantage is that administrative 
data record all recipients of a given training course, medical treatment, or 
examination outcome, for example, and if some measure like nationality, country 
of birth or ethnicity is recorded, this allows monitoring of both participation and 
outcomes. This assumes the data are usable and accessible for the purpose, which 
may not be the case. Under Action 8 of the Migrant Integration Strategy a data 
gaps working group was set up to identify both shortcomings in data collection and 
under-use of existing data, and the resulting report highlighted a wide range of 
datasets held both by the Department of Justice and Equality and other 
government departments, such as the Department of Education and the 
Department of Employment and Social Protection (Fahey et al., 2019a). Another 
important initiative is the ongoing equality data audit being conducted by the 
Central Statistics Office as part of the equality budgeting process. The focus here is 
data relevant to all the equality groups listed under Irish equality legislation, but 
non-Irish nationals and minority ethnic groups are included, and this exercise 
covers an impressive range of administrative data, in addition to survey data.125 
The ability to analyse and potentially link administrative datasets with survey data 
offers tremendous potential for research in the area.  
 
 
                                                            
 
125  See https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/methodologicalresearch/rp-eda/equalitydataaudit2020/ for the report on the 
equality data audit. See also Equality Data Audit July 2020 Audit File (XLS 416KB) for the data audit itself.  
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With the exception of data gathered on residence permissions (see Chapter 1), 
refugees are not identified in national survey or general administrative data in 
Ireland. Recent migration debates in Europe were dominated by the refugee crisis, 
and Ireland has increased its intake of resettled and relocated refugees (see 
Box 1.1). Although efforts are underway to monitor outcomes of new arrivals 
under e.g. the Community Sponsorship Programme there is currently no way of 
tracking how well refugees are integrating into Irish society, aside from occasional 
ad hoc studies, such as the Refugee Integration Capacity and Evaluation (RICE) 
report (UNHCR, 2014). This is true whether they have come here as part of a 
refugee programme with status already granted, or seeking international 
protection, later determined to be Geneva Convention refugees. Ahad et al. (2020) 
stress the importance of monitoring and evaluating measures to integrate refugees 
in Europe. This gap in data and knowledge is all the more problematic given that 
international and Irish research shows that refugees face greater challenges when 
compared to other groups of migrants, for example in the labour market, due to 
lower language proficiency, trauma and lack of support from social and other 
networks (Connor, 2010; Bevelander, 2011; for Ireland see Ní Raghallaigh et al., 
2016; McGinnity et al., 2020).  
 
The accurate tracking of racist incidents is crucial and NGOs such as ENAR Ireland, 
the Immigrant Council of Ireland and NASC Ireland have expressed concern about 
the under-reporting of racism. Crimes with a discriminatory motive – hate crimes 
– are recorded on the Gardaí’s PULSE system (Fahey et al., 2019a). However due 
to reliability concerns, Fahey et al. note that these are no longer published by the 
CSO, and Haynes and Schweppe (2017) in a detailed study document consistent 
under-reporting of hate crime in Ireland. A public consultation on hate speech was 
launched in October 2019, and the Department of Justice and Equality has stated 
new legislation on hate speech and hate crime is currently being developed. These 
will be important issues for the new anti-racism strategy to consider.  
6.2 POLICY ISSUES 
The Migrant Integration Strategy covers a very broad range of policy areas from 
employment, education, health and political participation to intercultural 
awareness. This discussion is a more focused reflection on some issues arising from 
outcomes presented in this Integration Monitor.  
 
In terms of employment, Chapter 2 assesses the extent to which migrants had 
shared in the ongoing recovery in the Irish labour market. Overall, the picture is 
positive: there is not a significant gap in unemployment rates between Irish and 
non-Irish nationals overall in 2019. In fact, in 2019 we find slightly higher 
employment and participation rates among non-Irish nationals than Irish nationals. 
To maintain this trend, it is important that the jobseeker engagement and labour 
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market activation policies described in Actions 39, 40 and 41 of the Migrant 
Integration Strategy are appropriate to the needs of migrants and are effectively 
implemented.  
 
However, not all groups of non-Irish nationals are faring so well. Chapter 2 finds 
that in general non-EU nationals have higher unemployment rates and lower 
employment rates than Irish nationals. In particular, we find high unemployment 
and a very low employment rate among African nationals in 2019, as was found in 
earlier Monitoring reports on Integration in Ireland. This is also consistent with 
research using administrative data on jobseekers, which shows longer 
unemployment durations, and fewer exits to employment among African 
jobseekers (Cronin et al., 2018). A much higher proportion of African jobseekers 
have never worked (38 per cent compared to 14 per cent of Irish jobseekers) (ibid.). 
Investigating the factors underlying this disadvantage is beyond the scope of a 
report like this, but McGinnity et al. (2020) find that in 2016 migrants from 
countries with high rates of international protection have higher unemployment 
rates, as do migrants of Black ethnicity. This suggests that part of the explanation 
may be coming to Ireland as an asylum seeker and spending time out of the labour 
market for those who were seeking protection, and potentially also the experience 
of racism and discrimination in the Irish labour market (see McGinnity et al., 2018).  
 
For those who have come through the protection system, the fact that many are 
struggling to find a foothold in the Irish labour market suggest that these refugees 
may need targeted support (UNHCR, 2013; McGinnity et al., 2020). Currently 
supports differ for the resettled and spontaneous refugees in Ireland, with more 
targeted support for resettled refugees (Arnold et al., 2019b).  
 
The recently published report from the Expert Group Report Of The Advisory Group 
On The Provision Of Support Including Accommodation To Persons In The 
International Protection Process recommends promoting the integration of those 
seeking international protection from the earliest stage of the process 
(Government of Ireland, 2020). This is a positive recommendation, which if 
adopted is likely to facilitate the integration of those granted protection or an 
alternative status and may help enhance the capabilities of those who return. If 
this approach is adopted, it follows that consideration should be given to including 
this group within the remit of the successor to the Migrant Integration Strategy 
2017-2020, as those seeking international protection awaiting a decision are not 
included in the current strategy. Any change in policy here would usefully be 
accompanied by initiatives to track integration outcomes of protection applicants 
and refugees in Ireland as this is not currently possible, a point that has been raised 
in a number of previous Monitoring reports (Barrett et al., 2017; McGinnity et al., 
2018). 
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In terms of ethnic discrimination, the establishment of a new anti-racism 
committee with the task of developing an anti-racism strategy is a positive 
development. Specific measures to combat racism and discrimination may be 
required (IHREC, 2019), potentially as part of a new Migrant Integration Strategy.  
 
A more general issue is recognition of foreign qualifications. Arnold et al. (2019a) 
highlighted that the recognition of non-EU nationals’ qualifications is a challenge 
to implementing labour market integration policies. Stakeholders in this study 
called for further efforts from Irish professional bodies, and increased promotion 
of Quality and Qualifications Ireland, as part of Action 43 (ibid.). In some instances, 
where qualification requirements in Ireland for a given profession differ from those 
in other countries, re-training or bridging programmes may be required. For 
example, Marino Institute of Education has initiated a bridging programme for 
foreign-qualified teachers to engage more migrant teaches into the teaching 
profession (see Box 3.1).  
 
Chapter 4 also documents falling poverty rates in Ireland, particularly among the 
non-Irish population. However, while rates of income poverty have fallen, they are 
still high for the non-EU population. Deprivation and consistent poverty among the 
non-EU group have fallen further than income poverty since the 2018 Monitor, 
though in the 2017-2018 period consistent poverty among non-EU nationals (at 
11.6 per cent) was still higher than that of the Irish population (6.2 per cent). 
(Consistent poverty measures those who are income poor and deprived on two or 
more items). Some of this disadvantage is accounted for by the high proportion of 
students in the non-EU group. In addition, previous research in Ireland has shown 
clearly the link between low employment rates and income poverty and 
deprivation for working-age adults and children (Watson et al., 2012). This suggests 
that consistent poverty might be high among the African group, but further 
detailed research on African migrants would allow us to investigate their outcomes 
in more depth and point at some potential policy responses. The shift in 
composition away from Africans towards Asians and ‘Rest of the World’ (see 
Table A1.1) between 2016 and 2017/2018 may also explain the fall in consistent 
poverty for non-EU nationals. Unfortunately, the SILC data used for the analysis of 
poverty and deprivation in Ireland contain very small numbers in the African group, 
and other non-EU groups, that do not permit them to be identified separately. 
 
Learning the host country language is the key skill for facilitating integration (OECD, 
2020). English language skills and labour market outcomes are not included in this 
report as they are not available in the ongoing Labour Force Survey. However, 
McGinnity et al. (2020), using census microdata, find that migrants with better self-
reported English language skills are more likely to be employed, and when they are 
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employed to have a better job. This is hardly surprising but set against a backdrop 
of uncoordinated policy/lack of awareness of measures that do exist, it does 
suggest that this requires more policy effort. This lack of a coordinated approach 
to English language provision for adult learners in Ireland has been raised as a 
policy issue in Monitoring Reports on Integration since 2012 (McGinnity et al., 
2012). It is also recognised as being a policy priority in the Migrant Integration 
Strategy going forward (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019a), but 
implementing and coordinating this may prove difficult. A shift to online 
(e-learning) for adult learning, particularly of language skills, potentially offering 
classes via Zoom or an online platform may offer potential in Ireland: this is already 
happening in some other OECD countries (OECD, 2020).  
 
Housing and homelessness are not identified as issues in the Migrant Integration 
Strategy. Yet findings from this Integration Monitor suggest that migrants 
(Chapter 4) are much more likely to be in private rented accommodation than Irish 
nationals, which is a potential problem in the current housing market, where 
private renting is often linked to high and fluctuating rents and insecurity of 
housing tenure. The current housing problem is particularly acute in cities, where 
around half of migrants live (Fahey et al., 2019b). A study of housing discrimination 
finds non-EU nationals to be at greater risk of overcrowding compared to others 
on the same income and with the same characteristics (Grotti et al., 2018). These 
authors also find higher rates of homelessness among African migrants than among 
the Irish population. This is consistent with a recent labour market experiment in 
the private rented market, which showed particularly high rates of discrimination 
among Africans seeking rented accommodation (Gusciute, 2019). Finding suitable 
and affordable accommodation is particularly challenging for those moving out of 
direct provision centres who have been granted international protection status. 
AIDA (2019) finds that 11 per cent of all residents of direct provision 
accommodation centres in Ireland have actually been granted protection status 
already but have yet to transition to independent living. Taken together these 
findings suggest any future Migrant Integration Strategy could and should usefully 
include a number of actions specifically on housing.  
 
One important finding in Chapter 3 is that the educational achievement of non-
Irish adults is similar to or even slightly better than Irish nationals. To answer the 
question of where the highest qualification was achieved, Chapter 3 compares 
educational qualifications for non-Irish adults who received their qualifications in 
Ireland (22 per cent) compared to those educated abroad (78 per cent). Generally, 
for EU and Asian nationals the proportion with third-level qualifications are similar, 
regardless of where their education was completed. The large ‘Rest of the World’ 
group (including Africa, the US, South America and non-EU Eastern Europe) 
educated in Ireland have lower rates of third-level education than nationals from 
this group educated abroad, and this may require further analysis with a larger 
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dataset. In the 2018 Monitor the rate of early school leaving among young East 
European adults was twice as high as the national average, though this rate has 
fallen since then and is no longer significantly different from the rate among Irish 
nationals, which itself was very low in 2018/2019 (less than 5 per cent of the age 
cohort).  
 
As so many non-Irish adults in Ireland were educated abroad, the performance of 
young people may give a better indication of how well the Irish education system 
is integrating migrants. The proportion of 15-year olds of migrant origin is now 
18 per cent in the 2018 PISA data, compared to 8 per cent reported in the first 
Integration Monitor (based on PISA 2006 data). Chapter 3 finds that, as before, 
there are gaps in reading proficiency between Irish students and both first- and 
second-generation children of migrant origin who do not speak English as their first 
language. Mathematics and Science scores did not differ between migrant-origin 
and Irish young people at age 15. 
 
The findings on English reading suggest maintaining language support for migrant 
students is very important. In order to plan effectively, policymakers need to know 
what proportion of students at primary and secondary level require English 
language tuition, what the budget requirement is and how effective English 
language tuition is (see Actions 29 and 33 in the Migrant Integration Strategy). To 
supplement PISA data more differentiation of education statistics would be very 
useful. Are there differences in achievement between Irish students and those 
from a migrant background in State examinations? This could potentially be 
achieved by merging data from the State Examinations Commission on results with 
the post-primary online database (P-POD) which contains data on nationality and 
mother tongue, with due consideration to data quality and data protection issues 
(Fahey et al., 2019a). Research could usefully build on the case study by Faas et al. 
(2019) on post-school transitions of students from a migrant background.  
 
Chapter 5 shows that although the annual naturalisation rate has now declined 
from the 2012 peak, there has been a rapid rise in the size of the naturalised 
population in the last decade. This is due to increased applications, as more 
migrants became eligible to apply, as well as improvements in the processing of 
applications. Just under 110,000 non-EEA nationals acquired Irish citizenship 
between 2005 and 2019, resulting in improved opportunities for integration. It is 
important to note that we cannot say for certain whether citizenship leads to 
improved integration outcomes or whether those who are more integrated tend 
to apply for citizenship. McGinnity et al. (2020) show that non-EEA migrants who 
are Irish citizens have better labour market outcomes than non-EEA migrants who 
are not. Recent years have also seen a rise in naturalisation of EEA migrants, from 
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5 per cent of those naturalised in 2012 to around 50 per cent in 2019, though the 
overall proportion of EEA migrants living in Ireland who became Irish citizens is low.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy 2017-2020 aims to ensure all migrants can 
actively participate in Irish communities, workplaces and politics. While the 
Strategy Progress Report showed positive developments in some areas, others are 
slower to progress. Action 12 states that the introduction of both civics and 
language tests for those seeking citizenship will be examined. Groarke et al. 
(forthcoming) will explore international practices in this regard. Actions to 
introduce the registration of non-EEA migrant children and a statutory long-term 
residency scheme are among those facing ‘major difficulties’ (Department of 
Justice and Equality, 2019a). These delays underscore the importance of a timely 
follow-up strategy, and the importance of prioritising these issues.  
 
Given generous voting rights, the political participation of migrants in Ireland is, in 
principle, favourable. Actions under the Migrant Integration Strategy designed to 
increase political participation, for example encouraging migrants to register to 
vote and become involved in politics, have been progressed by both a range of 
events and improved dissemination of information (Department of Justice and 
Equality, 2019a). The research presented in Chapter 5 highlights that although 
there were significant increases in migrant involvement in local elections between 
2014 and 2019, much remains to be done. Migrants are much less engaged with 
politics than the native population and were substantially under-represented 
among voters, candidates and councillors in the recent local government elections. 
The recurrent topic in the analyses of political engagement is the importance of 
knowledge and experiences which go beyond politics – local involvement and 
activity in non-political bodies such as sports clubs.  
 
Many studies have stressed that integration takes place at local level and 
understanding neighbourhoods and their composition plays an important role 
(Casey, 2016; OECD, 2018c). A recent investigation of how migrant groups are 
distributed across neighbourhoods in Ireland using census data showed that in 
general migrants are not heavily concentrated in particular areas in Ireland, though 
migrants are much more likely to live in urban areas (Fahey et al., 2019b). In 
general, migrants are not more concentrated in disadvantaged areas, with the 
exception of those with poor English language skills (ibid.). That said, the 
characteristics of migrants, and the communities they live in, certainly differ across 
the country (Fahey et al., 2019b). The role of integration at local level is 
acknowledged in the Migrant Integration Strategy as an area where efforts need 
to intensify (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019a). OECD (2018c) recognises 
that it can be difficult to integrate local integration policy and practice with 
national-level policy, while recognising that different local areas will have different 
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needs. Consultation with local authorities in devising local-level initiatives and 
targets for the follow-up to the Migrant Integration Strategy might be one way of 
helping to address this issue. Forging links between community and voluntary 
sector initiatives, education centres and local businesses with local government 
efforts may also be promising here. At both national and local level, it is important 
to keep in mind that integrating migrants is not simply a task for government, 
either at national or local level, but of employers, schools, communities, sports and 
social clubs. As OECD (2020) argues, integration requires a ‘whole of society 
approach’.  
 
The Migrant Integration Strategy in early 2017 showed a renewed commitment to 
integration policy, though as noted in the interim review, some actions were more 
successful than others (Department of Justice and Equality, 2019a). Of course, as 
noted by the interim review, with a mainstreamed approach to integration in 
Ireland, implementing the strategy is not just the responsibility of the Department 
responsible for Integration and Equality (formerly the Department of Justice and 
Equality), but of all relevant government departments and agencies who interact 
with migrants, including Local Authorities. The policy gaps and areas of concern 
highlighted here underscore the importance of renewing the Migrant Integration 
Strategy to keep up the momentum built by the current one. The COVID-19 
pandemic and associated job losses may prove even more challenging for migrants 
than others, and it is particularly important then that their needs are kept in focus 
by the new government. Enright et al. (2020) considers the early impact of the 
pandemic and associated restrictions on work and life in Ireland, particularly in the 
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Appendix 1 
Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration 
Policy in the European Union 
1.  Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all 
immigrants and residents of Member States.  
2.  Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union.  
3.  Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the 
participation of immigrants, to the contributions immigrants make to the host 
society, and to making such contributions visible.  
4.  Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions is 
indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants to acquire this basic 
knowledge is essential to successful integration.  
5.  Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and particularly their 
descendants, to be more successful and more active participants in society.  
6.  Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and private goods and 
services, on a basis equal to national citizens and in a non-discriminatory way 
is a critical foundation for better integration.  
7.  Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State citizens is a 
fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared forums, inter-cultural 
dialogue, education about immigrants and immigrant cultures, and stimulating 
living conditions in urban environments enhance the interactions between 
immigrants and Member State citizens.  
8.  The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed under the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded unless practices conflict with 
other inviolable European rights or with national law.  
9.  The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the 
formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, 
supports their integration.  
10.  Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant policy 
portfolios and levels of government and public services is an important 
consideration in public policy formation and implementation.  
11.  Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms are necessary to 
adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration and to make the exchange of 
information more effective. 
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Appendix 2 
Definition of Indicators 
Indicator Definition Data Source 
1. Employment 





Proportion of labour force (employed plus 









Proportion of employed population who are self-
employed (that is working in his or her own business, 
professional practice or farm for the purpose of 






Share of population aged 15 to 64 with third-level, 
Post-Leaving Certificate, upper secondary and no 
formal/lower secondary education. 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 









Share of migrants and Irish nationals who were 
educated in Ireland and educated abroad 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 
Share of migrants 
and Irish nationals 
educated in Ireland 
or abroad with 
third-level 
education* 
Share of migrants and Irish nationals educated in 
Ireland or abroad with third-level education 
Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) 




Share of population aged 20 to 24 with no more than 






olds in reading and 
Mathematics and 
Science*  
Mean achievement scores in English reading, 
Mathematics and Science at age 15 by English 
language ability and generational status 
PISA 2018 
3. Social inclusion 
Median net income 
Median net income – median net (household and 
equivalised) income of the immigrant population and 
the Irish population. 
EU-SILC 
At risk of poverty 
rate 
At risk of poverty rate – share of population with net 
disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national 
median.  
EU-SILC  
  Contd. 




Indicator Definition Data Source 
Consistent poverty 
rates 
Proportion of population both (1) at risk of 
poverty and (2) living in households that lack two 
or more basic items such as food, clothing or 
heat. 
EU-SILC  
Share of population 
perceiving their 
health status as 
good or very good 
Share of population aged 16+ perceiving their 
health status as good or very good. EU-SILC  




and the total 
population 
Percentage of property owners, private renters 
and local authority renters among immigrant and 
Irish household respondents.  
EU-SILC  






Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant 
population who have acquired citizenship (best 
estimate). 







Share of estimated non-EEA immigrant 
population granted long-term residence (best 
estimate). 






Share of immigrants among elected local 
representatives. 
Immigrant Council of 
Ireland 
 
Notes: Employment and unemployment are defined in this table and elsewhere in this report using the standard International Labour 
Organization’s (ILO) definitions. People are defined as employed if they have worked for pay in the week preceding the survey 
interview for one hour or more, or who were not at work due to temporary absence (i.e. sickness or training). Unemployed 
persons are those who did not work in the week preceding the interview but were available to start work in the next two weeks 
and had actively sought work in the previous four weeks. ILO unemployment estimates differ from both the Live Register of 
unemployment and from the individual’s own self-assignment of his or her principal economic status. * indicates where 
definitions of the indicators differ slightly from those proposed at Zaragoza, based on data constraints. Share of 25- to 34-year-
olds with third-level educational attainment instead of the share of 30- to 34-year-olds with third-level educational 
achievement; share of early leavers from education and training aged 20 to 24 instead of 18 to 24; mean achievement scores 
for 15-year-olds in reading and Mathematics instead of the proportion of 15-year-olds achieving Level 1 or under in the PISA 
assessment tests. 
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Appendix 3 
CSO Statistical Disclosure Rules 
This appendix provides a brief discussion of the rules by the Central Statistics Office 
regarding statistical disclosure and cell counts. These rules apply to both the LFS 
and SILC results presented in this Monitor. 
 
In order to produce reliable statistics and prevent disclosure, the CSO recommends 
not to publish any cell results based on less than 30 cases, in cases such as these 
the result is replaced with two asterisks (**). In cells where the result is based on 
30 to 49 cases, LFS results are presented with parentheses ([ ]) as they are 
‘considered to have a wider margin of error and should be treated with caution’.126 
 
There are two types of statistical disclosure referenced by the CSO, primary 
disclosure and secondary disclosure. Primary disclosure is ‘when an unsafe cell is 
published’ for example, a cell which has less than 30 cases. To prevent primary 
disclosure, we remove unsafe cells and replace with two asterisks as mentioned 
above. Secondary disclosure is when ‘an unsafe cell is removed but its value can be 
deduced from the aggregate totals and non-suppressed values’. In order to prevent 





                                                            
 
126  Central Statistics Office (n.d.). Labour Force Survey (LFS) Guidelines. https://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/aboutus-
new/dataforresearchers/Instructions_on_the_use_of_LFS_data_for_Researchers.pdf [Accessed 29 June 2020]. 
127  Linehan, T. and K. Dineen (n.d.). CSO Best Practice for Statistical Disclosure Control of Tabular Data. 
https://www.cso.ie/en/aboutus/lgdp/csodatapolicies/dataforresearchers/resourcesforresearchers/ [Accessed 29 
June 2020]. 
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Appendix 4 
Country of Birth by Nationality 
TABLE A4.A COUNTRY OF BIRTH BY NATIONALITY, 2016 CENSUS 
 
Source: 2016 Census. 
Notes: Own calculations from Census microdata. Includes all individuals resident in Ireland in April 2016. N= 96,611 missing cases for 
country of birth and/or nationality are excluded. Irish nationals includes Irish citizens with dual nationality, where one of these 
is Irish.  
 
TABLE A4.B COUNTRY OF BIRTH BY NATIONALITY, AGED 15 OR OVER, 2016 CENSUS 
 
Source: 2016 Census. 
Notes: Own calculations from Census microdata. Analysis restricted to those aged 15 or over. N= 65,763 missing cases for country of birth 
and/or nationality are excluded from the analysis. Irish nationals includes Irish citizens with dual nationality, where one of these 
is Irish.  
 
 Non-Irish Irish Total 
Country of Birth % Count % Count % Count 
Ireland 1.0 39,416 99.0 3,781,921 100 3,821,337 
EEA 66.7 401,983 33.3 200,561 100 602,544 
Non-EEA 54.6 131,681 45.4 109,387 100 241,068 
Total 12.3 573,080 87.7 4,091,869 100 4,664,949 
 Non-Irish Irish Total 
Country of Birth % Count % Count % Count 
Ireland 0.6 15,755 99.4 2,652,659 100 2,668,414 
EEA 67.2 349,810 32.8 170,582 100 520,392 
Non-EEA 57.5 113,699 42.5 84,049 100 197,748 
Total 14.2 479,264 85.8 2,907,290 100 3,386,554 
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